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Abstract
NATURALISAI, NORMATIVITY 
AND THE ‘OPEN QUESTION’ 
ARGUMENT
by Andrew David Fisher
The ‘open question’ argument, as it has come to be known, was 
popularized by G. E, Moore. However, it is universally recognized tliat liis 
presentation of it is unconvincing, as it is based on dubious metaphysics, 
semantics and epistemology. Yet, philosophers have not confined the 
argument to the liistory books, and it continues to influence and shape 
modem meta-ethics. This thesis asks why this is the case, and whether such 
an influence is justified. It focuses on tliree main positions, analytic 
naturalism, non-analytic naturalism and supernaturaUsm. It concludes that 
the ‘open question’ argument challenges all tliree.
*OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT'
(I) Moore's Open Question Argument
(II) Three Modem Versions of the OQA
(III) Moral Motivation and the OQA
(IV) The OQA and Rationalism
(V) Non-Analytic Naturalism and the OQA (I)
(VI) Non-Analytic Naturalism and the OQA (II)
(VII) Robert Adams' Supernaturalism and the OQA
(VIII) Dispositional Accounts of Meaning and the OQA
(IX) Conclusion and Suggestion.
INTRODUCTION
G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica is bold. It argues that the majority of moral philosophy 
that predates 1903 has a problem, namely, that it rests on the false belief that ‘good’ is 
definable.^ ‘Good’, Moore argues, is simple, non-natural and indefinable. His confidence in such 
a radical claim arises from a deceptively simple line of thinking. If we consider a definition of 
‘good’, maldng it as complicated or as simple as we want, and if we ask ourselves whether the 
definition is correct, we should, if the definition is correct, find such questions trivial and 
uninteresting. However, this is not what we find. In fact, when considering the truth of such a 
definition we recognise that there is a veiy real chance that we may be wrong and that 
questioning the truth of our proposal is, as such, non-trivial and interesting. Moore argues that 
the same is time for every proposed definition of ‘good’ and that consequently ‘good’ is 
indefinable. This way of proceeding has come to be known as the ‘open question’ argument and 
is the focus of my thesis. Essentially, I set out to ascertain why philosophers find such an 
argument intuitively compelling, and whether they are right to do so.
I argue that Moore’s ‘open question’ argument is based on dubious epistemology and 
metaphysics, is circular and relies on the false premise that property identity requires synonymy. 
This makes the topic of this thesis even more pressing. Given that such claims are typically 
accepted, why does the ‘open question’ argument continue to be so influential? I think that an 
answer to this is only forthcoming if we resist the urge to search for an argument and concede 
that, at best, Moore presents a challenge to certain accounts. Then we should ask what is the 
challenge? And what accounts are challenged?
’ Moore (1993).
I start my thesis from Moore’s writings. Then, after considering a number of modern 
versions of the ‘open question’ argument, I spend two chapters attempting to develop a number 
of open question challenges to analytic naturalism. These rely on two central ideas. First that 
there is a connection between moral judgment and motivation and second that there is a 
connection between moral judgement and practical reason.
I argue in chapters V, VI and VII that contraiy to popular thinking the ‘open question’ 
argument also challenges non-analytic naturalism. There are two general challenges that I find. 
One starts from the fact that the naturalist relies on certain normative claims to characterise his 
account. The other relies on the difference in our referential intentions with moral and natural 
terms. As such, I conclude that Moore was indeed ‘on to something’ and that a moral account 
should respond to these open question challenges. I suggest that the correct position to adopt in 
light of my conclusions is what I label ‘ethical nominalism’.
MOORE'S OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT
At least two things are true of George Edward Moore’s Principia Ethica^ First, it has 
been unquestionably influential, changing the way philosophers study ethics/ Second, it is 
undoubtedly unclear. Both of these claims will become evident in this chapter, which I split into 
three sections. §1 gives an overview of Moore’s main aims whilst avoiding expository debates. 
§2 does engage, in part, in such debates when reconstructing two versions of the ‘open question’ 
argument; §3 draws some conclusions.
§1 Moore’s 'Open Question’ Argument.
Moore wrote that the most fundamental question in all ethics concerns how ‘good’ is to be 
defined."  ^He claims that without an adequate answer to this question, the rest of ethics is ‘as 
good as useless from the point of view of systematic loiowledge’.^  He concludes that ‘good’ is 
indefinable and that, in failing to recognise this, the majority of philosophers commit the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’.*^ He argues that a form of argument generally known as the ‘open question’ 
argument (OQA) demonstrates this. I develop these points below; however, before doing so, it 
is necessary to make some background comments concerning Moore’s use of ‘meaning’ and 
‘definition’.
2 Moore (1993).
3 Danvall, Gibbard and Railton (1992) take it as tlie starting point for tlieir survey of modern meta-etliics. Baldwin (1990: 
66) writes: ... British etliical tlieoi)' is miintelligible without reference to PE... {Principia Ethica].
4 Moore (1993: 57).
5 Moore (1993: 57).
6 As such he writes tliat tire fallacy: ‘... is to be met with in almost ever)' book on Etliics; and yet it is not recognised... ’ 
Moore (1993; 65-66).
5Given Moore’s view that this is the most fundamental question in all ethics, one would 
expect him to have a clear and distinct account o f ‘definition’, ‘meaning’ and ‘analysis’ -  he has 
none. His use of all three terms is vague and ambiguous.^ In light of this, the aim of this section 
is to give a ‘feel’ for Moore’s overall project rather than attempting to connect a number of his 
conflicting and unrelated ideas.
Moore holds a concept/proposition theory of meaning. Simply put, the meaning of a 
predicate is the concept it stands for, and the meaning of a sentence is the proposition it denotes. 
However, even though this is the main theoiy within Principia Ethica, Moore sometimes writes 
as if he were committed to an object theoiy of meaning which holds tliat the meaning of an 
expression is the object for which it stands. Consider when he discusses what it is to define 
‘horse’. Here, he writes as if this requires dividing the object horse into its parts; for example, its 
liver, head etc.^ He also talks about the impossibility of dividing the object good into parts. Both 
of these ways of talking invite us to interpret Moore as holding that the meaning of an 
expression is the object it names. However, we can avoid some of this confusion concerning his 
account of meaning by noting that when he talks of the object referred to by ‘good’ or ‘horse’ he 
means object of thought, which he takes to be a concept.^ Once this is recognised, other 
passages in Principia Ethica become clearer. For instance when Moore writes about the
7 For example, in tlie opening section o£Pi'incipia Ethica, he comments tliat tlie meaning o f ‘good’ is tlie object or idea" for 
which the word stands. Moore (1993 ; 58).
8 ‘We may mean tliat a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: tliat it has four legs, a head, 
a heart, a liver etc...’ Moore (1993: 60). Emphasis mine. This passage has always puzzled me as it invites questions 
concerning which parts are required before we are tliiiiking about the whole horse. Moore, for instance, cites tlie horse’s liver. 
In that case, do we need a horse’s molecules, blood, stomach, etc? I touch on a related issue in tlie next section where I 
discuss tlie picture tlieoiy of ideas. However, more immediately, we can avoid some of these confusions if we note tliat 
Moore use o f ‘object’ is ambiguous, and hence we can read tlie previous quotation as referring to the concept of horse. See 
the discussion below.
9 Although this is not explicitly hi Moore (1993), we can see this view being refined m Moore (1927).
definition of the term ‘chimera’, reading him as claiming that its meaning is the object of 
thought that it denotes allows us to understand how he can talk about the temis meaning whilst 
acknowledging that chimera’s are fictions. We can make some further remarks concerning 
Moore’s concept account of meaning.
Moore makes it clear that concepts are not psychological. For instance, he writes:
...concepts are possible objects of thought; but that is no definition of them. It merely 
states that they may come into relation with a thinker; and in order that they may do 
anything, they must be something. It is indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks 
them or not.^^
And, Moore’s view is that:
Apprehension of the meaning of one sentence with one meaning, differs in some respect
from the apprehension of another sentence with a different meaning. 11
Since
Each act of apprehension is alike in respect of the fact that it is an act of apprehension, 
and an act of apprehension of the same kind [they can only] differ in that whereas one is
10 Cited in White (1958: 48).
'11 Moore (1953: 57).
the apprehension of one proposition, the other is the apprehension of a different 
proposition. Each proposition, therefore, can and must be distinguished both from the 
other proposition, and also from the act which is the apprehending of it.^ ^
Thus, for Moore, the meaning of a sentence is the proposition for which it stands, and the 
meaning of a predicate is the concept for which it stands. It is this account of meaning which 
helps us understand what Moore means by ‘definition’ and ‘analysis’ and, ultimately, the OQA.
Throughout Principia Ethica, Moore talks about analysing ‘good’. To understand this we 
need to ascertain what it is that he thinks we are analysing when we analyse. We can certainly 
ascertain that he does not mean. He says explicitly in Principia Ethica that by analysis he will 
not mean the consideration of verbal expressions, as this should be the concern of the 
lexicographer and not the philosopher.^^ Furthermore, in various places Moore describes the 
analysandum as various kinds of entities, such as relations, properties, facts, and also physical 
objects.However, Alan White writes:
Above all, [Moore] speaks of the analysis of what might be grouped as ‘mental’, or 
‘psychological’, entities; for in one place or another the role of analysandum is filled by 
volitions... sensations... ways of knowing... a state of desire... Where the entities to be
12 Moore (1953:58)
13 Moore (1993: 58)
14 See Moore (1927: 171), (1953: 276,265) and (1993: 59)
analysed are not, in an ordinaiy sense, mental or psychological, he nevertheless links
them to the psychological. 15
However, in Principia Ethica Moore most frequently talks about what is being analysed as a 
concept or a proposition. Moreover, given his account of meaning, when Moore writes about the 
analysis of ‘good’ he writes about analysing the meaning of ‘good’. It follows then that when 
Moore discusses ‘meaning’ he is not interested in the proper usage as established by custom but;
...solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is 
generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or 
idea...
Hence, there is a fiirther ambiguity in the notion of meaning in Moore’s writing. In one reading, 
‘meaning’ concerns proper usage as established by custom, in the other it concerns the concept 
or proposition for which an expression stands. However, we should read Moore in terms of the 
second meaning as this fits best with his account of the OQA.
According to Moore, ‘good’ has no definition. However, by definition he means -  at least 
when he first introduces the topic -  the process of dividing the concept of proposition that an 
expression names. What does this mean? Moore claims that it amounts to substituting the
15 White (1958: 51).
16 Moore (1993: 58), Emphasis added. NB. This causes ftirther conllision. when reading Moore: whereas it makes sense to 
say a predicate is indefinable, it makes little sense to claim that tire denoted object/idea is indefinable.
concept under consideration for other concepts/^ Thus, the process of defining ‘chimeara’ 
would involve substituting the concept it denotes for other concepts: for example, the concept of 
a lioness, a snake, etc.
A term is then indefinable if one cannot substitute the concept it denotes for others. As 
such, Moore thinks that the ultimate end of all definition is a set of ‘simple’ concepts; concepts 
that are not complex and hence are ones that we cannot replace with others. He argues that good 
is part of such a set:
I say that [good] is not composed of any parts, which we can substitute for it in our minds 
when we are thinking of it. We might think just as clearly and correctly about a horse, if 
we thought of all its paits and their arrangement instead of thinking of the whole... but 
there is nothing whatsoever which we could so substitute for good; and that is what I 
mean, when 1 say that good is indefinable.^^
However, Moore does not claim the things we call ‘good’ are indefinable. Hence, he writes that 
‘that which is good’ is d e fin ab le .It is the concept named by ‘good’ itself that we cannot 
substitute. However, it is unclear what Moore meant by a concept that cannot be substituted and 
unfortunately, I suggest that to gain a fuller understanding of what he did mean we need to make
17 See my discussion in tlie next section.
18 Moore (1993: 60).
19 Moors (1993:61).
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explicit another account of definition present in Principia Ethica: the inspection method/^ 
Perhaps the best way to try to understand what he means is to consider an example.
Moore considers the colour yellow, which he thinks is also simple and indefinable.^^ 
Essentially, he claims that due to the phenomenological qualities of yellow, one cannot 
substitute what we experience when we experience something as yellow in our thinking. He 
writes;
... light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we 
perceive. Indeed we should never have been able to discover their existence, unless we 
had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colours. The 
most we can be entitled to say of those vibrations is that they are what corresponds in 
space to the yellow which we actually perceive.^^
The key to understanding this (one Moore makes explicit) is that by ‘yellow’ we mean 
what we can call a phenomenal property. It is in these terms that we can reasonably hold, as 
Moore does, that yellow has no parts. However, even though Moore makes this point about 
yellow, he does not explain what he means by a phenomenal property. He thinks good is 
indefinable for phenomenological reasons; via inspection of the concept denoted by ‘good’ we 
see that we cannot substitute good for any other concept. This still is far from clear and I discuss 
it in more detail in the next section. The main point is that there seem to be two interrelated
20 Moore does not make tlie distinction between division and inspection explicit,
21 He also gives the example of pleasure. Moore (1993: 64-65).
22 Moore (1993: 62).
II
daims made by Moore in the opening chapter of Principia Ethica. First, to define something we 
need to divide what it names; the second is that to define something we need to inspect what it 
names. Furthermore, he claims that ‘good’ is indefinable either way.
From his characterisation of simple ideas, Moore recognises a potential ‘naturalistic 
fa lla c y A ssu m e  ‘A’ (for instance, ‘yellow’) is indefinable; however, because it is always 
instantiated with B (for instance, light-vibrations), we mistakenly think that ‘A’ can be defined 
in terms of B.^ '* Moore argues that ethics is particularly prone to this fallacy as it is concerned 
with those properties instantiated with good. For example, when investigating the good we may 
note that those things called ‘good’ are also pleasurable. This may lead to the definition of 
‘good’ in terms of pleasure, which would be a mistake. Moore’s stated aim in Principia Ethica 
is to demonstrate that most moral philosophers have committed such a fallacy As Moore 
writes;
... too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties [the 
ones instantiated with good] they were actually defining good; that these properties, in 
fact, were simply not ‘other’ but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This 
view I propose to call the ‘naturalistic fallacy’... ^
23 There are a number of ways of interpreting the fallacy. I discuss this below.
24 See, for example, Moore (1993: 68).
25 These philosophers include: Jeremy Bentliam (pg. 70), Herbert Spencer (pg. 102), Immanuel Kant (pg. 178), John Stuart 
Mill (pg. 118), Stoics (pg. 165).
26 Moore (1993: 62). Put simply, the fallacy is mistakenly tliinking constant conjunction is tlie same as identity.
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Moore argues that good cannot be complex or meaningless, and therefore must be simple/^ He 
argues that by a ‘simple appeal to facts’ he can demonstrate that to think otherwise is to commit 
a fallacy. I will now consider this argument
Moore states that ‘good’ could not stand for a complex idea because:
...it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is 
itself good.^^
This is Moore’s first presentation of the OQA.^  ^To elucidate these ideas Moore considers the 
definition of ‘horse’. Consider ‘horse’, a noun which, as Moore claims, refers to a complex idea. 
He argues that we can think of ‘all the parts of a horse and their arrangements instead of 
thinking of a w hole .Im ag ine  thinking about a horse’s head on a horse’s neck, covered with a 
horse’s mane, joined to a horse’s body with four horse legs, etc. Now, hold all these parts in 
mind. Could this be anything other than the concept of a horse? Moore thought that the answer 
was, obviously not; and that in such an instance, to ask whether what we are thinking about is a 
horse is an insignificant and ‘closed’ question. Moore claims that the same is true of any 
complex concept. That is, consider all the parts of a complex concept held ‘before the mind’ and 
it will be a ‘closed’ question as to whether what we are presented with is the original concept.
27 Moore (1993: 67).
28 Moore (1993: 67).
29 Moore gives a number of presentations of the OQA. 1 discuss tliese below.
30 Moore (1993: 60). Emphasis added.
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Consider the definition of ‘good’ as that which we desire to desire, then substitute the 
object of your thought for this second-order d e s ire .I f  ‘good’ does refer to a complex concept it 
ought to be obvious to us that to have the desire as the object of our thought is to have good as 
the object of our thought. However, Moore claims that it is not obvious; in his words, one can 
always ask with significance whether the complex (in this case the second-order desire) is itself 
good. This, he claims, is true for all proposed definitions of good, and therefore good cannot be 
a complex concept. The analyst o f ‘good’ should;
... attentively consider with himself what is actually before his mind [in the hope that if] 
he will try this experiment with each suggested definition in succession, he may become 
expert enough to recognise that in every case he has before his mind a unique object...
Hence, this version of the OQA is not merely the claim that if good is not identical to some other 
property, say v, then it would be fallacious to identify good and x. What he attempts to do here is 
give a positive reason to conclude that good could not be identified with a property it is not. This 
is why this account differs form the version of the OQA which I label as trivially true below.
Moore claims there are only three options: ‘good’ denotes nothing and hence is 
meaningless, ‘good’ denotes a simple concept, or ‘good’ denotes a complex proposition/concept 
and hence is definable. Given his OQA has shown that the last option is unavailable, he 
concludes that ‘good’ must be either meaningless or denote a simple concept. However, he
31 Moore (1993: 67) discusses this definition.
32 Moore (1993: 68) Notice that this shifts tlie focus from division to inspection.
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daims that it is prima facie implausible that ‘good’ is meaningless. For example, he points out 
that people talk about things being ‘good’ and are understood, and that we can communicate 
meaningfully with the term. Moreover, and this is where the ‘inspection’ account of analysis 
plays a role again, he claims that if we consider ‘good’ a concept is ‘brought before our mind’. 
And given that the meaning of an expression is the concept/proposition it expresses, ‘good’ must 
therefore have a meaning.^^ Thus, Moore is left to conclude that ‘good’, must denote a simple 
idea. Using the OQA Moore has demonstrated that to define ‘good’ is to commit a fallacy.
Notice, though, that Moore has not demonstrated anything about the ontological status of 
good. The OQA demonstrates that ‘good’ must denote a simple object of thought, but is silent 
on the nature of the object. If it makes sense to talk about a simple natural object of thought, and 
Moore thinks it does, then good may be a natural object. '^  ^Hence, he needs another version of 
the OQA to link the discussion of the naturalistic fallacy to the ontological claims central to 
Principia Ethica, something of which Moore is apparently unaware. Consider this quotation;
In this argument the naturalistic fallacy is plainly involved. That fallacy, I explained, 
consists in the contention that good means nothing but some simple or complex notion, 
that can be defined in terms o ïnatural qualities.^^
33 See specifically, Moore (1993; 68).
34 Moore claims that yellow and pleasure are botli natural and simple.
35 Moore (1993; 125). Emphasis added.
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Evidently, Moore thought he had demonstrated in Principia Ethica that the naturalistic fallacy 
shows that good cannot be defined in terms of ‘natural’ properties. But he does not; at best, he 
only shows that ‘good’ denotes a simple concept.
However, he makes things even more complicated by inadvertently encouraging another 
reading of the naturalistic fallacy. He writes that the fallacy is committed if we identify good 
with something that it is not, for example, if we were to identify good with that which we desire 
to desire when it is in fact not that which we desire to desire^^ I do not discuss this version, as it 
seems to me to be trivially true. There is obviously something wrong with an account which 
asserts that something is something which it is not.
In the next section I give a more detailed analyses of Moore’s OQA, and I suggest that if 
successful it will demonstrate that ‘good’ is indefinable, but that it remains silent on the 
ontological status of good.
§2 Moore’s OQA.
Moore’s presentation of the OQA is confusing. Furthermore, the OQA is not an argument; it has 
no recognisable premises and conclusion. Thus, I suggest it is best thought of as a challenge.
Recall that the OQA is Moore’s way of showing that: (I) ‘good’ is indefinable; (II) good 
is a non-natural object; (HI) good cannot be anything other than what it is.^  ^As stated above, I 
do not discuss (III).
36 For example, see Moore (1993: 109).
37 It is interesting that even tliough this reading is implicit and rarely discussed by Moore, it fits best witli his ‘epigraph’ for 
Principia Eihica-, that is, Bishop Butler’s claim that ‘Everything is what it is and not another thing’.
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One might reasonably assume that (II) would be the focus of Moore’s OQA. After all, his 
ontological position forms a central theme in Principia Ethica. However, Moore’s aim is to 
demonstrate (I). Thus, even if the OQA is successful, it does not secure (II). Let us consider the 
argument for (I) in more detail.
Moore writes that:
It may indeed be true that what we desire to desire is always also good; perhaps, even the 
converse may be true: but it is veiy doubtful whether this is the case, and the mere fact 
that we tmderstand very well MEat is meant by dcmbting it, shows clearly that we have 
two different notions before our minds.
However, one may wonder why this demonstrates anything. Why is being able to doubt a 
proposition about good significant? The answer lies in Moore’s account of analysis. He argues 
that all propositions about good are synthetic.However, why think that this is true and, more 
importantly, that it is relevant?
Moore argues that if someone understands a paradigmatic analytic proposition, then he or 
she cannot significantly question it. For example, consider: ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man of 
marriageable age’. Given that we understand the meaning o f‘bachelor’, questioning the truth of 
the proposition is not significant."*  ^ However, according to Moore it is always significant and 
nontrivial to question a proposition about the good. In his terms: ‘we understand very well what
38 Moore (1993; 68). Emphasis added.
39 Moore (1993: 58).
40 Of course, modem philosophy of language has shown that we can. For example, the question ‘is tlie Pope a bachelor?’ 
appears ‘open’. Nevertlieless, in lliis chapter - pace Quine - 1 assume that tlie analytic/syntlielio distinction is meaningM.
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is meant by doubting if/*  He concludes that all proposed propositions about the good must be 
synthetic."*^
However, as Moore later recognised, to accept this line of reasoning means his position 
leads to a ‘paradox of analysis’."*^ If he thinks that because one can doubt a proposition the 
conceptual analysis must be incorrect, he must also think that all correct conceptual analyses are 
obvious and hence uninformative. A way of trying to understand why Moore is committed to the 
paradoxical conclusion follows. Moore claims that to define a term was to substitute the object 
of thought it denotes with its components. However, to do this we must already know which 
parts form the whole. I glossed over this point when I outlined Moore’s account of the definition 
of ‘horse’. In such an analysis, we substitute the concept of horse for a horse’s head, a horse’s 
mane, a horse’s hooves, etc. However, for this ‘definition’ to be successful we must know two 
things: first, what a horse's head, a horse's mane, horse's hooves are, and so on. Second, we 
must Icnow when we have completed the substitution."*"* Arguably, then to give a satisfactoiy 
definition of ‘horse’ we must have complete prepositional knowledge concerning the meaning 
of ‘horse’. For it is only then that we could both know the parts we have are parts of the whole, 
and that they form a complete concept. Given the nature of prepositional knowledge, Moore is 
thus committed to the conclusion that all conceptual analysis must be obvious and
41 Moore (1993: 68).
42 Note though tliat at best tliis only invites the naturalist to provide a proposition about good tliat is analytic. That is, it does 
not establish that we could never find a proposition about good that we could not doubt. Thus, as stated this version of tlie 
OQA is best tliouglit of as a challenge, ratlier than an argument.
43 See Moore (1942).
44 We could put this in tenus of his ‘inspection’ account of definition: for us to see’ the concept more clearly, we have to 
already laiow what we are meant to be looking at, and for.
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uninformative. However, consider for example, Frege’s analysis of the concept of number."*  ^
This is an unobvious and informative conceptual analysis; thus, the paradox of analysis appears 
to be a reductio of Moore’s account of analysis.
A position concerning conceptual analysis could avoid the paradox if it recognised the 
difference between ‘knowledge how’ and ‘knowledge that’. A simple example of the difference 
is that even though I know how to ride my bicycle, I have no propositional knowledge that 
represents this ability. I could not, for instance, describe how the centripetal forces react to keep 
me balanced as I swing around a hairpin bend. In general terms, though, analysing ‘A’ requires 
grasping the meaning of ‘A’. This need not entail having complete propositional knowledge 
concerning ‘A’. Grasping its meaning may include knowing howto do various things with ‘A’. 
Hence, it could be a significant question to ask whether ‘A is B’, even if we know the meaning 
of ‘A’, because we may not know that ‘A is B ’. Therefore, it does not follow that from a 
proposition being analytic we could fail to know what it means to doubt it. So, by avoiding the 
paradox of analysis, Moore’s line of reasoning fails to justify his claim that all propositions 
about good are synthetic.
Consider Moore’s reasoning again. He argues that one can always ask significant and 
non-trivial questions concerning propositions about the good; hence, they all are synthetic. He 
also argues that property identity requires analyticity. So, if all propositions about good are 
synthetic, we cannot reduce the property good to another property. Now, the ‘paradox of 
analysis’ already shows the OQA cannot sustain that conclusion. But an important further point
45 It could be questioned whether what Frege provides is an analysis; however, most philosophers would count tins as an 
analysis, and so do I. Moore would, then, have to demonstr ate why he, holding the less popular position, was correct to deny 
that it was an analysis.
19
is that philosophers now generally accept that property identity does not require a priori 
meaning equivalence/^ Thus, even if Moore’s claim about analysis were correct, this version of 
the OQA would not establish that good is a simple non-natural property.
Even given the failure of this version of the OQA it has been hugely influential. For 
instance, Daiwall, Gibbard and Railton write:
However readily we now reject as antiquated his views in semantics and epistemology, it 
seems impossible to deny that Moore was on to something.47
Their suggestion is that it is ‘impossible to deny that Moore was onto something’ because 
people whom we judge to be psychologically and linguistically competent do find questions 
concerning naturalistic accounts open. Yet, if the best account of Moore’s OQA is as DGR state, 
then the philosopher attempting to define ‘good’ would most likely not be worried. After all, 
people are often confused, and so there is no reason to think that people’s linguistic intuitions 
reflect the tru th .H ence, for Moore’s OQA to be a genuine challenge we require an account to 
justify the claim that open question intuitions have evidential weight. I find two accounts in 
Principia Ethica.
The first uses Moore’s phenomenological claims. However, I judge that even though 
these are more plausible than they first appear, they still fail to justify the OQA as they require a
46 See, for example, Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980); I discuss tliis in chapters V and VI.
47 Darvvall, Gibbard and Railton (1992: 3).
48 Perhaps, though tlie naturalist camiot dismiss this approach so easily. I discuss tliis in the next tluee chapters.
49 Plowever, note that Moore’s OQA has now been reduced from an jirgument demonstrating tliat good must be a simple 
non-natural propert)', to a challenge against the proposal Üiat ‘good’ can be defined.
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coherent foundation in epistemology and connection to metaphysics that is absent in Principia 
Ethica.
Moore writes:
And if [one] will tiy this experiment [questioning a proposed definition of ‘good’] with 
each suggested definition in succession, he may become expert enough to recognise that 
in eveiy case he has before his mind a unique object...
And,
Whenever [one] thinks o f ‘intrinsic value,’ or ‘intrinsic worth,’ or says that a thing ‘ought 
to exist,’ he has before his mind the unique object -  the unique property of things -  which 
I mean by ‘good.’ *^
As stated, this suggests a phenomenological reading of the OQA. However, can we make sense 
of the claim that to think about good is to have a ‘unique object before our mind’? I argue below 
that we can if we ascribe to Moore a specific account of consciousness, an account which also 
lends plausibility to his intuitionism.
One way of attempting to understand what it is to have a ‘unique object before our mind’ 
is to consider Moore’s conception of analysis. The most frequent account of analysis in
50 Moore (1993 ; 68). Emphasis added.
51 Moore (1993: 68). Emphasis added. I discuss below the obvious worry that tliis is a definition of ‘good’.
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Principia Ethica daims that to analyse a term is to inspect the concept it stands for, and divide it 
into its parts. However, what this means is also unclear; perhaps a way of understanding it is as 
follows. To analyse a term, we bring before our mind the concept denoted by that term and we 
‘concentrate’ on it. We ‘focus’ our attention on it to try and ‘see’ it more clearly, and in so doing 
its composition is revealed to us.^  ^How should we make sense of this? Well, possibly this way 
of talking makes sense if we adopt a theory which holds that a concept is a picture : the concept 
of a horse is a picture of a horse, the concept of a house is a picture of a house, etc.
This seems to be a useful way of proceeding as, for example, we Imow what it is for 
something to be part of a picture that represents a horse. We may be presented with a photo of a 
friend’s horse, and we could circle the mane, cover up evei-ything except the head, cut out the 
torso, etc. We could physically isolate parts of the picture of the horse. When we are asked what 
parts make up a picture of a horse, we do not d own and shrug our shoulders: we Icnow how to 
answer.^^
Perhaps then if concepts are pictures we can apply the same reasoning to them. A concept 
is a concept of a horse because it pictures one, and if we concentrate on this concept, we can 
understand what a part of it would be. In effect, in our thoughts we can go through the same 
process as we would with the real picture. For example, we might bring the concept before our 
mind, and think of part of the picture of the horse disappearing, leaving say the head. Now, 
underlying the plausibility of this claim is the thought that just as pictures in tlie external world 
are made of colours, etc, so are our concepts, and that, as a result of this, we can inspect our
521 am well aware that (Iris language is highly metaphorical, but there seems to be no other way to account for Moore’s 
discussion of analysis by introspection; we will always have to talk in temrs of ‘seeing’ of the ‘mind’s eye’ etc.
53 For instance, we could describe to someone the parts of a picture of a horse, in order that he/she could draw it.
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concepts and also substitute the concepts for their components. Hence, I suggest that if we think 
of concepts as pictures, we can start to understand what Moore means by his inspection and 
division account of analysis. The suggestion, then, is that Moore’s phenomenological version of 
the OQA requires us to conceive of concepts as images in the mind.
Consider how this version of the OQA would run. In contrast to the concepts of houses 
and horses, it seems inappropriate to say that the concepts denoted by ‘good’, ‘yellow’ and 
‘pleasure’ are pictures of good, yellow and pleasure. This way of talking makes no sense - just 
consider being asked what parts make up ‘yellow’ or ‘good’; in this case, we would probably 
frown, shrug our shoulders, and be unable to answer. Hence, Moore would argue that when we 
bring good, yellow and pleasure before our mind we are presented with things that are unique, 
are simple, and indefinable. That is, we cannot inspect them in more detail to ascertain their 
parts and we cannot attempt to divide them into parts. Hence, although they are concepts, they 
are different in type from other concepts, such as the concept of a horse, a house, or a chimeara 
as they are not pictures. This then helps us start to comprehend Moore’s phenomenological 
version of the OQA,
However, there is one major problem with this account of the nature of concepts - it is 
false. In fact, I suggest that to think that the meaning of a term is the concept that it denotes, and 
that what a concept is is a picture representing something, is so clearly false that people have 
concluded that Moore’s phenomenological OQA is irrelevant and hopeless.
54 Hence, tj^ically articles on the OQA focus on meta-linguistic issues; for example. Ball (1991) and Kalderon 
(forthcoming).
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To summarize, I suggested that one natural way to understand Moore’s notion of analysis 
by division and inspection is to adopt an account of concepts as picture, t claimed that people do 
implicitly and explicitly ascribe such an account to Moore. And that consequently, because 
philosophers correctly see this view of the nature of concepts hopeless, they reject Moore’s 
phenomenological version of the OQA. However, in what follows, I show that Moore would not 
have accepted such an interpretation of his position.
It is interesting and informative to note that Moore states in the preface to the first edition 
of Principia Ethica that within Franz Brentano’s work he finds:
... opinions far more closely resembling my own, than those of any other ethical writer 
with whom I am acquainted.
Arguably, the most influential of Brentano’s opinions concerns intentions. Consider the 
following quotation from him:
Eveiy psychological phenomenon is characterised by... intentional inherent existence 
of... an object {by which we do not mean a reality')... In the idea something is conceived, 
in the judgement something is recognised or discovered, in loving loved, in hating hated, 
in desiring desired, and so on.^^
55 Moore (1993: 36). He cites speoilically Brentano’s (1969) Origin o f  the Knowledge o f  Right and Wrong.
56 Brentano (1973: 88). Emphasis added. A similar quotation can be found in Brentano (1969; 14),
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Brentano’s basic thought, then, is that all thinking is thinking about a real, or unreal, object. 1 
will call these objects intentional objects I suggest that for Moore also, to think about a horse 
is to think about an intentional object, to think about a chimera is to think about an intentional 
object, and importantly, to think about good is to think about an intentional object.
Of course, we could read this suggestion as neither clarifying nor accounting for 
anything. How does Imowing this advance our understanding of Moorean ‘analysis’, ‘definition’ 
and the OQA? That is, discussion of intentional objects is compatible with the previous 
unhelpful way of reading Moore’s phenomenological claims. For example, thinking about a 
horse may be both thinking about an intentional object and thinking about a picture precisely 
because the intentional object is a picture. However, I suggest below that Moore does not think 
about intentional objects in this way. Consequently, I argue that there is more reason to accept 
his phenomenological claims than this first reading suggests.
In the same year that he published Principia Ethica, Moore also published the influential 
paper ‘The Refutation of Idealism’. I  claim that ideas found in the latter can shed light on the 
former.^^ What interests me in ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ is Moore’s account of 
consciousness,^^ in which he claims that introspection never ‘presents us’ with consciousness. 
He argues that this is because consciousness is not a thing. This helps us make sense of the role 
of intentional objects in the phenomenological version of the OQA, or so I will argue. Consider 
Moore’s remarks on the nature of consciousness:
57 Hence, intentional objects can be real or imreal.
58 Moore (1903).
59 Baldwin (1990) certainly thinks tliis is true.
6 0 A similar account can be found in Brentano (1973) and Sartre (1956).
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... the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, 
it is, it seems to vanish; it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to 
introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it 
were diaphanous
It follows that if consciousness is not a thing then nothing could be in it. Specifically, it could 
not contain ideas conceived as pictures. Hence:
What I wish to point out is (1 ) that we have no reason for supposing that there are such 
things as mental images at all...
And:
To have in your mind ‘knowledge’ of blue, is not to have in your mind a ‘thing’ or 
‘image’ of which blue is the content. To be aware of the sensation of blue is not to be 
aware of a mental image -  of a ‘thing,’ of which ‘blue’ and some other element are 
constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue 
bead.^^
61 Moore (1903 ; 450). Emphasis added,
62 Moore (1903; 449).
63 Moore (1903 ; 449).
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Moore’s claims that there is no question of how we are to ‘get outside the circle of our own 
ideas and sensations as:
Merely to have a sensation is already to be outside that circle. It is to know something 
which is as truly and really not a part of my experience, as anything which I can ever 
know.*^ "^
I think then that we can reasonably reject the claim that Moore’s phenomenological 
account of the OQA demands construing concepts as images, and as such we cannot dismiss his 
OQA so easily. In fact it turns out that not only does ascribing to Moore (1993) this account of 
consciousness allows us to reject naïve accounts of Moore’s OQA, butwe can also respond to 
another type of worry raised by Hume:
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all 
lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In 
which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and 
thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as 
long as you consider the object.^^
64 Moore (1903: 451).
65 111 lact this view rules out any account where tliere is an item in consciousness, tor example, a mental ‘language’.
66 Hume (1978: 468).
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This worry does seem to hold for Moore if we regard consciousness as limited to 
sensations and introspection, for then it seems to follow that good is not an object of 
consciousness, and Moore’s position has a problem.^^ However, given my suggestion 
concerning Moore’s account of consciousness Moore need not be forced into accepting this 
conclusion. As Panayot Butchvarov states concerning Moore’s account of consciousness;
An immediate consequence of this conception is that any state of consciousness owes its 
distinctive character solely to its object, or more precisely to the object as it is given to 
that state of consciousness. The consciousness in itself has no character, no content, is 
pure transparence, translucence; if considered in abstraction from its object it is 
nothing...
If, then, there is no intrinsic qualitative nature of consciousness -  it is not a thing - any state of 
consciousness owes its distinctive character to its intentional objects.G iven  that Moore holds 
this account of consciousness, as T he Refutation of Idealism’ seems to suggest, we can say that 
to be in a state of ethical consciousness means only to be consciousness of the ethical or moral 
objects or properties, such as good. And it cannot consists in the occurrence of;
67 This would then cause a problem for his intuitionism.
68 Butchvarov (1982: 54).
69 See my discussion of conscience and qualia in chapter DC.
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...what Ryle would have described as ghostly events within oneself, having some 
intrinsic character, presumably “emotional” or “attitudinal,” and only causally related, if 
at all, to their so-called objects.^^
To morally approve of something then can only amount to being conscious of it as morally 
good, to be conscious of its moral goodness, even if this were illusoiy. Ethical consciousness 
must be consciousness of certain objective values, of certain properties of its objects, even if 
these were in some sense unreal, since there is nothing else ethical consciousness could be. 
Moreover, good in this sense must be objective in that it could not be in consciousness. 
Importantly this account follows from the nature of conscience which I think fits best with what 
Moore was writing at the time of Principia Ethica, and not from any specific account of ethical 
or moral consciousness.
My claims then are that one must read Principia Ethica as holding a doctrine of 
intentional objects, and as rejecting the claim that these intentional objects can be in 
consciousness^^ It follows that Moore is not committed to some ‘ghostly realm’ in which we 
experience good. If we think about good, then we are thinking about an intentional object. This 
in turn makes his phenomenological claim more plausible than it may seem at first.
The account of good as an intentional object is therefore promising. However, although 
these remarks help, they still leave a problem. For, if the OQA is to challenge naturalism, Moore 
must answer the metaphysical question concerning what sort of property good is. Of course, he
70 Butchvarov (1982: 55).
71 This seems correct. For an excellent discussion of issues surrounding consciousness and indirect realism see McCulloch 
(2003).
29
daims that good is simple, non-natural, and indefinable, but this merely returns us to the 
original problems concerning what it is for something to be non-natural, simple and indefinable. 
In fact, Moore himself claims that throughout his career his distinction between natural/non­
natural, definable/indefinable, and simple/complex which are now so vital, remained unclear.^^ 
Hence, it is improbable that Moore’s Principia Ethica can be read as giving a coherent and 
adequate metaphysical account of good.^^
In conclusion, if Moore wants to justify his phenomenological claims he must adopt the 
account of consciousness and intentional objects discussed. However, as he is committed to the 
claim that any state of consciousness owes its distinctive character solely to its object, or more 
precisely to the object as it is given to that state of consciousness, he needs to present a clear and 
coherent metaphysical and epistemological position, something that is not present in Principia 
Ethica. I leave it that //M oore gave such a foundation he would have a challenge to the 
naturalist, one that does not depend on the implausible phenomenological claims I discussed. 
My second suggested reading of Moore’s OQA develops from a quotation:^"*
Whenever [one] thinks o f ‘intrinsic value,’ or ‘intrinsic worth,’ or says that a thing "ought 
to existf he has before his mind the unique object — the unique property of things — which 
I mean by ‘good.’^ ^
72 Moore (1942).
73 We could of course reconstruct an account; it is just tliat in doing so we will distort some part o ïPrincipia Ethica.
74 Baldwin (1990) and White (1958) also make this suggestion.
75 Moore (1993; 68). Emphasis added.
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On the surface, this is an odd thing for Moore to write. He claims that the meaning of a term is 
whatever it denotes.From  the quotation then, it follows that ‘good’, ‘intrinsic worth’, ‘intrinsic 
value’ and ‘ought to exist’ have the same meaning. This would mean that ‘good’ is definable, 
something which Moore frequently reminds us is impossible. However, putting this issue to one 
side, the quotation is useful as it suggests another way of conceiving of the OQA.
There is an intuitive link between the terms cited in the quotation. If someone judges that 
a state of affairs is good, that it has either intrinsic valve or intrinsic worth, then arguably ‘this 
issues in a specification of what, in a particular situation, one ought to do’.^  ^Now, if this is 
correct then this may account for people’s open question intuitions. Arguably, if we consider a 
naturalistic state of affairs, say the amount of pleasure that a certain action would give, this does 
not specify what we ought to do. If we consider good, and we consider whether something 
would give us pleasure, the former ‘tells us’ what we ought to do, whereas the latter does not. 
Put very crudely, natural facts are ‘cold’ and ‘mute’, whereas good is dynamic and ‘guides us’ in 
our actions. Hence, because our intuitions reflect this gap, we resist any identification of good 
with natural properties -  such a definition would be open. What this means is that if an analytic 
naturalist wanted to resist this version of the OQA, he would have to demonstrate that his 
proposed reduction does in fact tell us what we ought to do..
There is more textual evidence to support this reading of the OQA. For example Moore
writes:
76 See for example, (1903; 68).
77 Baldwin (1990; 76). Emphasis added. Notice that tallc of a state of a flairs as good seems to conflict with tlic claim that 
good is an attributive adjective. I discuss this in the next chapter.
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The whole object of Mill’s book is to help us to discover what we ought to do, but, in 
fact, by attempting to define the meaning of this ‘ought,’ he has completely debarred 
himself from ever fulfilling that object; he has confined himself to telling us what M>e do
do?*
Moore’s point is that John Stuart Mill’s account fails because it must always reduce the 
prescriptive ‘ought’ to descriptive claims. Moreover, this means Mill’s proposed account of 
‘good’ is missing something, and hence questions concerning it will always be open. 
Specifically, Mill’s account can only ever tell us what we do do, and can never tell us what we 
ought to do.
However, for this reading of the OQA to be correct Moore must hold that no naturalistic 
judgements are ‘ought-implying’.?^  Yet such a reading fits uneasily with other claims he makes 
concerning the reducibility of ‘ought’ judgements to naturalistic judgements. For instance, 
Moore states that there is ‘at least one “ought-implying” natural property’, and in his paper ‘The 
Conception of Intrinsic Value’ he addresses some of the problems arising from adopting this 
relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. *° *^Thus, this reading of Moore’s OQA seems problematic. 
We either have to reject some of Moore’s claims concerning the reducibility of ‘ought’
78 Moore (1993: 125). This quotation is cited by Baldwin (1990: 89). Emphasis mine.
79 That is, to justify his claim tliat tliere is a difference between ‘telling us what we ought to do’ and ‘telling us what we do 
do.’
80 Moore (1942: 604).
81 Moore (1922a) and Moore (1942).
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judgements to ‘is’ judgements, or reject the claim that his OQA is based on the ineducibility of 
‘ought’ judgements.*^
§3 Conclusion
Moore’s OQA has been hugely influential, generating a vast body of literature. However, 
Moore’s presentation of it is neither clear nor convincing. For his argument to be successful, one 
or more of these must be true: conceptual analysis is obvious and uninformative. We have a 
unique property before our mind when thinking about good; there is an is/ought gap. The first 
claim leads to a ‘paradox of analysis’. The second, although less naïve than a superficial reading 
reveals, depends on an adequate epistemological and metaphysical account of good, something 
which Moore does not provide. The third brings the OQA into conflict with the rest of Moore’s 
moral philosophy.
However, even if Moore’s OQA is successful, the conclusion it generates highlights an 
ambiguity in Moore’s presentation of ‘the naturalistic fallacy’. The OQA cannot demonstrate 
that good is a non-natural property. At best, it challenges the analytic naturalist’s claim that 
good is definable. As such, the OQA, even if successful, becomes redundant in establishing the 
overall ontological position in Principia Ethica. However, even given Moore’s failure, I will 
argue that the OQA is a genuine argumentative device which puts the burden of proof on the 
analytic naturalist.
For an excellent and detailed discussion of this see Baldwin (1990: 89-90)
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(H)THREE MODERN VERSIONS OF THE OQA
This chapter deals with three recent accounts of the OQA. These have a number of things 
in common. First, all avoid giving an exposition of Moore’s work and concede that in its 
original form the OQA is unsuccessful. Second, all claim that the OQA is an argumentative 
device rather than a ‘knock down’ argument. Third, all think that the OQA challenges only 
analytic naturalism. I do not engage in a critique of these accounts; 1 outline them because they 
inform the discussion in the following chapters.**
§1. Stephen Ball’s lingu istic  Intuitions’.
Recently, Stephen Ball developed an account of the OQA based on pre-philosophic 
intuitions about moral language.*"  ^Stating the intention of his paper he writes:
... it will be contended that a linguistic version of Moore’s argument, when appropriately 
developed, provides at least useful evidence against naturalistic theories... *^
Ball sets out the OQA as follows:
(1 ) Any given naturalistic definition gives rise to an open question.
(2) Therefore, no such definition can be analytically (or definitionally) true.




(3) Therefore, no moral term refers to the same property as a natural term.*^
I do not discuss the move from (2) to (3). The focus of this section is (1) and (2).
Traditionally, philosophers have rejected the move from (1) to (2) as circular or invalid,*? 
circular because (1) merely assumes the truth of (2). Denying that a proposition is analytic is 
merely a sophisticated way of stating that questions concernipg it are open.** The move is 
considered invalid because the criterion for an ‘open question’ referred to in (1) is the fallible 
intuitions of native speakers of English.*^ I consider these worries in turn.
Circularity: Ball suggests that pre-philosophic intuitions can provide a non­
circular test of analyticity. Imagine attempting to demonstrate the idea that ‘good is pleasure’ is 
synthetic. We ask people about the proposition and we find that typically they feel that such 
questions are nontrivial and significant. Hence, we conclude that the proposition is not analytic. 
Ball claims that if it is non-philosophers that are asked then this way of proceeding is not 
circular. This is because this ‘data’ — the responses of the people asked - does not presuppose 
any meta-linguistic theorizing. If this is the case, the truth of (1) - the fact that people respond in 
the way that they do - is not based on the presumption of the truth of (2). How could it? What do 
the pre-philosophical Icnow about analyticity? Ball claims that making (1) into a ‘test’ in this 
way means that the OQA avoids the standard circularity objection.^^
86 Ball (1991:6).
87 For example, see Fraiikena (1939) and Brandt (1979).
88 This is essentially the main point made by Frankena (193 9).
89 Ball (1991: 7). This also means tliat stating (1) is contioversial, for it depends on tlie ability to infer fiom tlie subjective 
linguistic intuitions of native speakers.
90 For instance. Ball writes: ‘... Moore’s linguistic experiment in (1), is to be tliought of as conducted in the laboratoiy of the 
real world witli ordinaiy native speakers, and tlie philosophic claim of Moore’s type of argument in tlie move from (1) to (2), 
is that the “raw data” so collected, i.e., what might be called the “raw feels” of linguistic experience, are relevant for
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Another consideration recommends Ball’s way of proceeding. Asking native speakers 
certain questions can provide more information than merely observing how they behave. Ball 
gives an example from Charles Stevenson.Stevenson argues that we need not conclude that 
universalisability is analytically part of the meaning of moral terms from the fact that people do 
not ordinarily make non-universalisable moral statements. Perhaps, it is just that such statements 
are impractical, or pointless:
There is reason to believe, then, that checking speakers’ attitudes, or feelings of 
reluctance about making such denials -  which are otherwise synthetically false or 
psychologically impractical - is at least an important kind of data which is relevant 
evidence for evaluating naturalistic claims of analyticity.^^
Given these points it seems that the circularity objection fails. It is not circular to move from (1 ) 
to (2).
Invalidityr These claims have direct relevance to the charge that the OQA is invalid. Ball 
is not proposing that one can deduce that certain propositions are not analytic from the ‘data’ 
concerning native speaker’s intuitive feelings. The pre-philosophic intuitions are merely 
inductive evidence. Hence, if valid means deductively valid then this version of the OQA avoids 
the ‘invalidity’ criticism. However, there is another reading o f ‘invalid’. Because people’s pre-
establisliing a conclusion about meaning analyticity^’ Ball (1991:17). Notice tliough tliat we can take ‘on board’ tlie main 
claim that die triidi of (1) does not presuppose die truth of (2) widiout adopting all Ball states in Üiis quotation. He also takes 
his view as an extension of tlie Quinean view tiiat die analytic/synthetic distinction rests ultimately on behaviour criterion as 
to how statements intuitively/èe/. Specifically, statements are analytic to the degree that diere is a reluctance to revise diem.
Sec Quine (1951).
91 Ball (1991:20).
92 Ball (1991: 20).
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philosophie intuitions are possibly wrong, one cannot draw any conclusions from them. To do 
so would be ‘invalid’ in this revised sense. Recall that although the above way of proceeding 
rules out one version of invalidity, it leaves a challenge. Unless it can be shown that pre- 
philosophic intuitions are reliable, then it would be bad induction to base any conclusion on 
them.
Ball gives two reason to distrust people’s intuitions. First, people could be systematically 
misled in their intuitions, even on reflection. For example, perhaps people still have outdated 
religious views that reify moral properties as supernatural. This then creates the impression that 
moral terms do not mean the same as natural terms. Second, the complexity of proposed 
reductions may confuse people such that they find questions concerning them open. For 
instance, peoples’ ignorance about Frank Ramsay’s account of reduction employed by Frank 
Jackson would presumably lead them to question whether such an account is correct.^* 
However, we do not think that as such Jackson’s account fails to be true. Both these 
considerations demonstrate that one cannot simply make unqualified inference based on 
peoples’ intuitions. Hence, for Ball’s OQA to be convincing he has to dismiss such worries.
Ball argues that even if people’s ordinary linguistic intuitions are confused, this does not 
challenge his account. First, most of the proposed ‘distortions’ are not genuine, by which he 
means that they are things which the naturalist attempts to capture in their reduction. For 
example, concerning the confused notion of objectivity as indicated by Mackie, he writes:
93 Jackson (1998).
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Ethical naturalism, too, attaches at least a kind of “objective,” factual meaning to moral 
terms, and thus native speakers need not be misled by the test to reject the latter merely 
due to a feeling that it leaves out this component.
Therefore, even if there are distortions, the set of intuitions that have been corrected includes 
more than one may think. Hence, typically it is fine to make inductive inferences about 
analyticity from the set of intuitions.
Second, Ball claims that even the genuine distortions will dissipate after rational 
reflection. Hence, the ‘data’ from which we draw inferenc about analyticity should only include 
the responses of native speakers who have reflected rationally on the proposed reduction. This 
is because after reflection the data will not include, or would be unlikely to include, distorted 
intuitions.H e writes:
On the other hand, if Mackie’s metaphysical objectivity is, improperly, part of the 
“meaning” of ordinaiy moral terms, this conceptual mirage may be dissipated by rational 
“reflection” ...
To the charge of complexity. Ball has three responses. First, he suggests that even if 
people were aware of the complexity of a proposed reduction, they may still find questions
94 Ball (1991:26).
95 Of course, he has said that tlie distortions could remain even after reflection; hence, he camiot claim tliat after reflection 
a// intuitions will lack distortion.
96 So, the thought continues, the open-question is free to operate unambiguously as a lest of the residual meaning proffered 
by a naturalistic definition. Ball (1991:26).
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open. That is, the complexity is only one factor that helps account for peoples’ linguistic 
intuitions, and perhaps it is not even part of the open question test itself. The open question test 
only calls on speakers to be able to detail their feelings about ‘openness’.^ ?
Second, Ball reaffirms that even if two expressions are synonymous but differ in 
complexity, the open question test can still have relevance //‘synonymous expressions tend to be 
similarly complex. Moreover, he claims most naturalistic accounts do show this to be true. For 
example, ‘good is pleasure’ or ‘good is what one desires to desire’.
Third, Ball writes:
... though ordinary people may well be surprised about the needed complexity in a proper 
philosophic analysis of moral language, there is no reason why this complexity should 
not be incorporated into their linguistic intuitions, even if they cannot articulate, or are 
wrong about, the details.^*
The point is simply that people’s intuitions can reflect knowledge of the meaning of 
terms without any accompanying propositional knowledge about the meaning. Ball claims that 
presumably, then, the main problem with many naturalist definitions is that they are in fact too 
simple. He gives two reasons why this might be so. First, moral language has a multi-factual 
dimension including desires, social approval, etc., whereas the naturalist defines moral terms 
with a single factual dimension of this kind. Second, moral terms have a prescriptive force that
97 Bali (1991:26).
98 Ball (1991: 27). This looks an odd tiling to say. For if people may ‘be suiprised’ then it is unlikely tliat it will be 
incorporated into their pre-philosophicaI intuitions.
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is not contained in simple, uni-dimensional naturalistic definitions.^^ These suggestions are 
developed in sections two and three.
§2. Thomas Baldwin’s Suggestion.
Thomas Baldwin has two suggestions concerning versions of the OQA that also start 
from our semantic intuitions, and as such ‘sidestep’ issues relating to the ‘paradox of 
analysis’.^ ^^
Central to both suggestions is the idea that the starting point for the OQA ought to be the 
phenomenological fact that people do find questions concerning reductions significant. Baldwin 
writes:
I think... that we can to some extent sidestep these issues by assuming, on Moore’s 
behalf, that if a conceptual analysis is correct, then, once we have encountered it, it 
should come to seem to us entirely appropriate to guide our thoughts and judgements in 
accordance with it, even if at first the analysis strikes us as unobvious; and Moore’s 
objection to proposed analyses of intrinsic value is precisely that we do not find ourselves 
able to move to this reflective assimilation of them.^ ®*
Most likely the naturalist would argue that the open question ‘phenomenon’ is an illusion 
- a distortion, perhaps of religious belief. The reason that people are not happy to let the analysis
99 Ball (1991:27).
100 Baldwin (1993).
101 Baldwin (1993a: xix).
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‘guide their thoughts and actions’ is not because the analysis is incorrect; rather, they are 
systematically confused about the criterion for a correct reduction. Consequently, if Baldwin 
could give an account of ethical concepts that seeks to establish why reductive analyses are 
incorrect, then the OQA would be a genuine challenge. Before considering how he proceeds, we 
must clarify the methodology.
Baldwin’s suggestion starts from a problem he recognises in Moore’s work. In Principia 
Ethica, when discussing his ideal utilitarianism, Moore writes about states of affairs being 
good.^^  ^ Typically we use the concept ‘good’ as attributive, as in ‘good knife’ or ‘good bike’, 
where the noun (‘knife’, ‘bike’) which follows ‘good’ specifies what the thing said to be good is 
good as, and thereby indicates the standards by reference to which it has been evaluated. 
However, for Moore, goodness is a simple non-natural property that cannot readily 
accommodate this feature of the concept. So, there seems to be an immediate problem in 
understanding Moore’s account of good. In fact, a number of philosophers have rejected 
Moore’s ethics precisely because of this type of wor ry .However ,  Baldwin says that, if 
properly understood, Moore’s account could accommodate this feature of the concept. Central to 
Baldwin’s idea is the recognition that it is the goodness of states of affairs that is the main focus 
of Moore’s ethical theoiy.^^^ How is Baldwin going to show that this focus is consistent with the 
fact that in its typical use the concept good is attributive? He starts with this claim;
102 Moore (1903: 235-23).
103 Most tamously, Geach (1956).
104 Moore (1993: 239).
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... if a phrase ‘conveys a standard of goodness’ as long as there is a conventional way in 
which such a standard is identified by the use of the phrase, then phrases such as ‘event’ 
and ‘state of affairs’ do convey a standard of goodness.
Baldwin considers the familiar phrase ‘good weather’. We readily understand this phrase 
without investigating the context of utterance, even though good weather is not good os 
weather. Good weather is simply weather that is good for people affected by it, and this is 
weather which suits their interests. It is only when there are no such obvious implications for 
human interests that we have to return to the context of utterance for ffirther clues in how to 
understand what is being said.^^? Hence, if we do not use ‘good’ in a phrase that conveys a 
standard of goodness by the simple principle that a good X  is something that is good as an X, 
then a standard for goodness is:
...provided by reference to the implications for the interests of those affected by, or 
concerned with, that of which goodness is predicated. This suggestion can be readily 
applied to the interpretation of ‘good states of affairs’, and since it yields a standard of 
goodness which the phrase conventionally conveys... [the criticism considered above 
concerning how we can reconcile Moore’s account with the fact that in its typical use the 
concept good is attributive] is avoided.
105 Baldwin (1990: 73).
106 And: ‘... where interests conllict, we relativise our judgements, distinguishing between, say, weather that is good for 
farmers and whether that is good for holiday-makers.’ Baldwin (1990: 73)
107 For example, when someone says ‘tliat is a good cloud’. See Baldwin (1990: 73-74).
108 Baldwin (1990: 74). Emphasis added.
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Even if this way of proceeding saves Moore’s account, there is a fundamental problem in 
ascribing such a view to Moore. The thought was that we can combine a recognition of the 
attributiveness of ‘good’ with the focus on the goodness of states of affairs required by Moore’s 
ideal utilitarianism by assigning a central role to human interests in the evaluative states of 
affairs. However, Moore:
... will reject any such role for the concept of human interest, on the grounds that it gives 
rise to an unacceptable form of ethical naturalism, and it is this rejection, rather than his 
simple failure to recognise that attributiveness of ‘good’, which makes his conception of 
goodness so problematic.
Why would Moore find it incompatible with his account? Well, because for Moore there is no 
distinction between something that is good/b?* an agent, and something that is good in itself. 
Just consider the problem that Moore finds in Heniy Sidgwick’s egoism:
In short it is plain that the addition of ‘for him,’ ‘for me’ to such words as ‘ultimate 
rational end,’ ‘good,’ ‘important’ can introduce nothing hut confusion. The only possible
109 Baldwin (1990: 74).
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reason that can justify any action is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good
absolutely should be realised. no
For Moore, ‘good for me’ can only be understood as applying to states which are good in 
themselves and somehow concern me.^ ^^  However, as Baldwin notes what this means is that 
Moore cannot accommodate the attributive nature of ‘good’ in the way he suggests. As the 
evaluation of states of affairs by reference to the interest of those affected by them implies that 
such states are ‘good where they are good for those affected by them’.^ ^^
So, leaving the attempt to save Moore’s account to one side, let’s consider whether 
Baldwin’s suggestions provides a way of reconsti'ucting the OQA, as Baldwin thinks they do.^ *^ 
The first thing to note is that even though this is a naturalistic approach to the concept ‘good’, it 
is not itself a reductionist one for:
... the concept of a human interest is an ethical concept, linked to judgments
concerning the aspects of a life which make that life worth living 114
Thus, for the reductionist to succeed, he would have to demonstrate that he can reduce 
judgements concerning what ‘makes life worth living’. Baldwin suggests that Sidgwick provides
n o  Moore (1993: 153).
111 M oore(1993: 153).
112 Baldwin (1990: 74).
113 Baldwin (1990: 74-101).
114 Baldwin (1990: 91). Emphasis mine.
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the most plausible attempt at this/'^ Sidgwick argues that the aspect of life that makes life worth 
living concerns ‘no more than the intrinsic desirability of aspect of human life.’^^  ^ We can 
modify the details of Sidgwick’s account; a good candidate would be Peter Railton’s 
naturalism/^? Railton claims that the aspects of a life that make that life worth living are those 
which (roughly) our idealised self would desire our non-idealised self to desire.
What, then, is the relationship between this and Baldwin’s reconstructed OQA? Well, 
first notice that Moore would claim that because it is a significant question whether what our 
idealised self would desire for our non-idealised self to desire is in fact good (or valuable) for us, 
we can reject Railton’s account. However, Moore’s argument fails in providing convincing 
reasons to take his intuitions seriously. Here Baldwin makes a few suggestion as to why we 
ought to ‘go with’ Moore’s intuitions and why, in fact, Moore’s OQA is a genuine 
argumentative device.
Baldwin’s suggestion is that the only reason that we might think Railton’s account is 
plausible is because the second-order desires in his account are typically thought be informed by 
ethical knowledge. So, for Baldwin, second-order desires rely on, for instance, laiowledge of the 
value of dispositions such as kindness, loyalty, fairness, and it is for this reason that we accept 
that the content of second-order desires provides an account of what makes life worth living. 
Specifically, in terms of Railton’s account it is because ‘what our idealised selves would want 
for us’, relies on ethical knowledge. Yet, as Baldwin states:
115 Sidgwick (1963).
116 Baldwin (1990: 91).
117 See for example, Railton (1986a). 1 discuss Railton’s account in detail in chapter V.
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Obviously, however, a reductive analysis cannot include this ethical content; but once it 
is eliminated, most of the point of the distinction between first-order and second-order 
desires is undermined, and we are returned in effect to the simpler Sidgwickian account 
[the claim that the aspects of a life which make that life worth living concern no more 
than the intrinsic desirability of aspect of human life]. To this the Moorean objection that 
such a position makes it impossible for us to evaluate desires themselves does appear 
forceful; it cannot, I  think, be denied that closing o ff this dimension o f  critical thought 
appears to ns as a loss. Yet what remains to be understood is what lies behind it, once the 
naive appeal to our sense of the meaning of ethical language is abandoned.^
Baldwin thinks that if we consider the claim that the aspects of a life which make it worth living, 
we will recognise that such account is missing something . Given the focus on that which 
makes life worth living Baldwin claims that the focus on Thin’ ethical terms such as ‘good’ that 
Moore proposes is unhelpful and far too restrictive. He proposes that we shift the focus from 
‘thin’ to ‘thicker’ concepts such as kindness, loyalty, and courage .Thi s  seems a fair proposal; 
when we make an evaluation using ‘thin’ moral concepts, like ‘right’ or ‘good’ our answer at 
least seems to be guided by our ‘thick’ concepts. It is because some choices exemplify 
admirable characteristics, like compassion, that we judge them to be a good one.
Accepting this claim, though, would mean that the reductionist now has a far more 
daunting project. As Baldwin notes, the reductionist cannot merely list the ethical concepts to be
118 Baldwin (1990; 91). Emphasis added.
119 This distinction was introduced by Williams (1985: 128-9). This is discussed again in tlie next chapter when I consider 
blame.
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analysed. Instead, before he can establish that ethical truths are derivable from a theoi-y 
incorporating no ethical concepts, he has to characterise the e th i ca l . Th i s  is certainly a 
coherent project: there is descriptive content to Thick’ ethical concepts, and presumably if the 
reductionist can isolate this content using non-ethical terms he will have taken the first step in 
his project. However, influenced by John McDowell’s work, Baldwin argues that for the 
reductionist there seems to be no way of characterising the extension of Thick’ concepts. 
‘Thick’ concepts do not just attach an evaluative label to an otherwise ethically neutral 
disposition; they carve up the world from a point of view that is ‘embedded within the 
evaluative practices of culture.
These points suggest to Baldwin one reason why the OQA is as a challenge to the 
reductive naturalist. First, ‘thin’ ethical concepts get their content from ‘thick’ ones and second, 
‘thick’ ethical concepts are irreducible. Therefore, any proposed reduction o f ‘thin’ ethical terms 
such as ‘good’ will seem incomplete, and questions concerning them will seem open.
Notice that even though this helps Moore, again he would be very unhappy with at least 
two of Baldwin’s claims. First, Baldwin’s suggestion turns on the ability to define ‘good’ in 
terms of ‘thick’ ethical terms, and of course, Moore thinks that ‘good’ is indefinable. Second, 
Moore thought that good must be a non-natural property; however, Baldwin’s position uses 
‘thick’ ethical concepts and:
120 Baldwin (1990: 92). Also, see my discussion of blame in die next two chapters.
121 Baldwin (1990: 92) and McDowell (1979). We could, of course, at least start to describe virtues in descriptive terms. 
Kindness might be, for example, described as a disposition to pay extra attention to die welfare of others.
122 Baldwin (1990: 92). This does not mean diat to grasp die concepts one must have tlie values tiiat Uicy describe. All that 
is required is a sympatlietic imagination so tiiat we can see tlie point of values that we do not endorse. But importantly:
‘... die exercise of such imagination is not die identification of necessary and sufficient non-ediical conditions for die 
application of these concepts. It is the assumption of an ediical point of \dew that we do not altogether share.’ Baldwin (1990: 
92y
123 See Moore (1993) & Chapter I.
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...the use of thick ethical concepts has existential implications; there are no general 
truths about kindness independent of the existence of people.
Hence, although Baldwin’s anti-reductionist OQA concedes too much to the ethical naturalist to 
be acceptable to Moore, we can sum up Baldwin’s position as fol lows.Judgements about 
good are those that determine what people otighl to do. Hence, given that we can think of all 
evaluations as assuming an interested point of view, and it is this standpoint of appraisal that 
provides the criterion by which the things to be evaluated are evaluated, the standpoint that 
provides the criterion by which we evaluate something as good amounts to human agents 
wondering how to live their lives. As stated, it is the criterion of people asking themselves what 
it is that makes life worth living. Therefore, the reductionist has to reduce ‘good’ to a ‘value- 
free’ understanding of the ends of human life. However, Baldwin suggests that it is unlikely that 
anyone possesses such understanding. After all, we gain an understanding of the ends of human 
life through self-understanding, which is achieved through social identification and individual 
commitments which themselves incorporate value judgement. Consequently, he writes;
124 Baldwin (1990: 92).
125 This summary is developed from a later work: Baldwin (1993).
126 Baldwin ( 1993). I think Baldwin, by talking in tlris way of an ‘interested point of view’, has in mind sometliing similar to 
McDowell’s ( 1979) notion of ‘concern’ and Wiggins’s (1993b) notion of ‘ interest’. See my discussion of Wiggins in chapter 
V below.
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It is these value judgements which, as things stand, make possible the kind of reflective 
detachment concerning alleged analyses to which Moore’ phenomenological argument 
[his phenomenological version of the OQA] calls attention.
For Baldwin’s suggestions to be convincing a lot more work needs to be done on the notion of 
‘interest’. For instance, why should we accept Baldwin’s claim that ‘thick’ concepts do not just 
attach an evaluative label to an otherwise ethically neutral disposition, but carve up the world 
from a point of view that is embedded within the evaluative practices of culture? No doubt, 
Baldwin would have a sophisticated response to this and could elucidate the notion o f ‘interest’. 
However, it is not my aim to discuss this in detail here. The main worry with Baldwin’s 
suggestion is that it does not demonstrate that a reductionist’s project will necessary fail. His 
claim is, at best, a proposal as to why we ought to expect the open question phenomenon. In 
order to develop Baldwin’s reconstruction of the OQA, one would have to show that 
conceptually there could be no value-free understanding to the ends of human life.
§3. Barwall, Gibbard and Railton’s OQA.
Darwall, Gibbard and Railton’s (DGR’s) suggestion differs from Baldwin’s; theirs relies on 
the possibility tliat the link between moral judgement and motivation/reason is one of conceptual 
necessi ty.They ai'gue that if this were the correct account, then tlie intuitions people have
127 Baldwin (1993a: xx).
128 It is possible to read Baldwin’s account as implicitly internalist, and hence similar to DGR’s suggestion.
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demonstrate that analytic naturalism cannot secure their proposed reductions. DGR suggest this could 
count as an account of the fact that people find questions open.
In a recent review of modern ethics, DGR suggest:
Moore had discovered not a proof of a fallacy, but rather an argumentative device that 
implicitly but effectively brings to the fore certain characteristic features of ‘good’ -  and of 
other normative vocabulary - tliat seem to stand in the way of our accepting any Icnown 
naturalistic or metaphysical definition as unquestionably right, as definitions, at least when 
fully understood, seemingly should be.*^ ^
DGR, like Ball and Baldwin, argue that the most important feature of Moore’s OQA is that it 
highlights the phenomenon that people we judge to be psychologically and linguistically competent 
do find questions concerning proposed reductions of ethical terms to natural terms significant and 
non trivial. The force of the OQA arises if we:
... observe that the open question argument is compelling for otherwise competent, reflective 
speakers of English, who appear to have no difficulty imagining what it would be like to 
dispute whether P [some natural propeiiy] is good.^^^
129 DGR (1992; 3-4). Emphasis mine.
130 DGR (1992: 4).
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Agents we believe to be psychologically and linguistically nonnal do in fact find questions 
concerning proposed conceptual analysis of value terms ‘open’. DGR suggest that it is the 
philosopher’s job to explain this; their own ‘tentative suggestion’ starts from the realisation that 
questions of the form ‘Is P really good?’ can be read as ‘Is it clear that, other things being equal, one 
really ought to, or must, devote oneself to bringing about P?’^^  ^DGR continue:
Our confidence that the openness of the open question does not depend upon any error or 
oversight may stem from our seeming ability to imagine, for any naturalistic property R, 
clearheaded beings who would fail to find appropriate reason or motive to action in the mere 
fact that R obtains... Given this imaginative possibility, it has not been logically secured that 
P is action guiding (even if, as a matter of fact, we all do find R psychologically compelling). 
And this absence of a... conceptual link to action shows us exactly where there is room to ask, 
intelligibly, whether R really is good.*^^
In fact, this quotation contains two accounts of the OQA. One concerns motivation and the 
other concerns reason. There is, I argue, a close connection between them. However, in order to 
present DGR’s methodology clearly, I will focus on motivation. In the next two chapters, I will 
return to each argument and distinguish and develop them.
To understand DGR’s suggestion, we have to assume a conceptual link between judgement 
and motivation. They suggest that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, if agents judge it is right to do
131 Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992). Pg. 4.
132 Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992: 4). Emphasis added.
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(|), then they will be motivated to do (|), unless they are suffering from some motivational disorder. 
Call this position internalism.
Thus, for a successful reduction of moral terms to natural terms, the naturalist has to 
demonstrate that his account respects internalism. However, DGR point out that the naturalist must 
account for the fact that we think we can imagine people who, by our commonly aclcnowledged 
standards, are psychologically and linguistic competent, but who fail to be motivated by their 
judgement that a natural propeity obtains. This, they suggest, means that the naturalist cannot 
demonstrate that he respects internalism. Moreover, this accounts for the phenomenon that people do 
find questions concerning proposed reductions open. I suggest that tliis is a strong challenge to the 
naturalist in as far as internalism is plausible.
The naturalist who is also an externalist would remain unchallenged by DGR’s suggestion. 
Such a naturalist would argue moral terms are reducible to natural temis, that there is no conceptual 
connection between moral judgement and motivation, and thus there is no conceptual connection 
between naturalistic judgements and motivation. Adopting tliis position means that DGR’s 
observation that we can imagine clearheaded beings who judge that natural properties obtain yet fail 
to be motivated becomes supporting evidence, rather than a reason to question the plausibility of 
reductive naturalism.
If internalism is correct then DGR’s OQA presents a strong challenge to reductive 
naturalism, as the naturalist would be committed to the claim that, as a matter of conceptual 
necessity, naturalistic judgements motivate. But he would then be required to account for the 
convictions of competent and reflective speakers of English that they can imagine competent 
clearheaded beings failing to be motivated by their naturalistic judgements.
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To such a challenge the naturalist could presumably respond by claiming that rather than 
talcing these convictions as evidence against his position, we are best to account for the 
convictions in terms of the complexity of the link between moral and natural concepts. So, the 
naturalist would agree with DGR’s suggestion, but propose that the only reason that we can 
imagine competent clearheaded beings failing to be motivated is because we do not fully 
understand what naturalistic reductions involve because they are so complex that if we did, we 
would realise that there are no such possibilities. Alternatively, the naturalist could show that 
the convictions arise through systematic confusion. For instance, perhaps they are due to the 
residue of religious beliefs distorting people’s understanding of moral concepts. Finally, the 
naturalist could insist there is nothing in DGR’s suggestion to show that all possible reductions 
will fail. I discuss these points in detail in chapters three and four.
§4. Conclusion
Stephen Ball argues that the traditional criticisms of the OQA - that it is circular and 
invalid - fail. There is no circularity because the criterion for openness is not analyticity, but 
rather what non-philosophers would say about proposed naturalistic reductions. There is no 
invalidity because we can assume that after rational reflection native speaker’s intuitions are 
typically not distorted.
For the same reason as Ball, Baldwin and DGR reject the circularity objection. However, 
unlike Ball, they suggest that one could not merely infer from people’s linguistic intuitions that 
any semantic reduction of moral terms will fail. They argue that we must give an independent 
account as to why people think that the openness of open questions does not rely on any error or
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oversight. Baldwin gives two suggestions, both of which rely on the fact that morality requires a 
certain commitment -  what he calls people’s interests -  in virtue of which people make moral 
judgments. He claims that it is the analytic naturalist’s inability to give a semantic reduction of 
this commitment that explains the openness of open questions.
DGR suggest the reason that people think that the openness of open questions does not 
rely on any error or oversight depends on the action-guiding nature of moral judgements. 
Specifically, they claim that people’s intuitions undermine the possibility of there being a 
conceptual link between naturalistic judgements and motivation/reason. Hence, if there were a 
conceptual link between moral judgments and motivation/reason, this could account for people’s 
open question intuitions. In the next two chapters, I discuss DGR’s suggestions in light of 
Baldwin’s claims about peoples’ interests.
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(III)
MORAL MOTIVATION AND THE OQA
Recall that at the end of the last chapter 1 suggested that if we could give an account of 
peoples’ linguistic intuitions concerning open questions, then the OQA would be a genuine 
argumentative device. The explanation I discuss in this chapter concerns the link between moral 
judgement and motivation. To adequately assess this account, a broader discussion of moral 
motivation -  motivation by moral judgements - is required. If this enquiry concludes that as a 
matter of conceptual necessity moral judgments are connected to motivation, then Darwall, 
Gibbard and Railton’s (DGR) OQA presents a strong challenge to analytic na tu ra lism .O n  the 
other hand, if the connection between moral judgement and motivation is wholly contingent, 
then DGR’s OQA fails. I will conclude that it does fail, but argue that the nature of the link 
between moral judgment and motivation challenges the analytic naturalist.
§1. Moral Judgements and Motivation
In daily life, we encounter people who appear always to act in accordance with their moral 
judgements. For them, ‘doing their duty’ is of utmost importance, even if this means that 
relationships with family and friends suffer. In the other extreme, we meet people for whom 
there appears to be no relation between their apparent moral judgements and their motivation. 
For instance, they may agree with us that they have a moral obligation to give to Oxfam, but
133 The direction of tlie possible necessary connection is Irom judgement to motivation.
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wonder why this should concern them. Such characters’ moral judgements invariably fail to 
motivate them.
However, the majority of people fall somewhere in between these cases. Their moral 
judgements, for the most part, motivate them; however, if they are disillusioned or depressed 
their moral judgements fail to motivate.
It seems then that there is prima facie reason to think that the connection between moral 
judgement and motivation is wholly co n tin g en t.In  turn, this suggests that moral judgements 
(in their relation to motivation) are on a par with empirical judgements of fact.^^^
However, traditionally philosophers have suggested that drawing such an analogy with 
empirical judgements of fact would miss something distinctive of moral judgements as it seems 
to make the connection between moral judgement and motivation too arbitrary. We can 
highlight this worry by an example. A friend fails to be motivated to turn off the TV by his 
judgement that it is showing nothing of interest. We think nothing more of it, except perhaps 
that he is lazy, whilst we would be puzzled and worried if our friend judged it morally wrong to 
steal from supermarkets, but carried on taking tins of baked beans from Tesco. As such, it 
appears both that the link between moral judgement and motivation is not the same as for non- 
moral judgements. But, as we have already noted, the connection between moral judgements and
134 ‘ Wholly contingent’ is meant to capture the tliought that an agent may have never been motivated by his apparent moral 
judgement. That is, it rules out a link of logical dependency between moral judgement and motivation. This will become 
relevant below.
135 Of course, non-moral (but still evaluative) judgements motivate; for example, the judgement tliat tliis food is disgusting 
motivates me not to recommend it to someone.
136 Botli internalists and externalists make tliis point. See for example, Falk (1986), Smitli (1994), McNaughton (1988) and 
Brink (1997).
137 hi iact, this is one of my worries about the externalist position: tliat it appeals to make tlie link between moral judgement 
and motivation ad hoc. See below.
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motivation appears wholly contingent. How we deal with such thoughts designates us as either 
‘internalists’ or ‘externalists’.
Internalists claim that our intuitions about the link between judgement and motivation 
being wholly contingent are simply mistaken. There is a necessary connection between moral 
judgement and motivation. For them, this contrasts with non-evaluative judgements of empirical 
fact.
Alternatively, externalists claim that we should just ‘look at the world’ and recognise that 
the link between moral judgement and motivation is wholly contingent. They say that peoples’ 
thoughts about the ‘special’ nature of the link between moral judgement and motivation reveal 
only a purely contingent psychological fact. For the externalist, our puzzlement concerning our 
friend’s lack of motivation to stop taking cans of baked beans arises because it just so happens 
that typically, people desire to do what is right. Nevertheless, the externalist insists that things 
could have been completely different. People could normally be unmoved by their moral 
judgements.
Things become complicated quickly. This is because philosophers use ‘internalism’ to 
refer to a host of different ideas. Within meta-ethics, the only thing common to all accounts is 
that they attempt to clarify the link between moral judgement and motivation. The internalism 
I discuss claims that there is a necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation.
138 Maybe to illustrate tlie difference the externalists could reconstruct a (perhaps unbelievable) scenario in which we have 
all come to desire to stop watclnng luiinteresting TV, but where we have all lost the desire to do what is right. In which case, 
our puzzlement expressed in the example given above, would be completely reversed. We would be worried about our 
friend’s approach to TV watcliing, not to him stealing his lunch.
139 See for instance, Darwall (1983), Jackson (1988), Smith (1994), for different versions of internalism.
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and importantly this is conceptual necessity. If someone apparently makes a moral 
judgement yet fails to be motivated, then the internalist claims that he or she cannot be credited 
with moral judgements. The best we can say is that he or she only appears to make moral 
judgem ents.Internalism  provides ascription conditions for moral judgements in terms of 
moral motivation.
However, philosophers argue -  1 suggest correctly - that this makes the connection 
between judgement and motivation unacceptably strong. For example, if I made a moral 
judgement when in good health, and the reason for me making such a judgement remain 
unchanged, (as far as I know/believe) then we might say the judgement is genuinely my 
judgement even when I become depressed and am not motivated. It is not a priori that if a 
moral judgement fails to motivate, then it fails to be genuine. For this reason I understand 
‘internalism’ as a weaker claim. Moral judgements are of conceptual necessity connected to 
motivation except in individuals suffering from motivational disorders that affect them more 
generally.
Internalism then allows the ascription of moral judgement to agents, even if they are not 
motivated. Yet, internalists claim that it is conceptually impossible for an agent who has no
140 McDowell (1978) holds such a position.
141 Of course tliis is just a crude way of putting Hare’s (1952) inverted commas account of moral terms. See Smith (1994) 
for a discussion of tliis. The idea is tliat the agent who is not motivated by his moral judgment is not expressing a genuine 
moral judgement, but ratlier an opinion about what kind of moral judgment his fellows would make in his circumstance.
142 There are notable exceptions; for example, McDowell (1978), and Platts (1981), who tliiiik tliat tliis is acceptable.
143 That is, it matters when tlie judgement is formed. One might question whetlier a severely depressed person can make a 
judgement; might it not be devoid of conviction, hence not be a judgement? Alternatively, might tlie agent be unable to 
consider tlie reasons for it, so again it might not be a genuine judgement?
144 1 presume that tlie ‘without motivational disorder’ clause does not make internalism trivially true. Also this allows for 
akrasia; the moral judgement does motivate but does not win.
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motivational disorders to make a moral judgement and fail to be motivated. It is a priori that we 
cannot ascribe moral judgement in such cases as these.
The debate between internalism and externalism is essentially a dispute over the possible 
existence of the amoralist - the person who is completely unmoved by moral considerations. The 
internalist insists that amoralists are conceptually impossible while the externalist suggests that 
everyday life confirms their ex istence.H ow ever, philosophers have recognised that just 
focusing on the amoralist makes the debate intractable. As such, they suggest that the dispute 
between the internalist and the externalist should start from a claim that both accept. From this 
one side could demonstrate either that their account fits better with such a claim, or that the 
other side is incompatible with it. It is for this reason that Michael Smith introduces the ‘striking 
fact’ that a change in motivation follows a change in moral judgement. He argues that both 
internalism and externalism would accept this fact, yet it is only compatible with internalism. 
However, I want to consider another persuasive claim put foiivard by Sirgun Svavarsdottir who 
arrives at a different conclusion .S he states that both internalists and externalists would accept 
a certain methodological principle, but only the externalist can respect it. To demonstrate this 
she starts with an imagined scenario:
Virginia has put her social position at risk to help a politically persecuted stranger 
because she thinks it is the right thing to do. Later she meets Patrick, who could, without 
any apparent risk to himself, similarly help a politically persecuted stranger, but who has
145 For fascinating account of an alleged ‘real life’ amoralist see Watson (1987).
146 Svavarsdottir ( 1999).
59
made no attempt to do so. Our morally committed heroine confronts Patrick, appealing 
first to his compassion for the victims. Patrick rather wearily tells her that he has no 
inclination to concern himself with the plight of strangers. Virginia then appeals to 
explicit moral considerations: in this case, helping the strangers is his moral obligation 
and a matter of fighting enormous injustice. Patrick readily declares that he agrees with 
her moral assessment, btit nevertheless cannot be bothered to help. Virginia presses him 
further, arguing that the effort required is minimal and, given his position, will cost him 
close to nothing. Patrick responds that the cost is not really the issue, he just does not care 
to concern himself with such matters. Later he shows absolutely no sign of regret for 
either his remarks or his failure to help.*"^ ^
Importantly this description is neutral on whether Patrick is an amoralist; the externalist would 
claim he is, and the internalist would deny this on the ground that he is not really making a 
moral judgement. However, this means that as it stands the example will resolve nothing; we 
arrive at conflicting intuitions. Until we discuss more detail the externalist cannot claim that 
Patrick makes a moral judgement, and the internalist cannot claim that he does not. 
Svavarsdottir provides some neutral additional information that she suggests favours 
externalism.
Additional information about Patrick: Besides being known for courage and conservative 
estimates of risk to himself, Patrick is independently minded and earnest to a fault -
147 Svavarsdotlir (1999: 176-7). Emphasis added.
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indeed, honest to the point of tactlessness and even cruelty. And in any case, he has 
nothing to gain from misleading Virginia in the given circumstances. Moreover, Patrick 
makes claims couched in moral terms infrequently and impassionately, and never gives 
them as reasons for his actions. He has frequently been obsei*ved taking actions that seem 
uncontroversially wrong... without displaying any signs of hesitation or regret. In 
contrast, he has often displayed obvious signs of regret and shame when his plans have 
misfired, he has overestimated risk to himself, or he has publicly embarrassed himself in 
matters he finds important. He has also passed up numerous opportunities to perform 
obvious and uncostly moral deeds. However, when prodded, he will engage in prolonged 
and intelligent conversations about moral matters and seemingly take an independent 
stand on the moral statues of a controversial public policy or an action. Nonetheless, he 
usually ends such conversations by volunteering the opinion that he has long ago rid 
himself of any aspiration to live by moral standards.
Svavarsdottir thinks that with this additional information the best way of describing Patrick is as 
follows; he makes a moral judgment but fails to be motivated because he lacks the appropriate conative 
attitude. Hence, she thinks that this additional knowledge about Patrick favours externalism. However, 
the internalist will remain unconvinced; after all, we can interpret the example (including the additional 
information) as Patrick only appearing to make moral judgments. The question then turns on whether 
externalists can stop such a redescription. Svavarsdottir argues that they can. Presented with an 
example of someone such as Patrick - where someone makes a moral judgment but remains
148 SvavarsdoUir (1999: 177-8).
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unmotivated - an internalist would reject the example as incoherent. But, in so doing, he is ruling out a 
plausible explanation of this phenomenon, namely, the externalist’s. For instance, the externalist may 
argue that Patrick fails to be motivated by his judgment because he lacks the appropriate desire. 
However, it is a reasonable methodological principle to require those who would restrict the available 
hypotheses for explaining a given phenomenon to carry the burden of argument for this restriction. But 
internalists have not, so far, typically done this, or where they have tried, they fail. I think this is a fair 
criticism of internalism. Moreover, it fits with my intuition that it is not a priori that a psychologically 
competent agent whose moral judgement fails to motivate him did not, in fact, make a moral 
judgement. Internalism then is in tro u b le .M o reo v er, given that DGR’s argument rests on 
internalism, it is also in trouble. Yet, I suggest that the link between moral judgement and motivation 
may still cause problems for the analytic naturalist.
Given I reject internalism, does this mean that I accept externalism? If the externalists are 
mainly interested in defeating the internalist thesis that there is a conceptual connection between 
moral judgment and motivation, then yes. However, if their challenge to internalism is that 
moral judgement cannot motivate in and of themselves, then no.*^  ^I think it best that I reject the 
label ‘externalist’, as typically in the literature externalism includes both these features. 
However, why don’t I agree with both?
149 There are other worr ies I have concerning internalism. One is this; Michael Smith claims that a change in judgement 
brings with it a change in motivation. He states that tliis is a ‘striking fact’ tliat tlie internalist would accept, and only he could 
account for. However, it is controversial whetlier a conceptual truth could account for such a counter-factual claim (see 
Jackson (1987)). It tlien turns out -  ironically -  tliat it is the internahst, ratlier than tlie externalist, who has problems 
accounting for the ‘striking fact’.
150 They tlimk this would challenge internalism, because tliey typically think that motivation only takes place if there is 
belief and desire, and judgement lacks any desire. See below.
151 See for example. Brink (1997) and Railton (1993a).
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One of the main reasons why externalists think that moral judgement cannot possibly 
motivate in and of itself is because they typically (though not always) start from the presumption 
that belief-desire psychology is correct/^^ This is the view that an intentional action must be 
describable in terms of an appropriately related belief and desire had by an agent. For example, 
if I went to retrieve the post, and my desire is to read the post, then on this account my belief 
must be that going to get the post will satisfy my desire to read the post.^^  ^The account comes 
from David Hume, and recently philosophers have defended it.'^ '^  The externalist accepting this 
theoiy would claim that I am right in rejecting the conceptual connection between moral 
judgement and motivation, but wrong in thinking that moral judgment can motivate alone. For 
judgements to motivate there needs to be a further desire. Externalists differ on how to account 
for this desire; it is often thought of as a desire taken towards objects under a moral mode of 
presentation, specifically, the desire to be moral.
However, I reject belief-desire psychology. I do not think that all intentional action must 
be explicable in terms of appropriately related beliefs and desires. However, in rejecting this 
position I am not claiming that an account of motivation in terms of the belief-desire theory is
152 Notice, as I discuss below, even Uiough not all externalists explicitly start from this presumption, all I have encountered 
arrive at thinking which presupposes it. See for example, Svavarsdotlir (1999).
153 Notice tliat the internalist who is committed to (lie belief-desiie theory has a number of inmiediate problems, one of 
which is tlie fact that it would commit him to ascribing desires in cases where we would not want to. For instance, say 1 found 
my daughter committing a crime. 1 judge it is right to give her over to tlie pohce, althougli 1 know this will mean a lieaiq  ^
prison sentence. If 1 am an internalist, and am committed to tlie belief-desire account, tlien 1 necessarily have the desire to 
give my daughter over to the police. Surely, tliough it seems odd to tliink that because 1 make the moral judgement, I have, of 
necessity, a non-derivative desire which accords witli tlie belief expressed in my judgement.
154 Hume (1975) & (1978). For example, see Smith (1994).
155 See Smitli’s (1994) discussion of externalism. He claims tliat tliis way of characterising externalism (in terms of tlie 
desire to be moral) is tlie most plausible version, as it is only with such a general {cle dicto) desire tliat tlie externalist can 
guarantee tliat moral motivation ti acks changes in moral judgement. NB. Svavarsdottir tliinks tliat we must posit a desire to 
be moral to account for moral motivation. However, as 1 noted above, this is not her starting point. She claims that this is best 
way of accounting for tlie fact tliat moral judgment sometimes fails to motivate.
156 1 do not discuss my reasons. However, my first attempt at justifying tliis claim would be tliat tlie account is not 
falsifiable, which counts against it being a good hypotliesis.
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always false. The point is that, to progress in the philosophy of moral psychology, we must not 
allow the belief-desire account to become the presumption in virtue of which we redescribe all 
motivation.
This means, for instance, that there is no obvious reason justifying the inference from the 
fact that Patrick can make genuine moral judgements yet remain unmoved, to the claim that he 
must be lacking the appropriate desire. In general, one cannot simply assert that because moral 
motivation is affected by factors other than moral judgement, moral motivation must be 
grounded in certain conative attitudes: for instance, the desire to be moral.
I reject attempts to explain failures in motivation (absent pathological disorders) by 
saying ‘really there is no moral judgement’. In addition, I reject as sheer dogma, not merely the 
belief-desire theory, but the view that there must be an explanation (at the intentional level) of 
motivational failure. I am not required to explain failures in motivation at the intentional level at 
all, hence a fortiori, in terms of a desire to be moral. Moreover, I think that it is not elliptical to 
claim that we are disposed to do the morally obligatory thing when we take it to be the morally 
obligatory thing. Specifically, we do not need to postulate further intentional states that ground 
our dispositions. Conceiving of something in moral terms is enough to be motivated. One can 
adopt an empirical thesis that captures the attractive features of internalism without being an 
internalist.
One reason this option is perhaps unobvious is due to how philosophers describe 
amoralists. They write things like: the amoralist could not ‘care less’, or that he is not ‘bothered’ 
with moral matters, or that he is ‘left cold’ by his moral judgments. All these invite the thought 
that, if failure in motivation is due to the lack of some conative attitude, then agents must be
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motivated by this conative attitude in conjunction with the appropriate belief. However, this 
obviously does not follow (at least as long as one rejects the belief-desire psychology). Maybe it 
is true that one can account for the fact that moral judgement can fail to motivate in terms of the 
lack of certain desires, but this cannot demonstrate that the reason moral judgements do 
motivate is due to the presence of certain desires. This will become clearer in the following 
discussion. We can reject internalism without having to adopt such a move once it is recognized 
that there are many indicators of whether a person possesses a moral concept and makes a moral 
judgment. I demonstrate this using the indicator of blaming others.
Consider again the example of Patrick. Assume he does see what is right but fails to be 
motivated. This, the internalist would insist, is not merely puzzling but is conceptually 
impossible. True, it is puzzling; surely, though, it is not conceptually impossible. Can we know 
a priori that any agent who fails to be motivated by their moral judgement and who is suffering 
from no motivational disorders, did not make a genuine moral judgment? It is doubtful. As I 
stated there are surely other indicators of whether the person makes a genuine moral judgement.
Supposing that he makes a genuine moral judgement, imagine we ask Patrick whether he 
thinks there is a reason to blame him for not helping the politically persecuted strangers. If he 
says no, then either we will think that he is lying, or we will think that he really fails to grasp 
what it is to have an obligation. The reason for the latter claim is the obvious truth that if I fail to 
do what I have moral obligation to do then I am blameworthy.
157 1 discuss this truth in more detail in the next chapter.
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It follows then that if Patrick genuinely believes he has a moral obligation to help the 
politically persecuted stranger, then he will think that he is blameworthy for not helping him/^^ 
Furthermore, we can claim this because it is a platitude that he cannot be blameworthy if 
he did what he had most reason to do. As such, he must think that the contraposition of this 
platitude is true, namely, if he is blameworthy then he has failed to do what he has most reason 
to do. Consequently, from Patrick accepting that he has a duty to help, he accepts that he has 
most reason to help the strangers. As Skorupski writes, Patrick ought to reason as follows:
As Virginia says, I have a duty to help these politically persecuted strangers. So it's quite 
reasonable to blame me for not helping them. But it wouldn't be reasonable to blame me 
for not helping if not helping was what I had most reason to do. So what I have most 
reason to do is help.^^^
However, even granted that there is such a link between moral judgement and practical reason, 
this still does not address motivation. I think that the judgement that something is what one 
has the most reason to do has the potential to motivate in and o f  itself. There is no need to posit 
a further desire to do what one has reason to do for the judgement to motivate. Again, the 
temptation to do so may arise from the belief that in cases where such a judgement fails to 
motivate, we need to give an account at the intentional level. However, there is no reason to 
think this. Specifically, there is no reason to think either that there is always an absent single
158 Obviously he does not have \ojeel guilt to make tliis judgement. Perhaps, tliough, it is necessaiy tliat he has experienced 
guilt. See tlie next chapter for more on tliis issue.
159 Skorupski (1999b; 3) Emphasis added.
160 I discuss this connection further in tlie next chapter.
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unifying desire, or that we need to explain failed motivation at the intentional level. Consider an 
example from John Skorupski illustrating this. '^’^
I am driving down the road and notice that the fuel gauge is low. I think to myself T 
should stop at the next petrol station’, and immediately I see a turn-off for one.^^  ^In scenario A, 
I pull in to the garage, and in scenario B, I fail to slow down and drive straight past. In the latter 
case, there seems no reason to demand an account of why motivation failed that applies to all 
cases of failed motivation, nor does there seem to be any reason for demanding an explanation at 
the intentional le v e l .F o r  instance, in scenario B I may have low blood sugars due to spending 
hours driving.
I have demonstrated that moral judgements can motivate in and of themselves because of 
their link to judgements about what there is most reason to do. Hence, moral judgements can 
motivate in and of themselves, but they need not do so. In the example of Patrick, even if he 
admits he had most reason to help the strangers, he may not be motivated to do so.
We could write more about Patrick. We could claim that even though someone did what 
he or she had most reason to do, there is still reason to blame him or her for doing it. Agreeing 
that he has a duty, and that it is reasonable to blame him for not doing it, he could deny that this 
means he should help the strangers. Here we may start to wonder if Patrick really understands 
what it is for something to be blameworthy.
In this section, I have put forward three theses. First, I have argued that the amoralist is 
not a conceptual impossibility. It is not a priori that we can only ascribe moral judgments to
161 See Skorupski (1999b; 2).
162 By the claim tliat I ‘should’ do x, I mean that I have tlie most reason overall for dong x.
163 For example, one may think Uiat tlie reason for my iàiling to be motivated in B must be due to tlie lack tlie desire to do 
what I take myself to have the most reason to do.
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agents who are motivated by their apparent judgments. Second, it is empirically true that moral 
judgments can and do typically motivate in and of them selves.T hird , this is due to a link 
between moral judgements and what one has the most reason to do. Furthermore, I have rejected 
belief-desire psychology as a starting point in the discussion of motivation. Hence, I think that 
the amoralist does not demonstrate that moral motivation must be grounded in a co native 
attitude. It is true that factors other than the judgements themselves may affect the motivational 
impact of the judgement. However, this does not mean the motivation is best accounted for in 
terms of belief-desire accounts.
I am neither an internalist nor an externalist as such types are usually characterised. I 
reject externalism as far as it accepts belief-desire psychology; I reject internalism for its claims 
about conceptual necessity. The pressing question is whether this account renders the OQA a 
genuine argumentative device. Does the fact that judgements about one’s moral obligations in 
and o f  themselves typically, though not necessarily, motivate, render the OQA a genuine 
argumentative device?
§2, Motivation and BGM’s OQA.
Recall, that DGR’s suggestion ran as fo llo w s .F irs t, we ought not to claim utter 
conviction about open questions, but note that the open question argument is compelling for 
otherwise competent, reflective speakers of English.
164 I suspect that this is in fact all that the internalist wants, but attempts to capture it by the impossibly strong account of 
conceptual necessity.
165 DGR (1992). '
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Second, one should articulate a philosophical account of why this might be so. DGR’s 
suggestion is that our confidence that the openness of open questions does not depend upon any 
error or oversight stems from our seeming ability to imagine linguistically and psychologically 
competent beings judging that natural properties obtain but not being motivated. DGR claim that 
given this, it has not been secured that there is a conceptual link between naturalistic judgements 
and motivation.
Naturalists -  given what I said in the last section -  will be unimpressed by this. They 
could agree that there is no conceptual link between judgements about natural properties 
obtaining and motivation, yet point out that there is also no conceptual link between moral 
judgements and motivation. Hence, this is not an objection to the reduction of moral terms to 
natural terms. DGR’s suggestion fails.
Even given this failure, there is perhaps a challenge to analytic naturalism arising from 
the last section. That is, can analytic naturalists demonstrate that naturalistic judgements have 
the capacity to motivate in and of themselves? If they cannot then this could count as an account 
for why people find open questions ‘open’.^ ^^
Consider a paradigm example of a natural judgment which naturalists may give: the 
judgement that something causes pain. If they are asked why such a judgement motivated, their 
likely response would be that is was terrible, horrible, or abhorrent. But then it is only in virtue 
of an evaluative characterisation of the pain that such a fact has the potential to motivate in and 
of itself. Other likely candidates for naturalist judgements that have the capacity to motivate are
166 One could also ask: is there any natural property N, such that I am blameworthy if I judge tliat an action has N  and am 
not moved to do it (or just fail to do it)? I discuss this in Hie next chapter.
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‘x would be pleasant for me’ and x is in my interest’.A rg u a b ly , there need be no distinct 
desire for having either of these properties. However, both types are veiy poor candidates for 
being the reductive basis for T morally ought to pursue x’; that is, given that we continue to 
believe that sometimes we morally ought to assist strangers by actions not at all pleasant to 
ourselves. I think the burden of proof is on the analytic naturalist to come up with an example of 
a natural predicate that has more or less the same extension as its supposed normative equivalent 
and is such that judgment formed with it motivates, much of the time. In addition (as I will 
discuss in the next chapter), the predicate must be such that most people who make judgements 
about themselves while employing that predicate feel guilty and expect to be blamed if they 
don’t act accordingly. It seems to me not enough for analytic naturalists that they can imagine a 
world in which eveiyone has been conditioned to pursue, without an additional desire for it, the 
greatest good of the greatest number, and conditioned also to feel guilty, dish out blame etc. 
accordingly. How can this imagined possibility show us what ‘ought’ does actually mean, as 
distinct from showing us that there must be a world in which it does mean ‘leads to the greatest 
good’. To me, it is unclear whether naturalists could ever demonstrate that naturalistic 
judgements could have the capacity to motivate in and of themselves.
Hence, they must either reject the claim that the disposition to be motivated by 
naturalistic judgments must be grounded in a desire or they must demonstrate that, contrary to 
what I have argued, the disposition to be motivated by one’s moral judgement must be grounded 
in desire. Perhaps they could do this via a defence of belief-desire psychology.
167 Presuming the ‘interest’ can be tliought of as a natural predicate.
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§3. Conclusion
I have argued that it is incorrect to think that the ascription conditions for moral judgments are 
such that an agent could not be considered to have made a specific moral judgement unless he 
were motivated in a specific way. There are, I suggested, other indicators of whether an agent 
has made a moral judgement. Specifically, if an agent fails to recognise that if something were 
his moral duty then he is blameworthy for not doing it, then we would doubt he really 
understands what it is to have a moral duty.
I suggest that because of the relationship between moral judgment and blameworthiness 
we can accept that moral judgements have the capacity to motivate in and of themselves. This 
is because the judgement that x is what 1 should do can, in and of itself, motivate me. And, the 
disposition to do what I have most reason to do need not be grounded at the intentional level at 
all, a foriiori, in the desire to do what I have most reason to do.
All this means that even though DGR’s suggested reading of the OQA fails as it relies on 
there being a conceptual link between moral judgement and motivation, there is a possible 
challenge to analytic naturalism. That is, given the truth of this chapter, the challenge to the 
analytic naturalist is whether they can demonstrate that naturalistic judgements, in particular, the 
naturalistic judgments to which they say moral judgements reduce, have the capacity to motivate 
in and of themselves.
In the next chapter, I argue that there is a far stronger challenge to analytic naturalism. 
This develops from DGR’s second suggestion concerning the OQA: namely, that there is a
168 See the next chapter for a discussion fending off the objection that ‘moral’ cannot be explained in terms of 
‘blameworthy’ because ‘blameworthy’ implies ‘morally ought to be blamed’.
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conceptual connection between moral judgement and practical reason that accounts for why we 
think the openness of open questions does not rely on any error or oversight.
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(IV)
THE OQA AND RATIONALISM
In the last chapter I dealt with one of DGR’s suggestions concerning the OQA. In this 
chapter I discuss another suggestion concerning the relationship between moral judgement and 
practical reason.
§1 considers Smith’s rationalism; §2 discusses the following claims: (i) If it is right for x 
to (j) then X is blameworthy for not (|)-ing; (ii) if x is blameworthy for not <t)-ing, then there is a 
reason to thus, (iii) if (|)~ing is right then there is a reason to <j). I will argue that with certain 
qualifications we should think of these as conceptual truths. §3 applies the conclusions of §2 to 
DGR’s OQA. §4 discusses the conclusions of the last two chapters in relation to Frank 
Jackson’s analytic n a tu ra lism .§5 draws some conclusions.
§1. Smith’s Rationalism/^^
Clearly there is a close link between moral judgement and practical reason. It would be 
puzzling if I judged it right to give money to charity and, in the same breath, demanded a reason 
to give money to charity. The central question in this chapter concerns the nature of this link. In 
particular, I am interested in the status of this claim:
(M) if (|)-ing is right then there is a reason to (|).
169 I focus on Jackson (1998).
170 Smith (1994). Chapter 3, specifically §3.9.
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DGR’s suggestion concerning the OQA depends on one being able to recognise the truth 
of (M) simply and solely by virtue of grasping the concepts involved; that is, (M) must not be 
elliptical. It cannot require that we add a further conditional to the antecedent concerning, for 
example, the agent’s desires. Michael Smith has recently suggested an argument that supports 
this claim, and hence would sustain this version of the OQA.^^  ^ However, it is unclear and 
ultimately fails to illuminate (M).
Smith starts from the obseiwation that we approve and disapprove of what people do 
when moral matters aie at stake. Imagine that I hear that a friend borrowed some money, 
promising to pay it back, but he does not. In this instance, I am likely to disapprove of his 
actions. Alternatively, it is more appropriate for me to say that I dislike, rather than disapprove, 
of him eating chocolate ice cream. We can understand the difference between these cases in 
terms of me having a legitimate ground for expecting my friend to pay back his debt, but having 
no such ground to expect anything about his ice cream eating; there is no shared standard in 
terms of which we can judge ice cream eating. Hence, Smith claims that approval and 
disapproval are only ever in place when there exists grounds for legitimate expectations about 
how someone will behave. Smith continues:
But now, in light of our account of the preconditions for approval and disapproval, an 
obvious question presents itself. Consider, for instance, disapproval of those who act 
contrary to moral requirements. Such disapproval is ubiquitous. Yet how can this be? For,
171 Smith (1994: section 3,9). Note that Smith does not link (M) to tlie OQA. Also, notice tliat he calls the commitment to 
(M) ‘rationalism’. However, given tlie link to sentiment in (i) and (ii), I reject this label.
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as we have seen, disapproval for those who do not do what they are morally required to 
do presupposes the legitimacy of our expectation that they will act otherwise; it 
presupposes that, as we see it, their decision is a bad one in terms of the commonly 
aclaiowledged standards by which their decisions are to be judged. But what provides 
grounds for the legitimacy of this expectation?’^ "
Smith thinks that the only plausible answer demands that we accept (M). He first points out that 
it is implausible to think that what grounds the legitimacy of this expectation is the fact that 
rational creatures have entered into an agreement to act morally, for the simple reason that 
people have never made such an agreement.
Smith’s suggestion is that what legitimates expectation is a hypothetical agreement that 
people would make i f  they were rational. Hence, Smith states that what legitimates our 
expectation that people will act morally is not an agreement, but the veiy fact that people are 
rational agents;
Given that moral approval and disapproval are ubiquitous, the truth of the rationalists’ 
conceptual claim thus seems to be entailed by the fact that the preconditions of moral 
approval and disapproval are satisfied.
172 Smith (1994: 89). Emphasis added. Smith here appears to invite a nonnative reading o f ‘expectation’, tliattlie quotation 
should be read in terms of what we  ^ought to expect’. However, if this is the case then Smith appears to be begging the 
question. I discuss lliis below.
173 Smith (1994; 90).
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This argument from Smith is unconvincing. If ‘expectations’ is read non-normatively, 
then the desired conclusion does not follow, whereas if they’re read normatively, the question is 
begged.’^ '’
Consider an example. My friend is a habitual thief. Suppose I disapprove of his actions. 
For Smith this is explained in terms of me having a legitimate expectation that my friend will 
not steal. However, this cannot be the expectation that we will not steal. I know that he is a 
habitual thief. Thus, for Smith’s account to be plausible we must read ‘expectation’ in a 
normative way rather than a descriptive one. Hence, on this reading all that we require in order 
to satisfy the precondition of moral approval and disapproval is legitimate moral ‘oughts’. Now, 
if we presume that the legitimacy of moral ‘oughts’ entails that our concept of a moral 
requirement is a concept of a reason for action then Smith’s conclusion is vindicated. However, 
Smith cannot simply help himself to this claim as this is precisely what he is attempting to show. 
He cannot simply claim that we can satisfy the precondition of moral approval and disapproval 
because moral ‘oughts’ entail that our concept of a moral requirement is a concept of a reason 
for action.
To justify rationalism Smith assumes that our concept of moral requirement is a concept 
of a reason for action. However, even if Smith’s argument can avoid such worries, I do not 
know why Smith thinks it would illuminate (M).
§2. (M) and Blame.
174 Smith \wites in a number of places tiiat he mlends such a normative reading. For example, Smith (1994: 89).
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Smith is correct to focus on moral attitudes when discussing the connection between 
moral judgement and practical reason. However, while he focuses on the general ‘approving and 
disapproving’, I -  developing the theme of the last chapter - concentrate on blame. In this 
section, I argue that properly understood (M) is a conceptual truth. It is a truth that we can see 
simply and solely in virtue of grasping the concepts involved.
If I judge that my friend is morally wrong to break his promise then this amounts to 
blaming him.’^  ^It is to claim that his action is blameworthy; that is, that there is reason to blame 
him for breaking his p romise .Blame is characterised by feeling., hence, in judging that my 
friend was morally wrong in breaking the promise, I judge there is reason to feel blame towards 
his action. However, just as I can judge that there is a reason to feel sorry for my action, but not 
feel soriy, I can judge that there is reason to feel blame without feeling blame.
True, the nature of the feeling is not clear. For instance, it is not obvious that blame has a 
distinct phenomenology. However, this is unimportant for the rest of the discussion. I assume 
that whatever the feeling amounts to, blaming is an act or attitude whose notional core is a 
feeling, in the same way that feeling sorry is the notional core of an apology
Moral judgements can be characterised by evaluative reasons concerning blame. Moral 
propositions are propositions about what there is reason Xo feel. T h e  morally wrong is that 
towards which it is reasonable to feel the sentiment of blame. The morally right is that which it
We have here to take into account certain extenuating circumstances, see my discussion on pg. 79 concerning (M*).
176 There is a wider notion of blame which is used in relation to causes. For example, one may blame a loose nut on tlie 
railway track for tlie accident. However, these types of cases can be distinguished from tlie ones under consideration because 
they have no feeling core, hi blaming tlie nut for tlie accident I am not claiming that it is reasonable to have any feeling 
towards tlie loose nut.
177 For an extended discussion of tlie ‘blame-feeling’ see Skorupski (1999a: Paper Vll).
178 Note tliat tliey are still trutli-apt propositions and hence I reject noncognitivism.
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would be reasonable to feel the sentiment of blame towards not doing. Other moral propositions 
could be derived in a similar way.’^
Notice that although we can characterise morally wrong in terms of that towards which it 
is reasonable to feel blame, we cannot define ‘morally wrong’ in terms of blame; in fact I doubt 
that we can define ‘morally wrong’.”’’’ Even so, this does not mean that the concept that it 
expresses is simple. The concept is complex as it is constituted by practical reason and that 
which it is reasonable to blame.
To define ‘morally wrong’ in terms of the blameworthy would be circular. The concept 
of moral wrongness enters into the intentional content of blame-feeling. Blame-feeling is blame- 
feeling that... where ‘... ’ includes the belief that something was done that morally ought not 
have been.’^ ’ My blame feeling towards my friend’s promise breaking is a blame feeling that 
my friend has broken his promise but morally ought not to have done. It is for this reason that 
Skorupski writes:
The blameworthy and the morally wrong are indeed equivalent but the semantically prior 
term is ‘morally wrong’. ‘Blameworthy’ means something like ‘meriting that evaluative 
response which is appropriate to the morally wrong’, and so it is circular to define 
‘morally wrong’ in terms o f ‘blameworthy’.’^ "
179 See Skorupski (1997c: 30),
180 I suggest this is also true of otlier moral tenus. See my discussion o f ‘ethical nominalism’ in chapter IX.
181 See Skorupski (1999a: 31).
182 Skorupski (1999). Pg. 31.
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That which it is reasonable to blame partially constitutes the concept of morally wrong. If (j)-ing 
is morally wrong, then there is a reason to blame me for (|)-ing. We can recognise this as true 
simply and solely by grasping the moral concepts involved. It is a conceptual truth.
However, we need to answer a further question: What is the relationship between (|)-ing 
being morally wrong and there being reason not to <p. Put bluntly: what has blame got to do 
with (M)?
I argue that in grasping the concept of blame we recognise that if someone is 
blameworthy for doing (j), then there is reason not to do this is a conceptual truth. Imagine 
how puzzling it would be if I blamed my friend for not keeping his promise but also claimed that 
there is no reason for my friend to keep his promise. As Skorupski writes:
One simply doesn’t count as giving reasons for blaming a person unless one is giving 
reasons why that person should not have done what he did. If I can establish that there 
was no reason for a person not to a I have., unconditionally, established that that person 
was blameless in doing a. I do not have to establish that any further condition 
obtains...
Hence, there is a conceptual connection between someone being blameworthy for not 
doing (j) and there being a reason to (|). Those who would deny its status as a conceptual truth fail 
to grasp the concept of blame.
183 Skorupski (1999). Pg. 43.
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Thus, to sum up: what is morally wrong is that towards which it is reasonable to feel the 
sentiment of blame. This is a conceptual truth. Furthermore, if there is reason to blame someone 
for (|)-ing then there is a reason not to do (|); this too is a conceptual truth. One recognises both 
these claim as true solely and simply by virtue of grasping the concepts involved. By transitivity 
then, I conclude that it is a conceptual truth that if (|)-ing is right then there is a reason to (]); (M) 
is a truth we can recognise simply and solely by virtue of grasping the concepts involved.’^ '’
I have purposely oversimplified a number of issues here. For instance, it is not clear that 
one can blame an agent for doing what is morally wrong when he/she cannot recognise it as 
such. If someone cannot recognise murder as wrong, then can we really say that he or she is 
blameworthy for murdering? Perhaps we cannot. Furthermore, if an agent has an obligation to (j) 
yet he has no way of ^ -ing, then arguably we would not think he is to blame for not (j)~iiig. For 
instance, consider a friend who fails to meet you as promised because he is stuck on the train. It 
seems that he is not to blame even though he has failed to discharge his obligation to you.
For this reason I suggest we modify the initial c l a i m s . I f  (|)-mg is right and x is able to 
tell it is and is capable of ^-ing, then x is blameworthy for not (|)-ing. Furthermore, it is a 
conceptual truth that if A" is blameworthy for not (|)-ing then there is a reason to (j). Consequently, 
I claim that a modified version of (M), (IVP^ ) is a conceptual truth.
(M*) if (|)-ing is right, x can tell it is and x is capable of (|)-ing, then there is a reason for x to (|).
i 84 Some philosophers have denied tliese claims, for instance, Svavarsdottir ( 1999). For a brief discussion of tliis see the 
next section.
185 Wliilst keeping their status as conceptual tmths.
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In the next section, I suggest that the OQA presents the analytic naturalist with a 
challenge: given peoples’ linguistic intuitions, how can a semantic reduction respect (M^)? To 
do this, the analytic naturalist must demonstrate either that the OQA is compatible with (M'^), or 
argue that we should reject (M*).
§3. DGR’s OQA and Rationalism.
A challenge using (M*) will be stronger than the one considered in the last chapter. This 
is because while there is no conceptual necessity between moral judgement and motivation, 
there is between something being right and there being reason to do that thing, and we are 
inclined to think that a conceptual truth should be reflected in peoples’ linguistic intuitions.
Consider then such a version of the OQA. First, we ought not to claim that open question 
demonstrate anything beyond doubt, but start from the fact that people do find questions 
concerning proposed semantic reductions of moral terms open. Second, we must give a 
philosophical account of why. Here is one such an account.
Assume that (1\T^ ) is correct. It is a fact that competent and reflective speakers of English 
are convinced that they can imagine psychologically and linguistically competent people who 
judge that they have no reason to (|) by virtue of the fact that (|)-ing would produce natural 
property N.
If it is not a conceptual truth that if (|)-ing would produce natural property A^then there is aAreason (|), then competent and reflective speakers of English should have such a conviction about
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psychologically and linguistically competent people. But then, unless there is some other 
account as to why competent and reflective speakers of English have the convictions they do, we 
can conclude that there is no conceptual connection between judging that (j)-ing would produce 
N  and the judgement that they have any practical reason to (|). Consequently, in the absence of 
another account as to why competent and reflective speakers of English have such convictions 
concerning psychologically and linguistically competent people, we are not entitled to conclude 
that judging that <|)-ing would produce N  is the moral judgement that (|)-ing is morally right. 
Therefore, the analytic naturalist has not secured the tmth of his account.
The analytic naturalist could give a number of possible responses to this. First, he could 
reject (IVF^ ). If it were false, then there is no challenge. To do this the naturalist could deny that 
either or both of these claims are conceptual truths, (i) If (j)-ing is right and A' is able to tell it is 
and is capable of (ji-ing, then x is blameworthy for not (|)-ing; (ii) if x is blameworthy for not (|)- 
ing then there is a reason to (|). In fact, I think that there is a difficulty in defending (i) and (ii). 
The problem is that they are truths that people are spontaneously inclined to assent to, and trying 
to justify such spontaneous convergence makes their truth seem less plausible. This then 
presents an immediate problem for those defending (i) and (ii). I suspect this is one of the 
reasons that, even if successful. Smith’s account will fail to illuminate (M). However, this will 
not satisfy the analytic naturalist so I consider in more detail what denying these claims would 
amount to.
The analytic naturalist may reject (i), claiming that it is not incoherent to hold both that 
people have obligations and duties which they recognise and are able to discharge, and that there
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is never reason to blame people for their actions. If this were true I could recognise I have a duty 
to give money to charity and have the ability to do so, but there would be no reason to blame me 
for not doing so. Or, I could recognise I have an obligation to nurse my dying mother, and have 
the ability to do so, but there would be no reason to blame me for not doing so. To me, this 
seems incoherent. The naturalist who thinks these claims are coherent must give us an account 
of M’hy it is right to think I have obligations and duties in these instances. Surely, we abandon 
the belief that someone has a duty to A' if we realise that there is no reason to blame him or her 
for not doing A". It appears that we have ‘reached bedrock’. If the analytic naturalist were to say 
‘I know that you think you have a duty to look after your dying mother, and that you know you 
do, and that you can do it but this does not mean that there is no reason to blame you for not 
doing so’, then I do not know what else we could say to him.
Concerning (ii), the analytic naturalist may question whether it really is incoherent to 
advocate a view of reasons for action according to which a person might have had no reason to 
refrain from doing something, even though it is reasonable to blame him for doing it. I think the 
answer to this question is clear; ‘yes -  really - it is incoherent’.M o re o v e r , the incoherence is 
precisely something one ought to recognise in grasping the concept of blame. This is evident in 
the fact that it is hard to come up with examples to support such a proposal; here is my attempt.
My friend is walking home one night when he is attacked. He fights back, leaving his 
attacker injured. Perhaps the naturalist would claim that there is reason to blame my friend, even 
though there is no reason for him to refrain from defending himself. Yet, how could this be so? 
If there were no reason for him to refrain from defending himself, then what role would ‘blame’
186 Altliough some philosophers think it is not so clear. See for example, Svavarsdottir (2001).
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have in this case? Could it be meaningful for the naturalist to blame my friend for his actions? 
Maybe, if we add things like ‘well, he is a black belt in Karate; he has successful averted attacks 
in the past, he knew his attacker was a weak young girl,’ etc. However, if the naturalist attempts 
to convince us of his position in this way then surely what he is doing is tiying to show why the 
victim did have a reason to refrain from defending himself Moreover, he must think that this is 
sufficient to secure the judgement of blame. As such, I am unconvinced that the naturalist could 
present a coherent example which would challenge either (i) or (ii).
Assume then that the naturalist must accept (M*) as true. Therefore, his account is in 
doubt if he cannot show why his proposed semantic reduction respects (M*). As such, the 
naturalist must respond directly to the OQA. Simply, the challenge is this: if it is true that 
analytic naturalism can respect (M^), then why do people have the convictions they do? 
Specifically, why are competent and reflective speakers of English convinced that they are able 
to imagine psychologically and linguistically competent people who judge that they have no 
reason to (|) in virtue of the fact that (j)-ing would produce natural property A??’^^
The challenge to naturalists is to give an account of why we should retain the belief that 
their account respects (M^) in light of these convictions. They must give an alternative account 
of why competent and reflective speakers of English have such convictions. There are two ways 
of doing this.
First, the analytic naturalist could argue that the reason that competent and reflective 
English speakers can imagine what they can is due to the complexiiy of the link between judging
187 Notice that it is not an option for tlie analytic naturalist to deny tliat people have such convictions; such a move is 
empirically ihlse.
188 There is overlap here with the discussion of Ball’s paper in chapter II.
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that (|)-ing would produce N  and having a reason to (j), rather than it not being a conceptual link. 
The naturalist may cite other conceptual truths in support of such a claim. For example, most 
people are convinced they can imagine clear-headed beings that fail to recognise that 1 -sin^x is 
equivalent to cos^x. The reason is not that there is no conceptual equivalence between them; the 
reason is that even though they understand the concepts expressed by ‘1-sin^x’ and ‘cos^x’, the 
link is complex and unobvious.’^  ^In the case of such mathematical examples this seems correct, 
but it is not obvious that the analytic naturalist can make the equivalent point for morality. 
Specifically, there seems no reason to suspect there is any complexity in the link between moral 
concepts and natural concepts. For instance, we happily grant that understanding mathematics 
often requires a long and rigorous training, and that people’s intuitions about mathematical 
claims can be mistaken precisely because we first recognise that mathematics is complex. The 
problem is that we have no such intuitions about morality. In fact, we think the opposite: 
namely, that people do not need such a training to understand what is (for example) morally 
right. This suggests that we ought not to draw an analogy between subjects that deal with 
complex conceptual truths and morality. As such, to make this response convincing, the analytic 
naturalist is required to show why we ought to take his convictions as correct: that is, as opposed 
to the convictions of the majority of competent and reflective speakers of English. Presumably, 
he would argue that it is because he grasps the complexity of moral concepts that he can assert
189 Assuming for the sake of argument that one can talk about conceptnal trutli in mathematics.
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there is such complexity. However, it is unclear what could justify such a claim other than 
asserting the truth of his position.’ ”^
Rejecting a response in terms of complexity, the analytic naturalist could argue that 
systematic confusion leads English speakers to have such convictions. For example, perhaps 
they are due to the unrecognised residue of religious belief. However, accepting this does not 
necessarily demand the conclusion that the OQA ceases to be a challenge. It would only do this 
if we could show that the confusion generates different intuitions from those which reflect the 
truth. As a result, for the analytic naturalist to demonstrate that English speakers’ intuitions do 
not count against his proposed semantic reduction, it is not enough for him just to show such 
intuitions are systematically confused. He will have to demonstrate that the confusion distorts 
the intuitions people should have. To do this he will have to demonstrate that his account is 
correct.
Nevertheless, even if he manages to demonstrate that the confused intuitions distort the 
truth, there is another wony. Specifically, it is the intuitions of reflective speakers of English 
that count against the naturalist’s proposed reduction. Thus, the naturalist would have to claim 
that people, even after reflection, would remain confused in their intuitions. That is, that there is 
a systematic confusion which remains, after consideration of the concepts involved. However, it
190Even if he could provide adequate justification, it still seems reasonable to claim that the OQA would present a challenge 
{/‘synonymous terms tend to be similarly complex. That is, if we could conclude tliat typically, terms tliat mean the same 
were equally complex, then we could reasonably claim tliat tlie naturalist’s reduction of tlie simple term ‘good’ ought to be 
simple; we couldn’t conclude that people find the naturalist’s proposal ‘open’ because of its complexity. In addition there is 
evidence that -  at least in the moral domain -  the natiu'alist tliiiiks that tlie tenus that mean the same as ‘good’ are simple. For 
instance, ‘good is pleasure’, and ‘good is tliat which we desiie to desire’. If this is tlie case tlien we can reasonably claim tliat 
people do not find questions concerning naturalist’s reductions open because they are complex. Hence, tlie burden of proof 
lies with the naturahst to demonstrate why it is correct to assert that people’s intuitions about his proposed reduction do not 
challenge his position, as people are ignorant of the complexitj^ of his 
proposal.
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then starts to become hard to understand what entitles the analytic naturalist to claim that his 
proposed identity is analytic and a priori. For, even after reflection, people could still fail to 
spontaneously converge on agreeing to his proposed analysis of moral terms. Hence, whatever 
cases we could produce demonstrating there is no systematic confusion, the analytic naturalist 
can insist that we have just not looked at it in the right way - that is, in the way that he does. 
This response then appears to amount to the stipulation that analytic naturalism is correct.
There is one final response available to the naturalist. He could grant all the above, yet 
point out that the conclusion does not apply to all possible reductions, only to the ones that have 
already been proposed. To this there are number of obseiwations. First, this version of the OQA 
was set up as a challenge, and not as a decisive ‘knock down’ argument. Second, it is precisely 
part of the challenge that it asks the naturalist to convince us that a naturalistic reduction could 
respect (M*). That is, given that all proposed naturalistic reductions seem to fail, why think that 
any other account can do better? The analytic naturalist cannot merely respond to this challenge 
by claiming that they ‘just will’. In fact, even the briefest of considerations of our experience 
suggests that this way of proceeding will fail. The connection between naturalistic judgements 
and practical reason is elliptical. It is only because we have a certain psychology that a natural 
property obtaining gives us a reason to act in certain ways. Again, the burden of proof is clearly 
on the analytic naturalist. How could it ever be possible for a semantic reduction of moral terms 
to natural ones to respect (M’^ )? I conclude that given that (M*) is true, this version of the OQA 
presents a genuine challenge to analytic naturalism.
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§5. Frank Jac!cson’s Analytic Descriptivism and the OQ A/’” 
Frank Jackson has recently argued for:
... a version of what is often called definitional or analytical naturalism. However, I will 
call the doctrine analytical descriptivism.
It is the aim of this section to ascertain whether the general remarks I have made in the last two 
chapters are applicable to the detail and sophistication of Jackson’s widely discussed account. I 
suggest that they are.
Jackson thinks that moral terms are reducible to descriptive terms. He is a cognitivist and 
not an error theorist and, as such, claims that moral terms have descriptive truth-makers. His 
reduction is complex and relies on the work of Frank Ramsey and David L e w i s . T h e  
motivation behind using this work is the thought that if we fix the meaning of all the terms in 
ethics by the role or function that they play within ethics, then we can avoid problems other less 
sophisticated reductions encounter, such as circularity.’^ "’The details of Jackson’s reduction are 
as follows.
First, Jackson makes a distinction between naïve folk morality and mature folk morality 
(M). He takes this distinction to be essential to his account. Naïve folk morality is:
1911 will be focusing on Jackson (1998).
192 Jackson (1998; 113). Emphasis added. He chooses this label to avoid a possible confosion witli other questions 
concerning tlie relationship between natural and physical sciences and etliics. This need not worry us as in what follows, 
‘descriptive’ can -  without any distortion in meaning - be read as ‘natural’.
193 See Jackson (1998; 140).
194 For a brief account of tlie circularity problem, see Kripke (1982).
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...the network of moral opinions, intuitions, principles and concepts whose mastery is 
part and parcel of having a sense of what is right and wrong, and of being able to engage 
in meaningful debate about what ought to be done.’^ ^
Mature folk morality is:
...where folk morality will end up after it has been exposed to debate and critical 
reflection (or would end up, should we keep at it consistently and not become extinct too 
soon).’^^
It is M rather than naïve folk morality which is fundamental to Jackson’s account. He starts by 
imagining M written out as a huge conjunction of moral propositions written in property name 
style. For example, ‘Killing someone is typically wrong’ becomes ‘Killing typically has the 
property of being wrong’. Jackson then replaces each distinct moral property term by a distinct
variable to give M(xi, X 2 ,  X 3 . . . ) .  Then ‘(3xi),..M(xi,.....) is the Ramsey sentence of M and
(3xi)... (yi)... (M(yi,... ) iff xi = yi & X2 = y2 ....) is the modified Ramsey sentence of M which 
says that there is a unique realization of M. Jackson continues:
If moral functionalism is true, M and the modified Ramsey sentence of M say the same 
thing. For that is what holding that the ethical concepts are fixed by their place in the
195 Jackson (1998; 130).
196 Jackson (1998; 133). Notice that ‘critical reflection’ seems to imply flirther evaluative considerations; I return to this 
below.
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network of mature folk morality comes to. Fairness is what fills the fairness role; 
rightness is what fills the rightness role; and so on. We can now say what it is for some 
action A to be, say, right, as follows:
(R) A is right iff (3xi)... (Alias Xr& (yi)...(M(yi... ) iffxi = yi & ...)).
where ‘xf replaced ‘being right’ in M. We now have our account of when A is right: it is 
right just if it has the property that plays the rightness role as specified by the right-hand 
side of (R), a property we can be confident is a purely descriptive one, given the 
unrestricted, global, a priori supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive. Clearly, the 
same procedure, with appropriate modifications, will yield an account when A is good, 
just, fair, bad, and so on. For all ethical predicates, thick or thin, we have an account of 
their truth -  or application -  conditions. What is more, we have an account in purely 
descriptive terms, because the modified Ramsey sentence is obtained by replacing all the 
ethical terms by bound variables.
With such roles specified we could investigate which descriptive properties, if any, satisfy them. 
Jackson gives an example of discovering that the property satisfying the ‘rightness’ role is 
maximising expected hedonic v a l u e . A s  such, rightness is identical with maximising expected
197 Jackson (1998: 140-141). Emphasis mine. A question that I address is how Jackson can be so confident tliat the 
rightncss-role can’t be played by a non-natural property.
198 Note tliough that he does not say ‘rightness’ means ‘maximising hedonic value’.
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hedonic v a l u e J a c k s o n  can then give an analytic descriptive account of all evaluative terms: 
first, specify their role in the appropriate mature folk practice, and second, identify which 
properties satisfy this role.
Given that Jackson’s account is analytic, it seems susceptible to the OQA, a basis form of 
which would run as follows. One may see that (|)-ing has the property which would satisfy the 
‘rightness’ role in a network analysed mature folk morality, but is c|)-ing right? From this we can 
conclude that Jackson cannot secure the truth of his position. He has two responses to this type 
of challenge.
Jackson claims that we find such questions open because we ask them from within the 
context of naïve folk morality. However, what matters is the nature of mature folk morality 
because:
... there will, here and now, inevitably be a substantial degree o f ‘openness’ induced by 
the very fact that the rightness role is currently under negotiation.^’’’’
As such, Jackson thinks that people find questions concerning his account open, because they 
are ignorant of the practice of mature folk morality.
However, there is then a further version of the OQA challenge. That is, even if we knew 
about the practice of mature folk morality, questions concerning Jackson’s account remain open. 
Jackson responds that at this stage he is entitled to ‘dig in his heels’ and deny that such a
199 For Jackson’s account to avoid tlie charge of circularity we must read ‘hedonic value’ qualitatively rallier tlian in 
evaluative terms.
200 Jackson (1998: 151). Emphasis added.
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possibility is relevant to his account/”’ He attempts to explain why people might have such 
intuitions, suggesting that it could be due to a ‘hangover’ from platonistic accounts of meaning. 
Nevertheless, both of these responses are inadequate and, as such, the OQA remains a genuine 
challenge to Jackson’s account.
As I have presented it, the version of the OQA based on motivation in chapter III would 
not challenge Jackson’s account. This version of the OQA rests on this claim: whereas moral 
judgements have the capacity to motivate in and of themselves, naturalistic judgements seem to 
lack such a capacity. Central to this conclusion was my rejection of the belief-desire account. 
However, Jackson states that such a position is the only plausible account of motivation. Hence, 
for the OQA to present a genuine challenge based on motivation, I must produce an argument to 
justify my rejection of the belief-desire account. Without this, Jackson will deny that I am 
entitled to claim that moral judgements have the capacity to motivate in and of themselves. After 
all, beliefs, according to him, are ‘motivationally inert’. Even given the incompleteness of this 
challenge, considerations about practical reasons show the OQA to be a genuine argumentative 
device against Jackson’s position.
First, consider Jackson’s response that the openness of open questions is due to our 
ignorance of the practice of mature folk morality. Clearly then he thinks that knowledge of 
mature folk morality would close such questions. However, I argue that even if loiowledge of 
mature folk did close epistemic possibility, it does not follow that rightness is identical with 
what plays the rightness role. For Jackson’s responses to the OQA to be effective, he has to
201 Jackson (1998: 151).
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hold that it is an a priori conceptual truth that mature folk are right about ‘rightness’. According 
Jackson, this must be a conceptual truth:
(Q) Rightness is whatever satisfies the ‘rightness’ role in the network analysed mature folk 
morality.
Jackson is going to have problems securing the claim that (Q) can be recognised as true purely 
by grasping the concepts involved. Surely there is nothing in our moral practice that defers to 
some future time of moral development. Why, for instance, must we think that mature, rather 
than naïve, folk morality should be definitive of what naïve speakers mean by their moral terms? 
One way of highlighting this worry is to question how Jackson would respond to the claim that 
moral practice could mature so that eveiyone could do what is right, and that this made most 
people very unhappyll^o this type of wony he writes:
... a constraint on an acceptable mature folk morality is that it should end up with an
account of what rightness is that does not have this consequence. 202
We can now wony about Jackson’s use o f ‘constraint’, ‘acceptable’ and ‘should’. It is unclear 
what he means by them. Perhaps the best way to proceed is to read Jackson as claiming that 
mature folk are not just future peoples, but are wiser, more reasonable, reflective, and sensitive
202 Jackson (1998:145). Emphasis mine.
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peoples/”^  This would make Jackson’s point about our lack of knowledge of mature folk 
practice more plausible. We are more likely to accept that, in fact, in asking if a proposed 
analysis of ‘right’ is coiTect, we are asking whether more rational moral folk would accept such 
an analysis, rather than asking whether any old future moral folk would accept such an analysis. 
Reading Jackson’s response in these terms makes it more plausible. We find questions 
concerning his account open, not because his account is problematic, but because we are simply 
ignorant of what more rational moral folk would accept as a correct analysis.
However, for Jackson to respond in this way he has to deal with the fact that ‘rational’ is 
an evaluative term. It seems he has two options; first, he could treat ‘rational’ in the same way 
as other evaluative terms, such as ‘right’. Second, he could argue that ‘rational’ is an irreducible 
evaluative term. I argue that only the second option seems to be available to him.
Recall that to reduce ‘right’, Jackson claims we have to ‘Ramsify’ ‘mature folk 
morality’.^ ”"’ Moreover, we have stated that for his account to be plausible, ‘mature folk 
morality’ cannot be merely be the folk morality of any old future generation. It must be the folk 
morality of a more rational folk. So, if Jackson treats ‘rational’ as he treats ‘right’ and other 
evaluative terms -  if he takes the first option - then he will claim that we ‘Ramsify’ not our 
rationality, but ‘mature folk rationality’.^ ”^  But what is this? Well, if Jackson is going to be 
consistent he can’t claim that it is the folk rationality of any old future generation, but that it is 
the folk rationality of... Of what? He will have to answer; it is of a more rational generation. But
203 I will use ‘rationaT to refer to all tliese evaluative terms.
204 ‘Ramsify’ is my shorthand for tlie process of reducing terms introduced by Frank Ramsey and discussed in detail above.
205 Assume for the sake of argument that ‘mature folk rationality’ makes sense.
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now Jackson is using precisely what he wants to reduce in his reduction. As such treating 
‘rational’ in the same way as ‘right’ and other evaluative tenns, will lead to circularity.
We can state this as follows. If Jackson wants to reduce ‘rational’ in the same way that he 
reduces ‘right’ then he is committed to something like this:
(RA) (|) is rational if and only if, ^ uniquely satisfies the network analysis o f ‘rational’ in 
mature folk rationality.
So, the property that is rational is the one which is ‘picked out’ by the ‘Ramsified’ mature folk 
rationality. Let’s assume, as we did with Jackson’s treatment of ‘right’, that there will be one 
property picked out, and that this property will be descriptive as Jackson insists. Jackson can 
conclude that ‘rational’ can be reduced to a descriptive term.
Now, mature rational folk are naïve rational folk who are more rational, but why should 
‘mature’ folk have the role assigned to them in (RA)? How would Jackson respond to the claim 
that rational practice could mature so that eveiyone could do what is rational, and that this made 
most people veiy distressed, selfish or vnhoppyl Specifically, he cannot respond in the same 
way as he did with ‘right’, as to do so would be circular. It would not be illuminating for him to 
say, “Well, mature folk rationality will not be like this because they are more rational.” It turns 
out, then, that if Jackson wanted to treat ‘rational’ as he has other evaluative terms, he would be 
committed to something like (RA), and this turns out to be circular.
We can put this in terms of the OQA. Assume that someone attempts to reduce ‘rational’ 
by ‘Ramsifying’ naïve folk rationality; and that it is a significant and non-trivial question
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whether such a reduction is correct. Jackson would presumably claim that this does not 
challenge his account. We find questions concerning this proposed account open due to the 
openness of the question ‘is x rational?’ Moreover, the openness of this question can be 
accounted for in terms of the question ‘is that the most rational way of developing folk 
rationality from here. I suggest we would not be satisfied with such a response to the OQA.
The option left to Jackson is to claim that ‘rational’ is an irreducible evaluative term; 
‘rational’ picks out a non-descriptive property. Concerning such a proposal Yablo writes:
That might look like an impossible position; wouldn’t the same supervenience
206considerations that led Jackson to his descriptivism about ethical apply here too?
Let’s briefly consider what Jackson writes concerning supervenience. He states:
I will start by arguing that the nature of the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive 
tells us that ethical properties are descriptive properties in the sense of properties ascribed 
by language that falls on the descriptive side of the famous is-ought divide.^^^
What can we say about how the ethical supervenes on the descriptive? Jackson claims that for 
all worlds if two worlds are exactly alike descriptively then they are exactly alike ethically, and 
that this is both a priori true and necessary. However, Jackson claims that if this were true then
206 Yablo (tbrtlicoming: 7).
207 Jackson (1998: 118-119).
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any claim about how things were ethically would be equivalent to some claim about how things 
are, described in purely descriptive terms.
Next, he specifies that E is a sentence about ethical nature in the following sense:
(a) E is framed in ethical terms and descriptive terms; (b) eveiy world at which E is true 
has some ethical nature; and (c) for all if and w;*, ifE is true at w and false at if* , then w 
and If* differ ethically.
It follows that in any world that E  is true, that world will have some descriptive nature; and there 
will be a sentence made up of only descriptive terms that gives that nature in ftill.^ ^^  Now, if m>1 
and if2 are the worlds in which E is true, and D1 and D2 are the sentences made up of 
descriptive terms that give the descriptive nature of if7 and if2, then the disjunction of D1 and 
D2 will also be a purely descriptive sentence, call it D. But then:
...E entails and is entailed by D. For every world where E is true is a world where one or 
other of the A  is true, so E entails D. Moreover, every world where one or other of the A  
are true is a world where E is true, as otherwise we would have a violation of 
[supervenience]...Therefore, D entails E. The same line of argument can be applied 
mutaiis nmtandis to ethical and descriptive predicates and open sentences: for any ethical 
predicate there is a purely descriptive one that is necessarily co-extensive with it.^ °^
208 Jackson (1998: 122).
209 ‘... ethical nature without descriptive nature is impossible (an evil act, tor example, must involve death or pain... ).’
210 Jackson (1998: 123).
97
Jackson concludes that ethical properties are descriptive properties, for it is a consequence of the 
way that ethical supervenes on the descriptive that any claim about how things are made in 
ethical vocabulary makes no distinctions among the possibilities that cannot in principle be 
made in purely descriptive vocabulary
So, to recap, we suggested that Jackson could not claim that ‘rational’ was reducible in 
the same way that ‘right’ ‘wrong’ and other evaluative terms are. Hence, we claimed that he 
must be committed to ‘rational’ being an irreducible evaluative term. However, we then noted 
that Jackson argued against value being irreducible via supervenience, and the woriy was that 
this argument would apply to ‘rational’, thus ruling out this second option for Jackson.
We can summarise the possible way Jackson could argue against ‘rational’ being 
irreducibly evaluative; the nature of the supeiwenience of the rational on the descriptive tells us 
that rational properties are descriptive properties, in the sense of properties ascribed by language 
that falls on the descriptive side of the famous is-ought divide. This can be expanded. Jackson 
would claim that for all worlds, if two worlds are exactly alike descriptively then they are 
exactly alike rationally, and that this is both a priori true and necessaiy. However, if this were 
true then any claim about how things are rationally would be equivalent to some claim about 
how things are described in purely descriptive terms.
R is a sentence about rational nature in the following sense, (a) R is framed in rational 
terms and descriptive terms; (b) every world at which R is true has some rational nature; and (c) 
for all w and if*, if R is true at if and false at >r* , then w and if* differ rationally. It follows that
211 Jackson (1998: 123).
98
in any world that R is true, that world will have some descriptive nature; and there will be a 
sentence made up of only descriptive terms which gives that nature in full. Now, if wJ and if2 
are the worlds in which R is true, and D1 and D2 are the sentences made up of descriptive terms 
which gives the descriptive nature of wJ and if2, then the disjunction of DJ and D2 will also be 
a purely descriptive sentence, call it D. But then, R entails and is entailed by D. For every world 
where R is true is a world where one or other of the A  is true, so R entails D. Moreover, eveiy 
world where one or other of the A  are true is a world where R is true, as otherwise we would 
have a violation of supervenience. Therefore, D entails R.
We can conclude that rational properties are descriptive properties, for it is a consequence 
of the way that rational supervenes on the descriptive that any claim about how things are made 
in the vocabulary of reason makes no distinctions among the possibilities tin at cannot in 
principle be made in purely descriptive vocabulaiy.
If Jackson is committed to this conclusion, given he is committed to the conclusion that 
ethical properties are descriptive ones, then his position seems to face a challenge. Questions 
concerning the analytic descriptive account of ‘right’ are open, and he cannot cite ignorance of 
mature folk morality accounting for this. For, if he does, he is either committed to circularity or 
that ‘rational’ is an irreducible evaluative term. Taking this latter line would in turn mean he has 
to weaken his original -  fundamental - supeiwenience argument against ‘right’ being an 
irreducible evaluative term. Either way, the OQA challenges Jackson’s position.
Consider (A);
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(A) If (|)-iiig satisfies the ‘rightness’ role in the network analysed mature folk morality then there 
is a reason to do that which is (|).
Even given Jackson could adopt the claim that ‘rational’ is an irreducible evaluative term it 
would not follow that we could see the truth of (A) solely and simply in virtue of grasping the 
concepts involved. If we cannot reduce ‘rational’ to descriptive terms, but we can reduce ‘right’, 
then (A) is not a conceptual truth.
Thus, given the truth of (M*), Jackson cannot conclude that it is a conceptual truth that 
rightness is whatever satisfies the ‘rightness’ role in the network analysed mature folk morality. 
Therefore, he also cannot merely ‘dig in his heels’ as a response to the OQA. He has to meet the 
challenge I have given. This worry is brought out another way. Jackson writes that there could 
be:
... rather different mature folk moralities for different groups in the community; and, to 
the extent that they differ, the adherents of the different mature folk moralities will mean 
something different by the moral vocabulary because the moral terms of the adherents of 
the different schemes will be located in significantly different networks.^^^
If the mature folk moralities of some communities will never converge, then this means that 
people from these communities could never be in genuine disagreement, but would always be
212 Jackson (1998: 137). Emphasis mine.
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talking at cross-purposes.^’^  This is because the meaning of their terms, such as ‘rightness’ and 
‘rational’, are determined by different mature folk moralities. Therefore, for the people that are 
part of these communities there would only be apparent disagreements in the same moral 
language. There can be no such thing as intractable moral disputes between people in different 
moral communities.^’"’
However, because we do not want people who disagree with us to mean something 
different by their terms, we reject the suggestion that ‘reason’ and ‘right’ (and other evaluative 
terms) are conceptually identical to descriptive properties; as Stephen Yablo writes concerning 
‘reasonable’;
... it seems part of what we have in mind by ‘reasonable’ that the door is left open to the 
brilliant iconoclast who gets us to see that we have all along been acting contrary to 
reason. To dismiss such a person as meaning something else by ‘reasonable’ strikes us as
dogmatic 215
I agree. What Jackson and other semantic reductionist accounts do not recognize is that we want 
a moral theory where there are always semantic open questions, one which will not hold that it is 
an a priori conceptual truth that naive folk morality, or mature folk morality, are right about
213 Zangwill (2000) gives the example of Herman Goring and tire American prosecutor Robert Jackson at tire Nureirrberg 
trials. These men are paradigm cases of people from potential non-coirvergent mature folk moralities. However, we are 
coirvinced that when Robert Jackson claimed tlrat it is wrong to execute Jews and Goring denied tlris, they were genuinely 
disagreeing.
214 Jackson then has to give up oir one of the central ‘platitudes’ of folk morality. In fact tlren his accoimt is, reversionary of 
our current folk moralitj^
215 Yablo (forthcoming: 4). Eirrphasis added to illustrate tire ‘openness’.
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‘rightness’, ‘rationality’ etc. Hence, the OQA challenges analytic naturalism. I suggest such a 
theory, one that avoids postulating moral properties, in chapter IX.
§6. Conclusion
This chapter considered the second suggestion made by DGR concerning the OQA. Their 
proposal rests on the assumption that there is a conceptual connection between (j)-ing being right 
and there being a reason to They propose a reason why people are justified in believing that 
the openness of open questions does not rely on any error or oversight. It is a fact that competent 
and reflective speakers of English are convinced that they can imagine psychologically and 
linguistically competent people who judge that they have no reason to ^ in virtue of the fact that 
(|)-ing would produce natural property N. However, if their original assumption were correct, 
people should not have such convictions. Hence, analytic naturalists cannot secure the truth of 
their proposed reduction.
I argued that DGR are correct in their original assumption. I demonstrated this by arguing 
these are conceptual truths; (i) if (j)-ing is right and x is able to tell it is and is capable of ^ ring, x 
is blameworthy for not (j>-ing. (ii) if x is blameworthy for not (|)-ing then there is a reason to (|).
I suggested that, as such, the OQA is a genuine challenge to analytic naturalism. I 
considered a number of responses that the naturalist could give, that is, ways they could show 
that the convictions of English speakers have no evidential weight. I found all of these 
suggestions unconvincing. I concluded that this version of the OQA does present a genuine 
challenge to analytic naturalism
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In the final section, I focused on Jackson’s analytic descriptivism and argued that the 
OQA challenges his account. What the OQA demonstrates is that his position requires 
irreducible evaluative terms and fails to respect what we deem essential to a moral theoiy. That 
is to say, it forces us to adopt an error theoiy about morality. We think that there is right and 
wrong in intractable moral disputes; however, we are mistaken. In such disputes, people are 
talking at cross-purposes -  they mean different things by their terms.
I concluded that to think that it is a conceptual truth that mature folk morality is right 
about ‘rightness’ and ‘rationality’ etc., is to be revisionary about folk morality. It is to lapse into 
dogmatism. In the next two chapters, I discuss non-analytic naturalism which avoids such 
conclusions. However, I argue that it, too, is susceptible to a version of the OQA.
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NON-ANALYTIC NATURALISM AND THE OQA (I)
Peter Railtoii and Richard Boyd have put foiward distinct naturalist positions which, they 
claim, are unchallenged by the OQA.^’’’ This chapter discusses Railton’s account, the next 
discusses Boyd’s. §1 outlines Railton’s non-analytic naturalism; §2 considers David Wiggins’s 
unsuccessful version of the OQA; §3 outlines a successful version of the OQA;^’^  §4 draws 
some conclusions.
§1. Railton’s Naturalism.
We can conceive of naturalism methodologically or substantively. As Railton states;
Methodological natnvalism holds that philosophy does not possess a distinctive, a priori 
method able to yield substantive truths that, in principle, are not subject to any sort of 
empirical test. Instead, a methodological naturalist believes that philosophy should 
proceed a posteriori, in tandem with -  perhaps as a particularly abstract and general part 
of - the broadly empirical inquiiy carried on in the natural and social sciences.
Substantive naturalism, in contrast, is not in the first instance a view about 
philosophical methods, but about philosophical conclusions. A substantive naturalist 
advances a philosophical account of some domain of human language or practice that
216 Railton (1986a), (1986b), (1993a), (1993b) and Boyd (1988).
217 Wiggins (1993a) and (1993b).
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provides an interpretation of its central concepts in terms amenable to empirical
218inquiry.
These forms of naturalism need not go together. The analytic naturalism discussed in 
chapters I I , HI and IV, adopts a substantive claim but not a methodological one.^’^  It states that 
there is an a priori philosophical account of the moral domain that provides an interpretation of 
moral concepts in terms amenable to empirical inquiiy.
Methodological naturalists need not adopt a substantive claim. The broadly empirical 
inquiry carried on in the natural and social sciences may reveal that we cannot interpret moral 
concepts in terms amenable to empirical inquiiy; such a way of proceeding could favour non- 
cognitivism, for example.
Railton adopts both a methodological and a substantial view even though, importantly, he 
is a methodological naturalist first. He believes that an a posteriori explanatory approach to 
moral discourse and practice leads to the interpretation of moral concepts as properties that are 
amenable to empirical inquiiy. He writes;
... my naturalist finds [the rejection of substantive naturalism]... unsatisfactory for various
reasons, and instead entertains a reduction hypothesis, a synthetic identification of the
property of moral value with a complex non-moral property. He does so because he
218 Railton (1989: 155-156).
219 Wiggins (1993a: 301), calls the combination of substantive naturalism with the rejection of metliodo logical naturalism
‘Moore enraging naturalism’.
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believes the identification can contribute to our understanding of morality and its place in 
our world.,. while preserving important features of the normative role of moral value.
Even though Railton is committed to reducing moral value to a complex non-moral 
property he is not - contraiy to what some philosophers have written - scientistic.^^’ He does not 
think eveiything in the world, and an individuals place in it, ‘belong to’ scientific t h e o r y . H e  
argues that an a posteriori inquiiy into how to reduce moral concepts ought not to presuppose 
any ‘test of reality’ or ‘test of authenticity’, and that scientism is ‘remarkably crude and 
hasty
Some reductions are eliminative of the reduced phenomena, while some account for it. 
For example, the failure to reduce caloric fluid, vital force and phlogiston eliminated them, 
whereas the reduction of water to H2O reinforces, rather than calls into question, our sense that 
there really is water. If Railton’s project is to succeed, his proposed reduction must vindicate 
rather than e l iminate .He argues that, as such, the property he hopes to identify must be;
... on the one hand, a property to which we have epistemic and semantic access, and, on 
the other, a property which, through identifiable psychological processes, could engage 
people tnolivationally in the ways characteristic of moral properties.^^^
220 Railton (1993b; 317).
221 For example, Wiggins (1993a: 301). calls Railton’s accoimt ‘crude and scientistic’.
222 After all, tlie natiualist interested in reduction could reject that tliere is such a thing as ‘tlie scientific method’. See 
Railton (1993b: 318).
223 Railton (1989: 159).
224 Ibid.
225 Railton (1993b: 317). Emphasis added.
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The question is, then, whether there is a property that meets such naturalistic and normative 
requirements/^’’
For Railton, the normative requirement amounts to the claim that if something is good 
then it must be capable of motivating/^^ For example, he writes:
... what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would 
find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware. It 
would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might 
fail in any such way to engage him.^^^
Initially it is clear that Railton is concerned with the relational ‘good for a person’ rather than 
good. The natural property that Railton identifies as good for a person must be particularly 
‘made for’, or ‘suited to’, whomever it is good for, to such an extent that it is capable of 
motivating them.^^^
Not only is there a normative requirement, but there is also a naturalistic one too. 
Whatever is good for a person must play an explanatory role, and for it to do so it must meet two 
conditions:
226 Railton (1989: 163).
227 Although Railton calls this ‘intemalism’, it is distinct from ‘internalism’ discussed in chapter III. See below.
228 Railton (1986b: 9). Emphasis added.
229 His account of moral value, wliich I do not discuss, develops fi-om his discussion of non-moral value; the problems of tlie 
latter ar e problems for the foimer.
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1. independence -, it exists and has certain determinate features independent of whether 
we think it exists or has those features, independent, even, of whether we have good 
reason to think this;
2. feedback', it is such -  and we are such -  that we are able to interact
with it, and this interaction exerts the relevant sort of shaping influence or control 
upon our perceptions, thought, and action.
I outline Railton’s account and then demonstrate how he thinks it can meet the normative and 
naturalistic requirements.
We best understand Railton’s position by starting from his conclusion and concentrating 
on a number of features; X is non-morally good for A at time t if and only if, X would satisfy an 
objective interest of/f, the reduction basis of which exists at t.^ ’
‘Subjective interest’ includes wants and desires, and should be though of as akin to 
taste.^^ Importantly, subjective interests have relational, dispositional and primary qualities, 
which Railton calls their ‘reductive basis’. These are objective, play an explanatory role, and are 
‘truth-makers’ for subjective interest. However, such a basis is not sufficient to ground non- 
moral goodness as it does not capture the requisite normativity.^"’ We tend to have desires that 
are irrational, based on incomplete knowledge, or both. Hence, we think that even though we
230 Railton (1986a: 142).
231 For ease, I omit the temporal considerations in tlie following discussion.
232 Railton (1986a: 143). Railton was, of course, not the first to develop accounts using higher-ordcr desires. Moore (1903) 
considers tliem in relation to the OQA and Frankflirt (1971) discusses tlie important of second order desires in an account of 
persons and fr eewill.
233 Ibid. Pg. 142.
234 Railton (1986a; 142).
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desire something, it may not be desirable.^^^ For this reason Railton characterises objective 
interest for an individual yf as what A wants and desires, given that .4 has ‘unqualified cognitive 
and imaginative powers, full factual and nomological information about his physical and 
psychological constituent, capacities, circumstances, history and so on’ (Railton calls such a 
character A-plus).^^
This granted, Railton’s position is still not an accurate account of non-moral good forX, 
as it concerns good for ^ 4 idealised. Consequently, he claims that the objective interest fb r^  is 
what A-p lus would want A to want, were he in the actual condition and circumstances 
Hence, Railton arrives at an objective interest which, he claims, has the requisite normativity 
and a reductive basis which grounds the reforming account of ‘non-moral good for A’.^^ 
Railton concludes: X is non-morally good for A if and only if, X would satisfy an objective 
interest of A. However, if Railton’s proposed reduction is to vindicate non-moral good for a 
person, it must have the normative and naturalistic features highlighted above. I consider these 
in turn.
If something is good for a person then it must ‘engage people motivationally’ Recall 
that Railton claimed:
235 For example, consider the drug addict who craves another ‘liiF.
236 Railton (1986a: 142). This is a diverse and complex collection of characteristics and one may wonder whether Railton is 
really entitled to claim that A-plus has tlie same personahty as A. For not only must A-plus have these features but A-plus 
must also be able to compare all tlie possibilities tliat A’s life could follow and ‘indwell’ A’s actual position so as to advise 
A.
237 ‘We now ask A+ to tell us not what he currently wants, but what he would want his non-idealized self A to want -  or, 
more generally, to seek -  were he to find himself in the actual condition and circumstances of A.’ Railton (1986a: 142).
238 The reductive basis here is basically the same as that of subjective interest. The idea of a ‘reforming definition’ can be 
found in Brandt (1979).
239 Note tliat this must lake place through identifiable psychological processes. Railton (1993b: 317).
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... it would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it
might fail in any such way to engage him 240
Railton gives the following example demonstrating how his account can meet this condition.
Beth is a successful and happy accountant who one day decides to leave her job to 
become a writer. What Beth doesn’t know is that she is, and will always be, at best, an average 
writer; consequently, she becomes increasingly hustrated and poor. Crucially, Beth-plus would 
know that Beth would most probably always fail as a writer and would want herself, if she were 
Beth, to give up writing and return to accountancy, where, she reasons, her non-idealised self 
will be less frustrated and richer. Therefore, Beth’s question, Ts a writing career good for me?’ 
is answered by considering what Beth-plus would advise Beth to do - precisely what Railton’s 
account suggests.
The important question is how learning Beth-plus’s views would affect Beth. After all, 
Railton introduced the example to justify internalism. He suggests that she would lo^se the 
desire to be a writer leaving some contraiy desires to emerge.^"” Railton argues that it is 
peiTectly natural to expect this:
Partly because it is natural to care about whether one is happy and whether one’s desires 
are satisfied. The earlier Beth has every reason to believe that her later self takes these 
concerns to heart, since the later Beth is contemplating what she would want to pursue
240 Railton (1986b: 21).
241 Railton (1986b: 13-14).
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were she actually to relive the intei-vening years. Moreover, the earlier Beth also has 
reason to believe that her later self is better situated than she to know what would most 
satisfy Beth’s desires during those y ears.
Thus, the facts that on Railton’s account constitute non-moral value will have the requisite 
normative force; the normative force that facts about non-moral value, truistically, have to 
possess. The question remains whether Railton’s account has the naturalistic feature discussed 
above. He gives the following example to demonstrate that it does/^
Lonnie is a traveller who, unbelcnownst to him, becomes dehydrated. He feels pretty 
rotten and homesick and, consequently, longs for something familial* - a drink of milk. 
Unfortunately, milk is hard to digest and will not help his condition and, in fact, would make 
him feel physically and psychologically worse. Lonnie-Plus, being fully informed and fully 
rational, knows that if Lonnie is going to get better he needs to drink a significant amount of 
clear fluids. It is thus plausible to conclude that what is good for Lonnie is what Lonnie-Plus 
would want himself to desire if he were Lonnie in these conditions. So, imagine Lonnie given 
full information unqualified cognitive and imaginative powers, full factual and nomological 
information about his physical and psychological constituents, capacities, circumstances and 
histoiy. Then imagine what he would want Lonnie to want. This is very unclear, and it is hard to 
understand why Lonnie-Plus can be called Lonnie as opposed to someone else, and why he 
ought to have any authority in making any decisions - I discuss this below. However, assume
242 Railton (1986b; 13).
243 Railton (1986b: 13).
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that it makes sense. Then the objective interest (Lonnie-Plus’s) with its reductive basis (Lonnie- 
Plus’s dispositions, circumstances and constitution) has these features. He has them, 
independently of whether Lonnie thinks or has good reason to think they exist. Hence, Railton’s 
account satisfies the independence condition. Railton continues the example to demonstrate how 
it can also meets the feedback condition, and consequently the naturalistic condition.
Lonnie discovers that no milk is available and will not be until the next day. 
Consequently, he buys a few bottles of water. He drinks these over the next few hours and his 
psychological and physical health improves. Gradually, when travelling he finds himself drawn 
to drinking clear liquids rather than milk. This experience teaches Lonnie to prefer water to milk 
when travelling. Railton claims that what this shows is that appeals to degrees of congruence 
between A’s wants and his interests will often help account for facts about how satisfactory he 
finds his life (that is, the state of his psychological and physical well-being). Furthermore, it 
demonstrates a way that someone’s objective interest could play an explanatoiy role in the 
evolution of one’s desires; the basic idea being that self-conscious and unselfconscious learning 
about interests takes place through experience;
In the simplest sorts of cases, trial and error leads to the selective retention of wants that 
are satisfiable and lead to satisfactoiy results for the agent.
It seems then that Railton’s account also meets the ‘feedback’ condition. Lonnie develops the 
psychological profile that he does because of what is good for him. Lonnie can interact with
244 Railton (1986a; 144).
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what is good for him, and this interaction exerts the relevant sort of shaping influence or control 
upon his perception, thought, and action. Not only this but it will also follow that:
...other things equal, individuals will ordinarily be better judges of their own interests 
than third parties; that knowledge of one’s interests will tend to increase with increased 
experience and general laiowledge; that people with similar personal and social 
characteristics will tend to have similar values; and that there will be greater general 
consensus upon what is desirable in those areas of life where individuals are most alike in 
other regards... and where trial-and-error mechanisms can be expected to work well. "^’^
Thus, Railton can claim that the facts in his account that constitute non-moral good can 
simultaneously play an explanatory role with respect to features of our experience, and can 
capture the normative role which facts about non-moral value are ordinarily thought to possess. 
Hence, he claims that the following reduction vindicates rather than eliminates non-moral good: 
X is non-morally good for X at time t if and only if, X would satisfy an objective interest of A, 
the reduction basis of which exists at t. The next section discusses, and rejects, a version of the 
OQA thought to challenge this account.
245 Railton (1986a: 146). Note, one may worry that in tliis case tlie causal work is really being done by the reductive basis 
rather than the fact tliat something is a non-moral good. Railton claims tliat tliere is no need to accept tliis; to demonstrate 
why he considers the reduction of water to H20- He writes: ‘There can be no competition here: the causal work is done by 
water; the causal work is done by H^O. Railton (1989: 161). Thus, in the case of tlie reduction of non-moral good for a person 
there is no causal primacy, one can say the causal work is done by it, and tlie causal work is done by tlie reductive basis: there 
is ‘no competition here’.
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§2. David Wiggins’s OQA.“ '^
David Wiggins writes that;
Once they are put on to a proper basis, Moore’s objections [to naturalism] will reach 
further (I shall argue) than ‘definitional naturalism’^ "’^
The target of Wiggins’s ‘revived’ OQA is Railton’s non-analytic naturalism. However, it fails as 
(a) it begs the question and (b) its scope is too wide.^ "^  ^First, I outline his argument; second, I 
develop (a) and (b).
Wiggins partially transposes his argument into a Fregean f ramework. I t  stalls from the
assumption that value property V and natural property X are identical.
(I) V = X
250
(II) A propeily is natural if a predicate which present it either ‘pulls its weight’ in an
experimental science or is definable in terms of such (othei*wise it is non-natural). 251
246 Wiggins (1993a) and (1993b).
247 Wiggms (1993b: 330).
248 The following discussion is informed by Miller (forthcoming).
249 This is odd as it is of no advantage and complicates matters. Note tliat he only partially adopts this framework; for 
example, he talks about properties (someüiing that Frege rejects).
250 The following version is taken from Miller (forthcoming). Presenting the argument in this form brings a clarity which is 
lacking in Wiggins’s presentation.
251 Wiggms (1993b: 332).
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(III) V must have been presented to us under a predicate with the right kind of sense to
express a valuational interest. 252
(IV) X can be presented to us under a predicate with the right kind of sense to express an 
interest in explanation and prediction (from (II) and the assumption that X is a natural 
property).
(V) There corresponds to the property V some particular function from objects to truth- 
values, the V-function.^^"^
(VI) There corresponds to the propeity X some particular function from objects to truth- 
values, the X -  function.^^^
(VII) The X-function is the V-function (from (I), (V), (VI)).
(VIII) The X-function projects the valuational interest non-accidentally and faithfully into
256the future, and across any other cases that could arise (from (VII)).
(IX) The valuational interest is not the same as the interest in explanation and prediction.






Justification for (IX); Wiggins claims that valuational interest, but not an interest in explanation 
and prediction, ought to be characterised in terms of engagement:, he states three ways to 
understand this.
First, to engage with value involves finding value in an item rather than merely believe it 
is t h e r e . B u t  what does this mean? Perhaps it is best to think of this in terms of the claim that 
value is there to be experienced. But what is it for values to be properties of objects that are 
there to be experienced? Well, maybe Wiggins means that our concept of value is the concept of 
a property that is there to be experienced and that this is something that we can show 
phenomenologically. Evaluative experience presents itself to us as tlie experience of properties 
genuinely possessed by the objects that confront us. This argument is to yield the conclusion 
that objects seem to have evaluative properties.
We can make Wiggins’s suggestion more plausible than it may first seem, as it is not 
obvious that we all do ‘find’ value in items, that we all experience value as ‘there to be 
experienced’. However, this relies on an assumption that Wiggins need not accept; we need not 
think of ‘there to be experienced’ as phenomenologically similar to say, seeing the red of a rose, 
or finding a table hard. If we do think of it in these terms then it is implausible that we ‘find’ 
value in items. However, we need not adopt this assumption. For instance, according to Michael 
Smith, to talk about finding value in items is to say that;
257 He gives no justification for this claim simply writing tliat it; ‘ ... is more tlian a verbal manoeuvre’. Wiggins (1993b: 
332).
2581 will just consider this fii'st part of the ai'gument. O f coiuse, even given that Wiggins could secure this conclusion, he 
would have to argue for the is/seems distinction by showing tliat: ‘... according to tlie best systématisation of our platitudes 
about value, values are dispositions to elicit certain attitudes in us luider certain conditions: that is, our concept of value is tlie 
concept of such a disposition.’ Smitli (1993: 242-243) I do not consider tliis because I judge that Wiggins’ will have enough 
problems with the first stage.
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... we would unreflectively describe our experiences as experiences of that property: that 
is, in apparently representational terms. The crucial question is therefore whether we 
would unreflectively use [valuational] concepts in the ‘predicate position’ in describing 
our evaluative experiences. If we would then it seems that we do have reason to believe 
that we conceive of values as being there to be experienced... [Moreover] who denies that 
we would unreflectively describe the experience we have when, say, we witness a wilful 
murder in apparently representational terms; that is, as the experience of a wrong act?
We use value concepts in the ‘predicate position’; for example, we judge that acts are wrong, 
and that paintings are beautiful. It is then what Simon Blackburn terms the ‘realist-seeming 
grammar’ of our evaluative practice that justifies Wiggins’s claim that value is there to be 
experienced.
However, there is an obvious problem with proceeding in this way. (IX) requires that we 
do not use natural concepts in the ‘predicate position’ -  which is clearly false. I do not discuss 
whether Wiggins can produce a phenomenological account that would allow him to further 
distinguish valuational interest. I leave it that, without further qualification, his first 
characterisation of engagement is unable to distinguish valuational interest from an interest in 
prediction and explanation.
Second, Wiggins characterises engagement as:
259 Smith (1993: 243).
260 Blackburn (1985).
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... keyed not to the question whether everyone reacts in such and such a way to item x
261qua possessed of F but to the question whether one is oneself to concur in this reaction.
He believes that the response of finding a value in an item is révisable depending on whether we 
agree with such a response, whereas judging that something has a natural property is ‘keyed 
into’ how everyone reacts. However, consider pleasure, which Wiggins claims is a natural 
propeity.^’’^  Finding something pleasurable is surely not ‘keyed into’ how eveiyone else would 
respond. Something being pleasurable depends on whether we find that thing pleasurable. 
Consequently, this second characterisation also seems incapable of distinguishing valuational 
interest from an interest in explanation and prediction.
Wiggins’s third characterisation states that if engagement connects to feeling then it is 
‘however indirectly’ connected to the will.^’’^  The scope of this $ too  wide; it is incapable of 
excluding an interest in explanation and prediction. Again, consider the judgement that 
something is pleasurable. Such a judgement is capable of having such an ‘indirect’ connection 
with the will, all that is requires is that an agent has the appropriate psychology; for example, the 
desire to do what is pleasurable. Of course, if Wiggins claims that as a matter of conceptual 
necessity value judgements motivate then his position would be stronger. However, he does not.
261 Wiggms (1993b: 331).
262 ‘... a natural property is property that pulls its weight wiüiin a natural science... .On this view, every natural property 
either has some specification or otlrer under which it ctm figure (and figure essentially) in a natural science or else can be 
defined in terms of properties tliat have some specification or otlier under which tliey figure (and figure essentially) in such a 
science.’ Wiggins (1993b: 330).
263 Ibid. Pg. 332.
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In conclusion, Wiggins has not successfully distinguished valuation interest and an 
interest in explanation and prediction. However, for the sake of argument, assume that he can 
and that consequently he could justify (IX). His argument can then continue:
(X) It is difficult to see how the X -  function could project both the interest in explanation 
and prediction and the valuational interest non-accidentally faithfully into the future 
and across any other cases that could arise.
Wiggins’s justification of (X):
I do not question that, across a fixed number of cases, the function for X could mimic the 
function for V, and place exactly the same items in its inverse image of the True as the P- 
function places in its inverse image of the Tme... [However] in order to mimic the V- 
function across the open ocean of new cases, surely the X  -  function has somehow to 
catch on to the point of the attribution of V. It has to capture and make its own the interest 
that discerns that value. How else is it to go on indefinitely, generating the same 
extension as the function for V generates? Can it do this consistently with the claim that 
the property X  is one that can also be introduced... by a predicate that pulls its weight in 
an empirical science or is definable in such terms? The interests seem quite different.^ "^^
So, in conclusion:
264 Wiggms (1993b: 332 -  333).
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(XI) It is difficult to see how it could be the case that V = X.
Even assuming (IX) is true, Wiggins’s argument fails on two counts.
(a) Begging the question: First, recall from §1 that Railton adopts both substantive and 
methodological naturalism. The property identity claim he proposes does not require a priori 
meaning equivalence. It is via empirical testing that Railton arrives at his reforming account of 
moral terms. In the context of Wiggins’s argument, Railton would conclude V -  X, only after 
proceeding a posteriori in tandem with the broadly empirical inquiry carried on in the natural 
and social sciences.
Wiggins claims that the F-function and the Y-function cannot ‘generate the same 
extensions non-accidentally faithfully into the f u t u r e R a i l t o n  claims that they can, and there 
are good empirical grounds for this belief. Wiggins responds that for Railton’s account to be 
coiTect he must given an a priori justification for this. However, this is to stipulate that 
methodological naturalism could never show that substantive naturalism as correct, which is no 
argument at all. Wiggins begs the question against Railton’s position.
We can highlight the point in a different way. Consider Wiggins’s claim that an interest 
in explanation and prediction is different from valuational interest. He thinks that this is 
problematic for Railton’s identity claims. However, it would be strange if this were true, given 
that Railton explicitly concedes there is such a difference. After all, it is for this reason that he
265 Wiggins (1993b: 332). Notice that tliis way of talking is very iinlielpflil. I mean what does Wiggms means by functions 
‘ generating’ !? As far as possible, we should try to grasp the ‘essence’ of what he is sajhng ratlrer tlran get waylaid by the 
inappropriate discussion of Fregean fLinctions.
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rejects analytic naturalism. Wiggins’s argument runs: if synonymy is required for property 
identity, then the difference between valuational interest and an interest in explanation and 
prediction causes a problem for the naturalist. However, Railton’s account denies the antecedent 
and thus avoids Wiggins’s argument - a move the Wiggins simply does not acknowledge. 
Consider a quotation highlighting this:
Surely if substantive naturalism means what it says when it identifies V and X, then it is 
committed (and Railton does not demur, it seems) to attempt very much the same sort o f  
things as an old-fashioned reduction is^^^
This is to miss the central point: Railton’s naturalism is not attempting The same sort of thing as 
old-fashioned reduction is’. Railton states very clearly that he is a methodological naturalist 
first, and a substantive naturalist second.
(b) The scope o f  Wiggins's argument: The second problem with Wiggins’s argument is that, if 
successful, it could generate worries about uncontroversial theoretical identity claims. For 
example, one would have to conclude that there is tension in the claim that water is H^O, or that 
salt is NaCl; I take this as a reductio of Wiggins’s argument. The best way of demonstrating this 
is by rewriting the argument in terms of an uncontroversial theoretical identity. Thus, assume 
that water is
266 Wiggins (1993b: 332). Sic.
267 This presentation is taken from Miller (fortlicoming).
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(la) Water = H2O
(Ha) A property is natural if some predicate that presents it either pulls its weight in an 
experimental science or is definable in terms of such. Otheiwise it is non-natural.
(Ilia) Water must have been presented to us under a predicate with the right kind of sense 
to express a practical interest.
(IVa) H2O can be presented to us under a predicate with the right kind of sense to express 
an interest in explanation and prediction.
(Va) There corresponds to the propeity water some particular tiinction from objects to 
truth-values, the water-function.
(Via) There corresponds to the propeify H2O some particular function from objects to 
truth-values, the H2O function.
(Vila) The H20-function from objects to truth-values is the water-function.
(Vnia) The H20-function projects the practical interest non-accidentally faithfully into 
the future and across any other cases that could arise.
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(IXa) The practical interest is not the same as the interest in explanation and prediction.
A brief account of how one might justify (IXa): if I were to have a practical interest in 
some propeity, then essentially I want to do something with that property. If I were to have a 
practical interest in gardening, then I would not merely study the right books, I would actively 
get involved -  I would get my hands dirty. A property is practical if this interest picks it out. 
Such a propeity is then one that has some function; it is a property with which we do things. 
Water is a practical property as our practical interest presents it as something we bath in, drink, 
freeze, etc. Furthermore, to be a practical property requires only one person to have a practical 
interest in it. It does not require everyone to have such an interest. In addition, if I have a 
practical interest in water and I have a desire to do what the interest dictates, then I will be 
motivated to act in certain ways. None of these features are part of an interest in explanation and 
predication.
So,
(Xa) It is difficult to see how the H20-function could project both the interest in 
explanation and prediction and the practical interest non-accidentally faithfully into the 
future and across any other cases that could arise.
268 Wiggms (1993b; 332).
269 The justification for (Xa) would be the same as for (X); replace 'valuational interest' vtith 'practical interest'.
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In conclusion:
(XIa) It is difficult to see how it could be the case that water = H2O.
I suggest that this is a reductio of Wiggins’s argument.^™ It also reinforces the 'begging 
the question’ charge. The scientist would grant the claim that 'water’ and ‘H2O’ have different 
interests and as such are not synonymous. It is, after all, through a posteriori investigation that 
such theoretical identities are established. However, Wiggins’s argument amounts to the 
assertion that we must base such identity claims on a priori meaning equivalence, which is no 
argument at all. In effect, he stipulates that a posteriori investigation could never reveal the 
nature of water. If Wiggins’s account were correct then we would have to question the status of 
scientific claims in general. Wiggins labels Railton’s account as 'cinde and scientistic’. In 
contrast, he not only rejects scientism, but also questions the central claims of science.
Thus, even if Wiggins were correct about the existence of a qualitative difference 
between valuational interest and an interest in explanation and prediction, his version of the 
OQA is a failure. He fails to address Railton’s position: the combination of methodological and 
substantive naturalism.
270 Notice tliat the same form of argument can be nm for a whole range of theoretical identities, for example, salt and NaCl.
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§3. Railton’s Naturalism and the OQA.
Railton writes:
Even if Moore's “open question” argument cannot be deployed directly against an 
interpretation of discourse about a person’s good that does not purport to express analytic 
truths, a significant critical flmction may still be seiwed by pressing Moorean questions 
against such interpretations. For it would be a challenge to any theoretical identification 
or reforming definition of P in terms of O to argue that there is something central to the 
notion of P that does not appear to be captured by O', this would make the question T can 
see that this is O, but is itP ?’ genuinely compelling, not just barely possible.^^^
Railton’s account does not rely on an a priori meaning equivalence between 'good’ and 
natural terms and hence it is not challenged by Moore’s OQA. He thinks that by repeatedly 
questioning various accounts, we can develop a naturalist account which captures the central 
notions of non-moral good for a person. However, his mistake lies in where such questions 
cease to be ‘genuinely compelling’. This is because he fails to recognise the role people’s ideals 
play in the normativity of good.
Railton describes personality as:
271 Railton (1989: 158).
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... a collection of properties that ground dispositions to react in various ways to exposure 
to certain facts.
Railton is an ‘ internalist’ he claims that if something is a non-moral good for someone 
it must capable of motivating tliat person. To reject this is to make good 'intolerably alien’.^ "^^  
Railton thinks that on gaining full infonnation and rationality, a person’s personality will 
stay the same:^^^
...the idealization holds fixed the individual’s non-belief properties, so that the 
contribution of these features to desire-formation would remain largely the same.^^^
And,
When we ask [of the idealized agent] how his desires would change upon the impact of 
further information, we appeal to... [his personality]. We, in effect, hold this 
[personality] as nearly constant as possible when asking what someone like him would 
come to desire -  or, more precisely, would come to want that he pursue were he to 
assume the place of his original self.^ ^^
272 Railton (1986b; 23).
273 Again, tins differs from the type of intemalism discussed in chapter (III).
274 Ibid. Pg. 9.
275 This means Railton can avoid using substantive evaluative judgements, and hence avoid abandoning his reductive 
programme. Also it means he can retain a continuit)^ be a person and tlieir idealised selves, another essential feature to his 
account.
276 Railton (1986b; 20).
277 Railton (1986b; 23).
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With these points, we can introduce two criticisms of Railton’s position. First grant that non- 
moral good for A is what ^-plus would want A to want were he in X’s position. Then there 
seems to be a tension with this and Railton’s claim that if something is a non-moral good for A it 
must be capable of motivating
\
The tension arises because Railton thinks that A and A-pius have the same personality. 
But if this is the case then how could he cope with a case where A hates the personality he has, 
and hence is not motivated by the decisions it generates. This is a problem osA-plus would have 
the same personality and hence A would not be motivated by what advice A-plus would give. 
What A-plus would want A to want were he in A’s position, could then fail to be capable of 
motivating A. It could then fail to meet one of Railton’s main criteria for non-moral goodness.
It follows that if this argument were correct, Railton could not ‘close’ questions 
concerning his account, even if he rejects his intemalism. It is ‘open’ whether X is good for A, 
even if it is what A-plus would want A to want were he A. It suggests that Railton fails to 
completely naturalise the normativity of non-moral good for a person. I consider this in more 
detail, attempting initially to reconcile Railton’s intemalism with his account of non-moral 
goodness.
First, one may argue that if someone has Rill infonnation and rationality, then the 
‘objectionable’ parts of his/lier personality cease to play a role; something for which (P5) does not 
account. However, this is problematic. Arguably, something is ‘objectionable’ in as far as it causes 
deviation from the non-moral good. Thus, such a response must already assume an account of good.
278 This is Raillon's intemalism. See for instance, Railton (1986b: 9).
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Furthermore, evidence suggests that increasing information does not have a uniform effect on 
personality. Some people become more compassionate, whilst others become more ‘cold’ and 
fatalistic.^^ This way of responding by claiming personality changes is difficult. However, this is 
extraneous, as denying (P5) is not an option for Railton; on his account personality cannot 
change.^^^ If it could, then there would be a worry about the continuity between a person and 
his/her idealised self.
Second response: one may think that it is true that a person could detest his/her fully 
informed and rational personality, but that what he/she says might still be good for them. Hence, 
Railton could argue that the argument rests on the false implicit premise that there is a 
connection betw>een someone's ideal type o f person and what is good for that person. The 
problem with such a response is that it puts pressure on intemalism (P2). Rejecting the premise 
Railton is forced to claim that what is intrinsically valuable for a person need not have a 
connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were 
rational and aware. In what follows I will outline this in more detail; I start by adapting Railton’s 
example of Beth the accountant.^^^
Presume that Beth knows that she is very methodical and un-spontaneous; she is overly 
thorough, calculates all risks for all actions and tends to lack imagination (this is Beth’s 
personality- something she doesn’t much like). Beth-plus knows that Beth will fail as a writer
279 One may be inclined to think that fully informed agents will liave the same personality. However, the point is not 
whether frilly intbimed and rational people would prescribe the same thing but whetlier what they prescribe is good.
280 Recall tliat an ‘idealised’ agent is one with full infonnation and rationahty.
281 And problems about circularity. ,
282 See Railton (1986b), and § 1 of tliis chapter.
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and hence wants Beth to give it Because she has full information, Beth-plus can recognise 
her personality in a way that is unobvious to Beth. This makes it clear to her why Beth is an 
excellent bookkeeper, but a lousy writer. According to Railton, the views of Beth-plus will be 
‘suited to’ or ‘made for’ Beth such that they are ‘attractive’ and ‘compelling’ to her; but this 
does not obviously follow.^ "^^  Consider Railton’s reasoning again; Beth will be motivated:
... because it is natural to care about whether one is happy and whether one’s desires are 
satisfied.^^^
The point is that what is important to us, what will be ‘compelling’ and ‘attractive’ to us, is not 
just whether we will be happy. If Beth hates the fact that she is a miser and that this makes her 
happy, then laiowing she will be happy as a miser in the future is not going to motivate her. 
What is important is not whether ‘one’s desires are satisfied’, but whether the desires satisfied 
are the ‘right’ ones in relation to the person we want to become. It seems that Railton’s 
intemalism is in tension with the response that ideals for people and what is good for them are 
separable. For instance, one can imagine Beth, on learning Beth-plus’s views, saying:
“Well, it is no surprise that I say this! Regrettably, I always take the ‘safe’ option. 
However, I do not want to be driven by this personality any more; I promised myself 1 would act 
spontaneously to change myself. I realise that the only way to do this is by taking risks; but this
283 It is a pressing question why Railton thinks that Bctli-plus hw w s  Betli’s future; however, 1 do not discuss this.
284 In fact, he says tliat such a comiection is ‘psychologically necessary;': ‘There is no logical contradiction involved in 
embracing wholeheartedly a desire tliat one knows one would want not to be effective in one’s actual hfe were one fully 
informed and rational. The sort of conflict that is basic to the criticism of desires is psychological rather tlian logical. One 
might call this conflict “cognitive dissonance” were it merely cognitive.’ Railton (1986b: 14 -  15).
285 Railton (1986b: 13).
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is fine, even if it means failing as a writer. Such a situation is preferable to staying the way 1 
am!”^^
If this description is plausible (and I see no reason to think it is not) then Beth-plus’s 
desires lack the appropriate motivational force. Separating the ideal of a person and what is good 
for him/her appears to force Railton to reject intemalism. We can put this in a general form; 
assume that A i is an ideal type of person for A, and Ai would council A against doing X. Then, 
denying a connection between ideals for people and what is good means it is still possible thatX 
is good for A. However, how could Railton then show that X is ‘compelling’, or ‘attractive’ for A 
such that it is capable of motivating him? Therefore, claiming that there is no connection 
between ideals for people and what is good for them forces Railton to give up internalism.^^^ 
Further problems for Railton’s account arise after a few thoughts about the nature of persons.
Assume that what sets people apart from animals is their capability for self-reflection; 
people have higher-order desires, whereas animals do not.^^  ^ They have an ability to ‘stand 
back’ from their desires and make various decisions about which ‘path’ their life will take. We 
tend not to identify people with their actions and activities.^^^ Of course, they can be identified 
in such a way, consider the addict for example. However, in these cases we say that something 
essential to them as people is lost. Our language reflects this, as we tend to have distinct labels 
for such characters. In Frankfurt’s terminology, they are ‘wantons’. T o  have the ability for
286 Perhaps failing a number of times will create in her tire spontaneity tlrat she craves?
287 Rosati (1995) makes this point about the nature of persons.
288 This equivalence is controversial; this is how Frankllirt (1971) argues. He uses higher-order desires to characterise ‘self- 
reflection’ and ‘autonomy’.
289 Roughly, by ‘identified’ I mean that tliere is no potential to list the qualities of people. This is different from, for 
example, tables, dogs and some humans, addicts perhaps.
290 ‘ Wlien a person acts, the desire by which he is moved is eitlier tire will he wants or a will he wants to be without. Wlren a 
wanton acts, it is neitlrer.’ Frankflirt (1971: 14).
130
self-reflection gives people the ability to invent and re-invent themselves. This involves the 
ability to consider what type of person one wants to become, and what ‘path’ in life to follow. 
We do not merely want to be happy, but we desire to experience happiness as a certain type of 
person.Arguably,  what is central to the concept of person and free will, is the ability for self 
invention. We can usefully think of the ability to invent oneself as the capacity to ‘stand before’ 
a multitude of ‘possible selves’, and choosing to be guided by one of them. Of course, 
sometimes we lack the ability to change our personality.^^^ This, though, is still compatible with 
hating taking advice from that personality. The point is that we believe we can choose different 
selves to guide us.
If these thoughts are more or less correct then Railton cannot adopt the second response. 
Good for a person needs to be ‘attractive’ and ‘compelling’ so that it has the capability to 
motivate. Then it has to be ‘suited to’ or ‘made for’ people as self-inventors', after all, this is 
what is essential to personhood. However, Railton explicitly states that to give full information 
and rationality to an agent does not alter his/her personality. How then could his account be 
suited to someone as a person -  as a potential self-inventor? How could it even be capable of 
motivating that person?
Railton’s account does not respect the fact that as persons we have the ability to choose 
between possible selves. As Rosati writes:
291 Rosati make a useful distinction: ‘... in determining a person’s good, what matters is not simply witli whom a person is 
identical (i.e. the facts about her), but with whom she identifies^. Rosati (1995: 60),
292 Frankfurt (1971) and Rosati (1995) both hold a similar \dew. Again, like many of these points about tire nature of 
personliood, tliis needs frirtlier discussion, but the basic idea is - 1 think -  clear.
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[Railton’s] definition of ‘good for a person’ incorporates a person’s cuiTent motivational 
system into the very criterion of her good. It thereby treats her as identical with that 
motivational system for purposes of determining her good."^^
Hence, Railton has a restricted view of autonomy and personhood. The question about what is 
good for a person and what sort of person to be, are not separable. Rosati again;
In asking what is good, we ask what is worth pursuing or desiring or caring for. But being 
a particular sort of person involves having characteristic intrinsic motivations, and 
thereby, a distinctive way of approaching the world, of seeing value in things. 
Consequently, when we ask what to find motivating, we at the same time ask what sort of 
person to be. We settle simultaneously our questions about who to be, how to desire, and 
what to seek.^ '^*
Because I am a person, an ideal for me (the one I choose to advise me), will dictate what is good for 
me; the second response is not an option.
Notice that, as a response, Railton cannot simply adapt his account to include substantive 
evaluative judgements. He claims that it is a reductive account of good for a person that he finds most 
appealing. Of course, it is possible for him to reject reductive accounts, or alternatively intemalism 
(this ability to revise his account is a consequence of his methodological naturalism). However, in
293 Rosati (1995; 62). Notice tliat motivation is distinct from action. Arguably, I can be motivated to X, even tliough I am 
physically restricted from doing X; motivation ought not to be read as action.
294 Rosati (1995; 62).
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doing so he would be abandoning the defining features of his position, hi reference to his comments 
on Moore’s OQA opening this section, questions concerning Railton’s account are not ‘barely 
possible’, but are ‘genuinely compelling’.
§4. Coiidusion.
Peter Railton puts forward an account that combines methodological and substantive 
naturalism. It can avoid traditional versions of the OQA because it rejects the need for a priori 
meaning equivalence in establishing property identity. He attempts to give an account of non- 
moral good for a person, claiming that for it to succeed it must have both a normative and a 
naturalistic element. Railton concludes that a position based on full infonnation and rationality 
has these.
David Wiggins has argued that a ‘revived’ version of the OQA challenges Railton’s 
position. Essentially, he holds that because there is a qualitative difference between valuational 
interest and an interest in explanation and prediction it seems unlikely that naturalism could be 
correct. I claimed that such a challenge misses its intended target. Railton starts from the claim 
that there is such difference in interests and hence rejects conceptual analysis. Consequently, he 
claims to establish his position via a posteriori empirical investigation. I concluded that 
Wiggins’s account begs the question against Railton’s by assuming that methodological 
naturalism will never justify substantive naturalism. I also argued that if Wiggins’s argument 
were correct then the tmth of orthodox scientific identity claims becomes questionable. I took 
this as a reductio of Wiggins’s OQA, and I concluded that it is a complete failure.
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However, in the last section I argued that there is a version of the OQA that challenges 
Railton’s account. It turns on the fact that his naturalisation of normativity is incomplete. 
Questions concerning Railton’s account are ‘open’ because they fail to recognise the role of 
ideals for people. Possible selves inform our decisions, and the notion of possible selves requires 
the ability to change personality. This is something that Railton’s account rejects. I conclude that 
the OQA challenges his naturalist position.^^^
If the naturalist finds this challenge convincing then he could, as discussed above, either 
give up intemalism or reject reductionism and introduce substantive evaluative judgements. In 
the next chapter, I discuss Richard Boyd’s naturalism that takes the former option.
295 Furtheraiore, I granted that Railton could talk about M l rationality. However it is controversial that one can naturalise 
full information and fiUl rationality in this way. Thus, even if Railton met the challenge of this chapter he would still have to 




NON ANALYTIC NATURALISM AND THE OQA (II)
This chapter discusses Richard Boyd’s claim that moral terms are natural kind terms that 
rigidly designate natural k i n d s . I  argue that although Boyd’s naturalism is resilient to some 
forms of OQA, it is not resilient to all foiTns of it.
§1 discusses Boyd’s naturalism and §2 considers two versions of OQA, both of which 
challenge Boyd’s account. §3 concludes that non-analytic naturalism based on ‘natural kind 
semantics’ fails.
§1. Kripke, Putnam and Boyd’s Natnralism.^^^
The work of Hilaiy Putnam has provided a foundation for this version of non-analytic 
natural! sm.^ ^^  He argues that the ‘stereotype’ of a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to fix the reference of a natural kind term.^^  ^His ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment demonstrates 
this.^^ * Putnam imagines with the aid of a little science-fiction,
...that somewhere in the Galaxy there is a planet which we shall call Twin Earth. Twin 
Earth is very much like Earth; in fact, people on Twin Earth even speak English... One of 
the peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the liquid called ‘water’ is not H2O but a different
297 Boyd (1988).
298 Kripke (1980), Putnam (1975) and Boyd (1998).
299 Altliough Putnam and Kripke (1980) botli talk about tliese issues, I will focus on Putnam.
300 By ‘stereotype’ I mean tlie features one commonly associates with properties. The ‘stereotype’ of water would include a 
liquid which is tasteless, odourless etc. I prefer this to ‘nominal essence’ as it avoids confusion generated by the fact tliat 
Putnam and Kripke argue tliat natural kinds do not have nominal essences.
301 It is possible to generalise tliis point and claim that ‘stereotype’ understood in terms of concepts or cognitive content 
caimot fix tlie reference of natiual kind terms.
135
liquid whose chemical formula... I shall abbreviate... as XYZ. I shall suppose that XYZ 
is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures..., tastes like water 
and...quenches thirst like water...that the oceans and lakes and seas of Twin Earth 
contain XYZ and not water, that it rains XYZ on Twin Earth and not water, etc. °^^
In other words, twin-water has the same stereotype as water. However, Putnam argues that this 
does not mean that we Earthians mean by our word ‘water’ what Twin Earthians mean by theirs. 
If I were to travel to Twin Earth and pointing to a glass of twin water say ‘This is water’ then I 
should have gone wrong - that is - spoken falsely, since, twin water (XYZ) is not water (H2O). 
This is in contrast to the Twin Earthian who goes right - that is - speaks truly, in pointing to the 
glass of twin-water and saying ‘This is water’. Earthians and Twin Earthians understand the 
word ‘water differently The meaning of ‘water’ tracks a particular* kind of liquid, the XYZ 
kind for the Twin Earthian, and the H2O kind for Earthian.^ "^  ^Putnam concludes that it is the 
environment inhabited rather than the stereotype which determines the meaning of certain 
terms.
It follows that the ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment demonstrates that the referent is the 
same across all possible worlds. Natural kind terms are, in Kripke’s terminology, rigid
302 Putoam (1975: 223).
303 For a clear and useful discussion of tliis see McCulloch (1995: 167).
304 Kiipke (1980: 122), makes tlie same point about kinds of things.
305 Call tliese teims ‘natural kind terms.'
306 Flow is the reference of natural kind terms fixed? Kripke suggests it happens via a ‘dubbing’ with a sample of tlie natural 
kind winch causally regulate the terms’ use. Natural kind terms have their reference grounded by relevant casual ‘hook-ups’ 
between speakers and tlie world, wliicli establishes tliat natural kind terms’ capacity to refer passes tlirougliout tlie linguistic 
community.
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des ignators .A consequence of this is that natural kind tenns flanking an identity sign produce 
a synthetic identity that, if true, reveals something essential about what is being identified. Thus, 
although it is an epistemic possibility that water is not H2O, if it is, then it is metaphysically 
necessary.
Boyd argues that there is a similar identity between moral properties and natural 
properties. Even though moral terms and natural terms are not synonymous, if the property 
identity is true it reveals something essential to moral properties. Thus, the OQA does not 
challenge his position because there is no a priori meaning equivalence between the terms,
Boyd gives an account of how the reference of ‘good’ is fixed, and how the referential 
capacity of ‘good’ spreads throughout the linguistic community:
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t. [‘good’] refers to a kind (property, 
relation, etc) k just in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it 
about, over time, that what is predicated of the term / will be approximately true of k 
...Such mechanisms will typically include the existence of procedures which are 
approximately accurate for recognizing members or instances of/c (at least for easy cases) 
and which relevantly govern the use of /, the social transmission of certain relevantly 
approximately true beliefs regarding k, formulated as claims about /....a pattern of 
deference to experts on k with respect to the use of t, etc When relations of this sort
307 Kripke (1980: 48-49).
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obtain, we may think of the properties of k as regulating the use of t (via such causal
relations).
§2. OQA and Boyd’s Naturalism.
Horgan and Timmons state that if a semantically competent speaker considers a question 
carefully and judges that the answer to it is obviously ‘yes’ or obviously ‘no’, then the question 
is closed. They claim that a question that is not closed is ‘open’.^ ^^  Horgan and Timmons’s 
argument against Boyd starts by claiming that (1) & (2) are ‘open’;
(1) Liquid L is H2O, but is it water?
(2) Liquid L is water, but is it H20?^ ^^
This is true. Second, Horgan and Timmons claim that (3) & (4) are ‘closed’:
(3)G/w/2 that the use o f ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind H2O, 
is liquid L, which is H2O, water?
{A)Given that the use o f ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind H2O, 
is liquid L, which is water, H20?^ ^^
308 Boyd (1988; 116). Boyd is tlicii distancing himself from Kripke’s discussion o f ‘baptism’ and ‘dubbing’; he talks about 
‘... causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over time, tlrat what is predicated of tire tenir t will be 
approximately true of A'... (1988; 116),
309 Horgair and Thimroirs (1992: 161).
310 Horgan and Timmons (1992: 161).
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Horgan and Timmons argue that on Boyd’s account (5) & (6), like (1) & (2), should be ‘open’:
(5)Entity e has natural property N, but is it good?
(6) Does entity e, which is good, have natural property N?^ ^^
And (7) & (8), like (3) & (4), should be ‘closed’:
(7) Given that the use of ‘good’ by humans is causally regulated by natural property N, is 
entity e, which has N, good?
(8) Given that the use of ‘good’ by humans is causally regulated by natural propeity N, 
does entity e, which is good, have N?^ ^^
However, Horgan and Timmons suggest that a version of Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ thought 
experiment demonstrates that (7) and (8) are open. Their ‘Moral Twin Earth’ thought experiment 
runs as follows:
Suppose that on Earth, ‘good’ is causally regulated by a functional property whose 
functional essence is captured by Tc, a consequentialist normative theory. Now, consider a
311 Horgan and Timmons (1992; 161).
312 Horgan &Timmons (1992; 155).
313 Horgan and Timmons (1992: 163).
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planet ‘Moral Twin Earth’ which is supeiTicially identical to Earth: water falls from clouds, 
trains are rarely on time, politicians often avoid giving straight answers to straight questions, 
and, importantly. Twin Earthians have a moral vocabulaiy that is oithographically identical to 
Earthians. That is:
...the terms are used to reason about considerations bearing on Moral Twin Earthling 
well-being; Moral Twin Earthlings are normally disposed to act in certain ways 
corresponding to judgements about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’; they nonnally take 
considerations about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ to be especially important, even of 
overriding importance in most cases, in deciding what to do, and so on.^ "^^
Call these features ‘common sense morality’. As such, Earthians would be inclined to interpret 
Twin Earthians ‘good’ as meaning the same as theirs.
However, the planets are not identical. Tc does not causally regulate ‘Good’ on ‘Moral 
Twin Earth’, what does is a functional property whose functional essence is captured by a 
deontological theory Td. Additionally, there is a reliable method of moral inquiiy that could 
demonstrate that Tc and Td played these different roles.
Horgan and Timmons imagine a time before such an inquiiy where an Earthling and 
Twin Earthling disagree over whether something is good. They claim there are two ways of 
describing such a situation. Despite appearances, the Twin Earthling and the Earthling are not 
actually disagreeing as they mean different things by ‘good’. The environment determines the
314 Horgan and Timmons (1992: 164).
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meaning of ‘good’, and they inhabit different environments. Twin Earthling and the Earthling 
are best thought of as talking at ‘cross-purposes’. If this is the correct way to proceed then the 
intuitions match those in Putnam’s original thought experiment. Alternatively, common sense 
morality determines the meaning of ‘good’, and there is genuine disagreement.
Hogan & Timmons propose that the second description is the most natural. Learning that 
Td, rather than Tc, causally regulates ‘good’, does not invite the conclusion that it differs in 
meaning. Consequently -  contrary to what Boyd thinks -  our semantic intuitions do not support 
the claim that a natural kind causally regulates the use of ‘good’.
Horgan and Timmons argue that their conclusion is perfectly general across all non- 
analytic naturalistic accounts;
For any [version of non-analytic naturalism]... according to which (i) moral terms bear 
some relation R to certain natural properties that collectively satisfy some specific 
normative moral theoiy T, and (ii) moral terms supposedly refer to the natural properties 
to which they bear this relation R, it should be possible to construct a Moral Twin Earth 
scenario suitably analogous to the one constructed above -  i.e., a scenario in which twin- 
moral terms bear the same relation R to certain natural properties that collectively satisfy 
some specific normative theoiy T ’, incompatible with T. The above reasoning [against 
Boyd’s account] should apply, mu ta fis mutandis, against the envisioned alternative 
version of [nonanalytic naturalism]
315 Morgan and Timmons (1992: 167)
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If non-analytic naturalists want to resist Horgan and Timmons’s OQA, then they have 
four options.^^^ First, they can deny that Horgan and Timmons’s account describes a genuine 
possibility, and so hold that our intuitions have no evidential weight. This response is too strong. 
It would require defending the conceptual impossibility of such thought experiments. Given the 
‘Moral Twin Earth’ scenario is intelligible, this would incur an ovei*whelming burden of proof.
Second, they can argue that although (7) & (8) are ‘open’, there is no guarantee that they 
will stay this way; a natural property may end up ‘closing’ them. Apart from an unrealistic 
optimism, this response fails because it disregards the fact that Horgan and Timmons’s OQA is 
a general argumentative strategy. Consequently, such a reply would have to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of OQA before making such claims about the future.
Third, they can claim that people’s intuitions about ‘Moral Twin Earth’ are simply 
mistaken and hence do not undermine causal semantic naturalism:
After all, brute intuitions don’t settle the matter by themselves; they can be overruled by a 
semantical theoiy that best accommodates all relevant data, including data about the 
workings of moral discourse and inquiiy. Once all relevant data are considered, the new 
waver might argue, Boydian semantics has a lot going for it and recalcitrant intuitions 
should be dismissed.^^^
316 They could also adopt a form of relativism. However, I take Horgan and Timmons’s response to tliis as definitive; 
[Relativism] will be very unattractive to new wave meta-etliical naturalists like Boyd. These philosophers espouse moral 
realism, an adamantly non-relativist position. And in any case, relativism is tlie last defensive ditch against Moral Twin 
Eartli. If etliical naturalism gets forced mto that ditch, tliere it deserves to die. Horgan and Timmons (1992; 170).
317 Horgan and Timmons (1992: 168).
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Such semantic intuitions could be mistaken; however, the burden of proof would be great, as:
First, we are talking about not just any old intuitively strong beliefs involving morality, 
but intuitive beliefs about meaning, surely an important kind of data when one is 
considering theoretical accounts of meaning, not so easily dismissed. Second, even 
allowing that such intuitions could be overridden by an otheiwise plausible semantics of 
moral discourse, nevertheless, ceteris paribus, a semantical account that respects 
meaning-intuitions of competent language users is to be preferred over one that does 
not.^^^
The fourth response focuses on the work of Laurence, Margo lis, and Dawson -  I will 
argue this, too, fails.^^  ^They claim that Horgan and Timmons’s argument is ‘a cheat’ as it relies 
on a commonly known chemical identity. They write that the answers to (3) & (4) do seem 
obvious to ordinaiy English speakers. Yet this is simply because it is such a familiar eveiyday 
fact that water is H2O. The answers to these questions are, obviously, ‘yes’ simply on the ground 
that everyone htows that water is H20.^ °^
Horgan and Timmons’s argument then does not rely on semantic intuitions but on how 
much chemistry people know. The correct response to the ‘Moral Twin Earth’ thought 
experiment is to deny that (3) & (4) are ‘closed’. There is then no ‘open/closed’ distinction and
318 Horgan and Timmons (1992: 169-170).
319 Laurence, Margolis and Dawson: http://www.shef.ac.nk/-phiFstaffrlanrence/papers/MRTE.html.
320 Lam-ence, Margolis and Dawson: hllp://v\'ww.shef.ac.nk/—phil/staff/laui-ence/papers/MRTE.html: 12.
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hence no argument against Boyd. To make this clear, Laurence, Margolic, and Dawson claim 
that (7) & (8) are not analogous to (3) & (4), but are analogous to questions where the chemical 
identity is not so familiar, like (9) & (10);
(9) Given that the use of ‘saccharin’ by humans is causally regulated by C7H5O3NS, is 
substance S, which is C7H5O3NS, saccharin?
(10) Given that the use of ‘saccharin’ by humans is causally regulated by C7H5O3NS, is 
substance S, which is saccharin, CtHsOsNS.^ ^^
They claim that because (9) & (10) are ‘open’, but ‘saccharin’ does rigidly designate the 
natural kind C7H5O3NS, our semantic intuitions lack evidential weight. Specifically, we can 
conclude that (7) & (8) are ‘open’, but that ‘good’ rigidly designates N. However, I shall now 
argue that they are wrong; (9) & (10) are ‘closed’, and (7) & (8) are analogous with (3) & (4).
Somewhere in the Galaxy there is a planet which we shall call Twin E a r th .T w in  Earth 
is very much like Earth; in fact, people on Twin Earth even speak English. One of the 
peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the substance called ‘saccharin’ is not C7H5O3NS but a 
different substance whose chemical formula I shall abbreviate as XYZ. I shall suppose that XYZ 
is indistinguishable from saccharin at nomial temperatures and pressures, tastes like saccharin 
and sweetens coffee like saccharin. The shops, homes and teas of Twin Earthians’ contain XYZ.
321 ‘ Semantic open/closed distinction’ refers to whetlier, based purely on semantic intuitions (rather than epistemic state), 
one would answer a question obviously ‘yes’ or obrtously ‘no’ (closed), or whether one would not (open).
322 Laurence, Margolis atid Dawson: http://w\\fW.shef.ac.uk/~phil/staff/laurence/papers/MRTE.html: 12.
323 This is adapted from Putnam (1975: 223).
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In other words, twin- saccharin has the same stereotype as saccharin. However, this does not 
mean that we Earthians mean by our word ‘saccharin’ the same thing as Twin Earthians. If I 
were to travel to Twin Earth and pointing to a dispenser of twin saccharin say ‘This is saccharin’ 
then I should have gone wrong, that is, spoken falsely, since twin saccharin (XYZ) is not 
saccharin (C7H5O3NS). This is in contiast to the Twin Earthian who goes right, that is, speaks 
truly, in pointing to the dispenser of twin saccharin and saying ‘This is saccharin’. Earthians and 
Twin Earthians understand the word ‘saccharin’ differently. The meaning o f ‘saccharin’ tracks a 
particular kind of substance, the XYZ kind for tlie Twin Earthian, and the C7H5O3NS kind for 
Earthian.^ '^* It is the environment inhabited rather than stereotype which determines the meaning 
of the terms. If this is true, as it seems to me to be, then (9) & (10) are closed and Laurance, 
Margolis and Dawson are mistaken. That is, the ‘revived’ OQA does not depend on how much 
people know about chemistiy. It assumes that we know the referent o f‘good’ and then considers 
our semantic intuitions.
None of the four considered responses to Horgan and Timmons’s argument is successful. 
However, things are worse for the non-analytic naturalist. There is a version of the OQA that 
does not rely on specific intuitions about particular thought experiments.
What makes natural kind reductions such as Boyd’s possible is the claim that certain 
moral terms are rigid designators. A term being a rigid designator relies on certain referential 
intentions. Hence, if there is an asymmetry between the referential intentions associated with 
rigid designators and those associated with moral terms then this would count against Boyd’s 
position. Hence, to judge the success of Boyd’s claims we must clarify the nature of the
3 24 Kripke (1980: 122), makes the same point about kinds of tilings.
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referential intentions associated with rigid designators. To this end, I consider the rigid 
designator, and natural kind term, ‘water’.
Using the term ‘water’, we intend to refer to a property that has a particular role. In 
telling someone that a glass is full of water, we communicate that the liquid in the glass will 
have certain effects on him or her. It will cause him or her to see a liquid that is transparent, 
quench his/her thirst, etc. It will cause those characteristics typically associated with water.
Furthermore, ‘water’ is used to ‘pick out’ what is actually causally responsible for these 
characteristics. We are not, for example, concerned with the property causally responsible in 
another possible world. This reflects our belief that in using ‘water’ we intend to refer to that 
which we encounter in our everyday experience. We are interested in referring to whatever it is 
that causally impinges on our actual lives.
Finally, by using ‘water’, we ‘pick out’ a property that may lack some or all of the 
characteristics typically associated with water. If water were in fact green, then we would not 
conclude that water ceased to exist; the conclusion would be that water had always been green. 
This holds for all the characteristics associated with water: water may turn out to be a solid, boil 
at hundred and ten degrees, taste of Cola, etc. We can put these three points as follows:
(W) In using the term ‘water’ speakers intend to refer to whatever property was, in the 
actual world, causally responsible for water’s ordinaiy characteristics and causal role.
I simo;est this can be generalised for all natural kind terms that are rigid designators:
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(N) Speakers intended to refer to whatever property was, in the actual world, causally
responsible for the kind’s ordinary characteristics and causal role 325
If non-analytic naturalism were correct then a similar statement ought to be available; for 
example;
(G) In using the term ‘good’ speakers intend to refer whatever propeity was, in the actual 
world, causally responsible for the characteristics, including the causal role, common 
sense morality characterises for good.
(G) is not something we immediately recognise as true. That is, we do not straight away 
see that these are our referential intentions when applying ‘good’. This suggests that ‘good’ is 
not a rigid designator. However, before we can confirm this suspicion, further discussion is 
required concerning our referential intentions.
Saying that something is ‘water’ communicates that it will have certain causal effects: if 
someone drinks it, it will quench his or her thirst; if it is taken to zero degrees centigrade it will 
solidify, etc. However, communicating to others that certain facts have specific causal roles is 
not part of our referential intentions with moral terms. When we say that something is wrong, 
we are trying to get people to disapprove or feel a certain way; we are trying to get people to 
recognise it is something that there is reason not to do.
325 See Gampel (1996: 196) also has this formulation.
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The non-analytic naturalist may respond by claiming that there are in fact certain causal 
roles that people intend to refer to with their moral terms. However, this seems highly 
improbable. While there is a consensus concerning the causal role of temperature, water, salt, 
etc., there is no consensus concerning the causal role of good, wrong, right etc. Such asymmetry 
is a problem for the non-analytic naturalist. It seems unlikely, then, that there is a causal role that 
we all intend to refer to when using moral terms. In fact, I suggest that if there were such a role 
it would itself be moral in character. For example, good people do good deeds; injustice causes 
harm. This makes trouble for a naturalist who seeks to provide a reductive account of the 
relevant causal roles and moral properties.
Could it be the case that the original users of the terms ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, 
etc. picked out things which did not have the ethical properties in question? If we think the 
answer is ‘yes’ then it appears that another of the referential intentions identified does not apply 
to moral terms, for it is not the case that we think the original creators of ‘hot’, ‘water’, ‘salt’, 
etc. could have picked out things that did not have the natural properties in question. As Kripke 
has argued, there is in such cases an original ‘dubbing’, or ‘baptism’, of such terms with actual 
instances of the property. It is because of this that a ‘referential link’ can be ‘spread’ through the 
linguistic c o m m u n i t y I  suggest that the answer to this first question is ‘yes’; the original use 
of ‘good’, ‘right’ etc. could have picked out things that did not have the ethical properties in 
question. It seems that anyone could have been wholly mistaken in his or her ethical statements. 
This does not mean that there is no way of knowing what is good - just that no one knows yet.
326 Kiipke (1986:133-139).
148
Although improbable, this is possible, and hence suggests that there is another difference 
between the referential intentions with rigid designators and moral temis.
The final referential intention highlighted also fails to apply to moral terms. It is true that 
when using the term ‘water’ we accept that all the characteristics we associate with the property 
water may turn out to be different. However, it is not true that in using the term ‘good’ we 
accept that all the associated characteristics may turn out to be different. If what I have argued 
for in earlier chapters were correct, then the ability to motivate and the connection to practical 
reason are fundamental to our understanding of moral terms. Therefore, in using moral terms, 
these features must be present if we are to refer to various moral properties. However, the point 
need not rest on the truth of these particular claims. The question is whether in using moral 
terms we intend to refer to properties that may lack all of those characteristics we associate with 
moral properties. It seems to me that in such cases we would not conclude that our judgement 
about good was mistaken, but that we cease to be referring to good. Importantly, this is not to 
claim that all the ordinary characteristics we associate with good are correct; I am not a perfect 
judge of what is good, and can imagine that some ordinary criteria are wrong. The point is that 
what leaves this ‘openness’ to change is my awareness of alternatives whereas, with the criteria 
for natural kinds:
..my Agnosticism...is due to my knowing they are crude approximation methods, and 
that there are stricter (causal) ones which trump them.^^^
327 Gampel (1997a: 159).
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These observations highlight that the burden of proof lies with anyone who wants to 
claim that moral terms fiinction like terms denoting (natural) kinds. So, there is a way of 
challenging non-analytic naturalism that relies on eveiyday intuitions, rather than those based on 
‘Moral Twin Earth’.
§3. Conclusion.
Nonanalytic naturalism can respond to the OQA discussed in chapters III and IV, as it 
rejects the claim that property identity requires synonymy. Boyd argues that there is a synthetic 
identity between moral properties and natural properties that, if true, reveals something about 
the essence of moral properties.
I argued that there are two related versions of the OQA that challenge non-analytic 
naturalism. The first states that if Boyd were correct and moral terms rigidly designate natural 
kinds then a suitably altered version of Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment ought to 
support this. However, the thought experiment does not, and hence Boyd cannot secure the 
metaphysical necessity required for his account.
I claimed that, although a genuine challenge, the OQA would be stronger if it did not 
depend on a specific thought experiment. Therefore, I suggested another way of capturing the 
same open question intuitions that does not rely on claims about ‘Moral Twin Earth’. Reflection 
on one’s semantic practice reveals that there is a significant difference between the referential 
intentions with moral terms and the referential intentions with natural kind terms. This 
difference counts in favour of treating the OQA as a genuine argumentative device.
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I conclude that the OQA not only challenges analytic naturalism but also challenges non- 
analytic naturalism. In the next chapter, 1 discuss supernaturalism as a way of clarifying the 
relation between open questions and epistemic possibility.
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(VÏI)
ROBERT ADAMS' SUPERNATURALISM 
rBüE()(kL
In this chapter, 1 discuss Robert Adams’ claim that certain moral properties are 
supernatural.^^^ In §1 I outline Adams’ version of the OQA; in §2 I argue that the ‘openness’ of 
open questions is not due to epistemic possibility, that Adams’ version of the OQA fails and that 
his account is challenged by the OQA; in §3 I draw some conclusions.
§1. Good as a Super natural Property.
Adams claims that Good is God. God is the exemplar of good; that is, things are Good in 
as much as they resemble God. However, this does not mean that ‘Good’ is synonymous with 
‘resembles God’. Rejecting the idea that property identity requires a priori meaning 
equivalence, Adams adopts a semantic account similar to Richard Boyd’s . T o  understand 
‘Good’ is to grasp the characteristics of Good, and these fix the reference of ‘Good’. Once this 
reference is discovered a posteriori it can be claimed that Good, as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity, is identical with that referent. Adams’ account differs from Boyd’s by arguing that 
Good is not a natural kind.^^  ^Even so, Adams writes:
328 Adams (1979) and (1999).
329 Boyd (1988). See chapter VI.
330 Adams writes: What is given by tire meaning [o f‘good’]... is a role that the nature is to play. If there is a single 
candidate tlrat best fills tire role, tlrat will be tire nature of tire thing. In tire case of a natural kind, arguably, tire role its nature 
is assigned by our lairguage is tlrat of accounting causally for tire obserr^able conmron properties of identified sairrples. The 
role that tire meaning o f‘good’ picks out for tire nature of tire good will be ratlrer different. Adams (1999: 16).
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... the meaning of the word ‘good’ may be related to the nature of the good in something
like the way that has been proposed for natural kinds.^^^
Adams’ project has two stages. First, it specifies the nature of Good and second, he 
considers whether there is a property with this character. However, Adams claims that to try to 
specify the nature of good in all contexts is too hard. Hence, he considers the idea of Good 
understood as excellence. His first stage, then, is to specify the characteristics of excellence.
States of affairs can have instrumental value and can be desirable for their own sake, but 
they lack a certain sort of unity. Consequently, Adams argues excellence is not one of their 
properties. He claims that this is something we can learn by reflecting on language. Beauty is an 
example of excellence and we say persons, physical objects, deeds and lives and some kinds of 
abstractions, can be beautiful, but states of affairs cannot.^^^ Excellence is not, then, a property 
of states of affairs.
Even so, Adams argues that excellence is best thought of as a property. He suggests that 
grammar supports the claim that excellence is an objective property; that is, we talk as if 
excellence were a property that existed independently of people’s j udgement s . In  our inquires 
about what is, or is not, good we generally think and speak on the assumption that we could be 
mistaken. The second characterisation of excellence is, then, that it is an objective property.
Clearly, people pursue what they judge to be excellent. Adams therefore considers the 
nature of this pursuit. As evidently, people pursue things which are not excellent, such as
331 Adams (1999: 16).
332 Plato also argued that beauty (icaXôç) is excellence. See Plato’s Symposium (210E).
333 Adams (1999: 18).
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money. To clarify the nature of the pursuit of excellence, Adams introduces the Greek idea of 
Eros. Although it has the most sexual connotations of any of the main Greek words for love, 
Eros is not merely a physical drive but also prizes the object it pursues as intrinsically valuable. 
Furthermore, Eros does not pursue without reflection; we admire the object o f Eros and due to 
this admiration, we pursue the object. Adams claims that this is similar to how one understands 
the pursuit of excellence. Rather than being physically driven to pursue excellence, one first 
admires what is excellent as intrinsically valuable, and then pursues it. However, Adams asks:
... don’t we admit that, in our folly, we often love, with admiration and desire, things that
334are not... [excellent], and fail to love things that are?
This however is compatible with Adams’ account.^^^ He attempts to outline the nature of Good 
understood as excellence that fixes the reference of ‘Good’, rather than give a definition. Adams 
thinks it supports his position that things could exhibit the characteristics of excellence yet not 
be excellence. Hence, the admission in the quotation does not threaten Adams’ account. 
However, a stronger claim is also a possibility on his account, namely, that things always or 
typically exhibit all the characteristics of excellence yet are not excellent. Adams wants to reject 
this stronger claim since, if it were accepted, a property typically belonging to things judged to 
be bad could be excellent. He thinks that, typically, we can Icnow whether something is good or 
not, and consequently we cannot usually or typically be mistaken about goodness. Excellence,
334 Adams (1999: 19).
335 Just as, arguably, something can have all the features commonly associated with water, and yet not be water.
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to some extent, is a property that one can recognise in t h i n g s T h u s ,  for Adams, excellence 
must be an object of recognition; it must be the case that excellence is normally recognised as 
excellence. He claims this does not commit him to conclude that whether or not something is 
excellent depends on whether it seems to be excellent. He still maintains that we can be wrong 
about what is excellent -  but not on a regular basis.
From this discussion, Adams draws the conclusion that:
The thesis... that seems to me most clearly correct is that to the extent that anything is 
good, in the sense of ‘excellent’, it is good for us to love it, admire it, and want to be 
related to it, whether we do in fact or not.^^^
The question remains as to what propeity exhibits these characteristics. Is there a 
property that is good to love, admire, and want to be related to, whether we actually do or not? 
Adams thinks that there is - the property of resembling God. If it is good to love or admire a 
thing then this is because that thing resembles God. As far as something resembles God, we can 
conclude that if that thing were loved and admired, then it would be good. Consequently, via a 
modern semantic account, Adams demonstrates that the proposition that good is resemblance to 
God is a synthetic yet necessary identi ty.However,  for Adams’ project to be successful, he
336 Adams (1999; 20). Surely though tliis admission is controversial. That is, it looks as if Adams is admitting what he takes 
to be hie ‘real essence’ of good into the ‘nominal essence.’ I discuss this in more detail below.
337 Adams (1999; 20).
338 Furthermore, resemblance to God is somefiiing which things have or lack objectively. Hence, Adams labels his position 
moral realism.
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must demonstrate why a supernatural, rather than a natural, property best satisfies the features of 
excel lence .He thinks he can secure this by rejecting Boyd’s account.
Adams claims that Boyd’s position has a problematic consequence. One could discover 
the natural kind tracked by ‘good’ and hence questions concerning Boyd’s account would be 
‘closed’. He labels the reason that such a consequence is problematic the ‘critical stance’; what 
he calls the ‘truth behind’ the ‘open question’ argument.^^^ Adams writes:
The stance amounts to at least this. For any natural, empirically identifiable property or 
type of action that we or others may regard as good or bad, right or wrong, we are 
committed to leave it always open in principle to raise evaluative or normative questions 
by asking whether that property or action-type is really good or right, or to issue an 
evaluative or normative challenge by denying that it is really good or right.^ "^ '
According to Adams, we ought to reject Boyd’s account because it does not respect the 
critical s t a n c e . H e  thinks the following is possible on Boyd’s account: society will at some 
point discover the nature of good and once this has occurred we will have to concede that one 
cannot significantly and meaningfully question this discoveiy. At this point, Boyd’s account 
becomes incompatible with the critical stance. It is committed to closing the epistemic 
possibility concerning the nature of good. In contrast, Adams writes about his own view:
339 Boyd (1988).
340 Adams (1999: 78).
341 Adams (1999:78).
342 A similar tliought caii be found in Jackson: in his words, immature folk morality respects the critical stance, whereas 
mature folk morality does not. Jackson (1998).
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A realist view of the Good as transcendent favours a particular version of the critical 
stance. It is a stance that stands ready to question or challenge any human view about 
what the Good is, and any empirical test of values. At the same time it is not a stance of 
arbitrariness or mere self-expressiveness... It reaches out towards an objective standard 
that is actually glimpsed, though never fully or infalliblyK^^
Hence, Adams argues that his account can always respect the critical stance; it is because the 
nature of God is beyond human knowledge that in principle one can always raise evaluative or 
normative questions by asking whether the proposed property or action-type is really good or 
right. In conclusion, ‘good’ understood as excellence is identical with resemblance to God, and
this, unlike naturalism, is compatible with ‘a veiy important feature of ethics’ - the critical
344stance.
§2, Analysis of Adams’ Account of Good.
In this section, I first argue that Adams’ objection to Boyd’s naturalism is mistaken. 
Second, I argue that because the OQA is not about epistemic possibility, it challenges Adams’ 
position.
343 Adams (1999:82). Emphasis added. Notice tliat in chapter IX I suggest that we can accoimt for tliis semantic practice 
without having to postulate a transcendent Good; our semantic practice witli moral tenns can capture the evidence 
transcendence usually thought to be evidence for moral realism.
344 Adams (1999: 78).
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Adams argues that Boyd’s account is incompatible with the ‘critical stance’. L e a v i n g  
aside that the OQA is not about epistemic possibility, is he correct? "^^  ^Boyd thinks that moral 
terms are natural kind terms that rigidly designate natural kinds. Assume then that we know that 
good is pleasure (there are further questions concerning the relationship between knowledge and 
certainty which I do not discuss) we then /c720Mrthat ‘good’ rigidly designates pleasure; we know 
‘good’ tracks pleasure across all possible worlds and there are no worlds in which ‘good’ refers 
to something else. Consequently, on Boyd’s account, //’we know that good is pleasure, then it is 
not metaphysically possible that good is something else.^ "^  ^ However, does this mean Boyd is 
committed to the possibility that we can have such Icnowledge? No, he argues that we could be 
wrong in our beliefs about what we think we know, even if we judge these beliefs justified. 
Therefore, Adams is mistaken in thinking that Boyd’s account will necessarily close ‘epistemic’ 
possibility. Hence he is unable to establish that Boyd’s account fails to respect the ‘critical 
stance’.
My second argument is that the OQA challenges Adams’ position. Given that Adams’ 
account identifies good with the unlmowable God, I conclude that the OQA has nothing to do 
with epistemic possibility.
Horgan and Timmons claim that there is a version of the OQA that applies to Boyd’s 
nonanalytic naturalism.^"^  ^ They close epistemic possibility and then consider semantic 
intuitions. That is, they propose a test that runs as follows; first, grant that we loiow certain facts.
345 Adams (1999: 78).
346 Adams (1999: 81).
347 This is explained in more detail in the last chapter.
348 See chapter VI.
349 Horgan and Timmons (1992). Theii' argument is a way of formalising the point I made above concerning epistemic and 
metaphysical possibility^
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then consider questions concerning certain synthetic identities ‘closed’. Horgan and Timmons 
claim that we ought to find such questions ‘closed’. They, for instance, argue that the following 
questions are ‘closed’:
(1) Given that the use of ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind H2O, 
is liquid L, which is H2O, water?
(2) Given that the use of ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind H2O, 
is liquid L, which is water, H20?^ "^ °
Horgan and Timmons argue that if we consider analogous questions on the Boydian account, 
then our semantic intuitions concerning it are different. Boyd’s account fails the ‘test’ for 
synthetic yet necessary identities, and hence Horgan and Timmons conclude that in the moral 
case there cannot be these types of identities. They conclude that Boyd’s account relies on an 
implausible semantic framework.
Given that Adams employs the same semantic framework as Boyd’s account, we can 
assume that Horgan and Timmons’s OQA will challenge his account. Such an argument would 
proceed as follows. Initially, we have to ‘close’ epistemic possibility concerning good’s identity 
with resemblance to God, and then we consider our semantic intuitions concerning this identity. 
If these intuitions mimic those concerning (1) & (2) then Adams’ account differs from Boyd’s
350 Horgan and Tiininons (1992: 162).
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and hence could possibly avoid the OQA. Initially, to see if this is plausible we must find 
questions equivalent to (1) & (2):
(3) Given that the use of ‘good’ by humans is regulated by the property of resembling
God, is L, which resembles God, good?
(4) Given that the use of ‘good’ by humans is regulated by
the property of resembling God, does L, which is good, resemble God?
The key question is whether semantically competent agents would judge these questions 
‘closed’. If they would, then we can conclude that the type of question being asked in (3) & (4) 
is similar to the type of question being asked in (1) & (2). This means that the OQA does not 
challenge Adams’ account in the same way that it challenges Boyd’s position. However, I claim 
that the opposite is true. That is, our response to (3) & (4) is fundamentally different from our 
response to (1) & (2). However, to show this we need a further argument.
Horgan and Timmons use Putnam’s ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment to demonstrate that 
the answers to (1) & (2) are obviously ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Hence, Adams may be able to adapt 
Putnam’s thought experiment to demonstrate that the answers to (3) & (4) are obviously ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. Of course, if the opposite were true -  that the answers to (3) & (4) are not obvious - then 
this would establish that Horgan and Timmons’s OQA presents a genuine challenge to Adams’ 
account. That is, we were right in the first place; (3) & (4) are ‘open’ questions.
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Suppose that ‘Twin Earth’ and Earth are alike, apart from Earth having a God. 
Importantly, Earthlings and Twin Earthlings use ‘good’ in identical ways, such that Earthlings |
would be convinced that Twin Earthlings and themselves mean the same by ‘good’.^ ^^  This I
identity includes the type of action guiding role discussed in earlier chapters.^^^ Consider then a 
case where an Earthling finds himself on ‘Twin Earth’ and also finds himself engaged in a moral 
disagreement concerning whether something is good. If the analogy with Putnam’s thought 
experiment holds, then our semantic intuitions ought to be that the Earthling and Twin Earthling 
are not disagreeing. We must conclude that they are talking at cross-purposes.
However, this description is not the most natural. Given that the action-guiding role of 
‘good’ is identical across Earth and ‘Twin Earth’, we think that the meaning o f ‘good’ would be 
the same across Earth and Twin Earth. Hence, the ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment suggests 
that the meaning of ‘good’ is not determined by the supernatural environment we inhabit; we do 
not believe that the meaning of ‘good’ tracks God across all possible worlds. Therefore, the 
thought experiment establishes that (3) & (4) are ‘open’, which in turn generates a powerful 
challenge to Adams’ position; he has to account for why semantic intuitions differ fr om (1) &
(2) to (3) & (4). This is the central point of the chapter: we can successfully apply the 
Horgan/Timmons OQA to Adams' position.
Perhaps things will be clearer if we consider Adams’ own discussion of the ‘Twin Earth’ 
experiment. Adams introduces this in developing his account of morally wrong.^^  ^ Like his 
account of good, he starts by considering the characteristics of morally wrong and then tries to
351 That is, before tire discovery of any diflerences in supernatural properties between tlieii planets.
352 1 use tire ‘action-guiding’ role - specifically, tire coinrection witlr motivation, and the connection with reason - as 
shorthaird for the ‘nominal essence’ of good; which I take to be the constituents of common sense morality.
353 Adams (1979).
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ascertain which property, if any, has these features. He suggests that being contrary to the 
commands of a loving God best fits this role. Thus, he concludes that wrong is identical with 
being contrary to the commands of a loving God. Recognising that the ‘Twin Earth’ thought 
experiment could be a problem for his account he discusses it, attempting to show why, in fact, 
it does not challenge his position:
... there is still, I suppose, a possible world, W4, in which there would not be a loving God 
but there would be people to whom W4 would seem much as the actual world seems to us, 
and who would use the word “wrong” much as we use it... We can even say that they 
would believe, as we do, that cruelty is wrong... [that is to say] that the subjective
psychological state that they would express by the ascription is that same that we
354express.
Adams claims that he is open to the possibility of Eaithlings and w4 inhabitants meaning the 
same thing by the word ‘wrong’. I assume though that this is a slip on Adams’ part; yet, it is 
surely a revealing one.^^  ^ It reveals Adams’ desire to hold onto the intuition that if two 
communities share the features central to common sense morality, such as the action guiding 
role of moral judgements, then one would conclude that members of those communities mean 
the same by their moral terms. That is, even given that for one there is no God and for the other
354 Adams (1975: 117). Emphasis added. In fact, even stating these points is odd for surely tlie existence of God is not 
contingent. Perhaps then Adams ought to have argued that ‘mongness’ is a strongly rigid designator, rather than merely a 
rigid designator. See Kiipke (1980: 49).
355 Adams (1979: 117). Reveahng in tliat it highlights his desire to retain tlie ability ofEaitliiings and w4 inliabitants to be 
in genuine disagreement.
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there is. That Adams cannot secure these intuitions becomes apparent when 1 clarify the 
implications of his account.
Given Adams’ semantic account, he cannot assert, as he does, that there is any common 
cognitive content across the actual world and W4. To make such a claim is to miss the point of 
Putnam’s thought experiment. The thought experiment demonstrates that if one adopts 
internalism about cognitive content, then Eaithlings and Twin Earthlings can never have the 
same cognitive content; briefly, this is why. For ease, adopt a Fregean context for this 
discussion. First, assume that Frege is correct to claim that sense determines reference. Second, 
assume that cognitive content determines sense grasped (if individuals are cognitively identical 
and use E, then they associate the same sense with E). Putnam’s argument proceeds. Suppose 
that two atom-for-atom doppelgangers Toscar (from Twin Earth) and Oscar (from Earth) visit 
each other’s planets and both are facing a puddle. Oscar thinks (and says, pointing) ‘This is 
water’ and Toscar things (and says, pointing) ‘This is water’. If water and twin water really are 
different substances, then Oscars ‘water’ does not have the same reference as Toscar’s ‘water’. 
And given that sense detemiines reference, Oscar’s ‘water’ has a different sense from Toscar’s 
‘water’. But we granted that Oscar and Toscar are atom-for-atom replicas; thus, what I label 
‘cognitive internalism’ seems false since it requires the conclusion that Oscar and Toscar are 
cognitively identical. This is why Putnam famously claimed that ‘meanings just ain’t in the 
head!’^ “
Now apply this to what Adamjs says. Oscar’s belief ûidiX there is water [H2O] in a glass is, 
as a matter of necessity, different from Toscar’s belief that there is water [XYZ] in a glass. We
356 Putnam (1975).
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can make the same point, imHatis mutandis, for any propositional attitude. Given that Adams 
thinks that ‘good’ is a rigid designator which tracks resemblance to God across all possible 
worlds we cannot hold both that his account is correct and that there is a common cognitive 
content between Earthlings and w4 inhabitants. If there were no God in w4, then w4 inhabitants 
cannot think, hope, believe, etc. anything about good [resemblance to God]. Hence, Adams 
ought to have reasoned as follows:
... there is still, I suppose, a possible world, W4, in which there would not be a loving God 
but there would be people to whom W4 would seem much as the actual world seems to us, 
and who would use the word “wrong” much as we use it... We cannot however say that 
they believe, as we do, that cruelty is wrong, that is to say we cannot say that the 
subjective psychological state that they express by the ascription is the same as we 
express -  they express different subjective psychological states.
This highlights the implausibility of Adams’ semantic position. For instance, do we really want 
to be committed to the claim that we cannot say that w4 inhabitants believe, as Earthlings do, 
that cruelty is wrong purely because on Earth there is a God and on w4 there is not? It is, at 
least, not obvious that we do. Hence, questions (3) & (4) are ‘open’, and that, as such, the 
revised OQA successfully challenges Adams’ account.
In conclusion, the OQA is not about epistemic possibility but about semantic practice -  
as demonstrated by our linguistic intuition. Perhaps, though, Adams could respond that the 
comparison with Boyd’s account is too close. There is a significant difference between the
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accounts such that his is more plausible. It seems to me that the only way to establish such a 
conclusion would be to claim that because God is beyond human knowledge a test based on 
closing epistemic possibility is bound to be unrepresentative. Thus, we cannot justify this 
version of the OQA. I find such a response unconvincing; the ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment 
does not rely on us ever coming to know that water is H2O. It simply supposes, as a thought 
experiment, that we do in fact know that water is H2O. Hence, unless Adams can show that we 
can not even stipulate that Good is resemblance to God, he can not show this response to be 
viable. Hence, one can apply Horgan and Timmons’ OQA to Adams’ account.
However, if we had to pick between Adams’ and Boyd’s accounts, it is Boyd’s which 
seems more plausible. Consider the claim that water is metaphysically identical with H2O. 
Initially we can specify an a priori conceptual claim concerning water, which specifies water’s 
nominal essence. The scientists then investigate, and eventually discover, a posteriori, the real 
essence which fits this specification -  H2O. Importantly, it is because the discoveiy is made a 
posteriori that the identity ‘water is H2O’ is synthetic yet necessary. Boyd’s account adopts the 
same methodology; he starts with an a priori conceptual claim concerning good, and then the 
appropriate people investigate, and eventually discover, which homeostatic cluster of natural 
properties fits the role. Boyd can then make a synthetic yet necessary identity claim between a 
moral property and the discovered homoeostatic cluster of natural properties. It seems unlikely 
to me that a similar analogy is available to establish Adams’ account.
Just as in Boyd’s account, Adams’ position starts with an a priori conceptual claim 
concerning good. Once this is in place, to secure the analogy Adams would have to claim that 
we discover a posteriori property that fulfils this role. However, talk about a posteriori
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discovery seems out of place when talking about God. Surely, we do not think that an empirical 
investigation of the world could lead to the a posteriori discovery that good is resemblance to 
God. More likely, in such a case we would talk about revelation and insight rather than 
discovery. Obviously, the epistemological status of beliefs about revealed truths concerning God 
is controversial. However, it is clear that such claims are closely connected to faith, and that as 
such we do not have a posteriori knowledge of them. I suggest that if we expose two people 
with the same physiological capabilities to the same descriptive information then one may and 
one may not ‘discover’ that good is to resemblance to God. We are not forced to conclude that 
in this instance one must be mistaken, or needs to ‘properly’ consider the descriptive 
information. It is more correct to claim that people know good is resemblance to Good, a priori. 
However, a priori conceptual claims about ‘good’ make up its ‘nominal essence’. Hence, good 
being resemblance to God is something that Adams ought to think figures in the characteristics 
that ‘fix the reference’ of good, rather than being something that is discovered a posteriori. 
There then seems to be a fundamental problem for Adams’ semantic framework, even before we 
consider the OQA.
§3. Coïicliisioü
Philosophers have often thought that the ‘openness’ of open questions reflect human’s 
cognitive limitations. That is, we find questions open because we do not, or cannot, fully grasp 
the nature of moral properties. Hence, his Murdoch claims:
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Good is indefinable not for the reasons offered by Moore’s successors, but because of the
357infinite difficiilty o f  the task o f apprehending a magttetic but inexhaustible reality.
Similarly, Frank Jackson claims that he can reject the OQA because it relies on moral properties 
being ‘mysterious’ and ‘unknowable’; where in fact they are not.^^  ^However, it is our semantic 
practice which grounds the openness of open questions and hence it is a mistake to think the 
OQA is based on epistemic possibilityConsequently, Adams’ account is not at an advantage 
over naturalism by claiming that good is a supernatural property. In fact, no account can 
adequately respond to the OQA by arguing that moral properties cannot be known.
357 Murdoch (1970; 42).
358 Jackson(1998: 151, 167).
359 See chapter IX
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(VIH)
DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF MEANING AND TEE OQA
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain whether the OQA challenges a dispositional 
account of meaning, I argue it does. The chapter does not contribute to the general enquiiy into 
moral naturalism but addresses a side issue.
§1 Sophisticated Dispositionalism
A dispositional account of meaning can be ‘simple’ or ‘sophisticated’. The latter is the 
stronger position and will be the focus of this chapter. However, to better understand it I briefly 
outline simple dispositionalism.
Dispositionalism claims that there is a natural fact — a categoricah base - in virtue of 
which ascriptions of meaning, such as “Andy means addition by ‘+ ’”, are either true or false.
It argues then that meta-semantic claims are truth-apt and have truth-makers. Simple 
dispositionalism claims that such a sentence is true when Andy is disposed to respond to the 
relevant arithmetical queries with the sum of the numbers involved. For example, “Andy means 
addition by ‘+’” is true when Andy answers ‘4 ’ when asked to compute ‘2+2’, answers ‘10’ 
when asked to compute ‘5+5’, etc. The problem with such a simple account is that it cannot 
distinguish between competence and perfbnnance.
360 Interestingly, Stuart (1998) argues tliat dispositions need not be thought of as natural tacts. However by ‘disposition’ I 
mean a categorical base which brings about certain behaviour.
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Andy is not omniscient, and has not always given the correct answer in summing 
numbers. So, mistakes in calculation were part of his performance in summing numbers. Thus, 
according to the simple dispositionalist “Andy means addition by ‘+’” is true in virtue of Andy 
not only answering ‘10’ to ‘5+5’, but also answering ‘8’ to ‘2+1 ’ and ‘100’ to ‘56 + 43’, etc. Of 
course, intuitively we want to exclude these two answers but this is exactly what simple 
dispositionalism cannot do - it fails, as it cannot allow for mistakes. Hence, I reject simple 
dispositionalism.
If there were a way of distinguishing between competence and performance then such a 
simple refutation of dispositionalism would not be available. By introducing an ideal condition 
clause, the sophisticated dispositionalist claims that this is possible. It is not that “Andy means 
addition by ‘+ ’” is true when Andy is disposed to respond to the relevant arithmetical queries 
with the sum of the numbers involved. It is true when he is so disposed to do so under ideal 
conditions, the basic thought being that Andy would not make mistakes; he wouldn’t answer ‘8’ 
when asked ‘2+1’, under ideal conditions. We can outline sophisticated dispositionalism as 
follows:
(SD) Andy means addition by ‘+’ = Given ideal conditions (of the environment and of Andy), 
when asked to compute ‘x+y’, Andy is disposed to produce the sum of the two numbers.
If (SD) is correct then there is a natural fact in virtue of which “Andy means addition by ‘+’” is 
either true or false, and the distinction between competence and performance can be preserved.
361 This is controversial, but I assume it is true.
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Saul Kripke has suggested a number of reasons why sophisticated dispositionalism 
fa ilsH o w e v e r , I won’t discuss all these. I shall focus on the ‘nomiativity argument’ and 
argue that (i) if it were successful then it would challenge sophisticated dispositionalism; but (ii) 
its crucial premise relies on a traditional account of the OQA and hence fails. In the next section, 
I argue there are two other forms of the OQA that justify the normativity argument.
Suppose that Andy means addition by ‘+ ’. What is the relation of this to the question: 
how will Andy respond to the problem ‘68+57’? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive answer: 
if Andy means addition by ‘+’, then Andy would answer ‘125’. However, Kripke argues that the 
relation of meaning to future action is normative not d e sc rip tiv e .If  Andy intends to accord 
with his past meaning of ‘+’, he should answer ‘125’. The main ideas here can be set out:
(1) The best the dispositionalist can say is this: under ideal conditions Andy M’ould 
respond with such and such a number to each addition sum.
(2) However, Andy’s meaning addition by ‘+ ’ determines what answer he should give, 
not what answer he would give. Meaning facts are normative facts, while dispositional 
facts are descriptive facts.^*’'*
(3) Descriptive facts cannot license evaluative claims.^^^
362 See Kripke (1980).
363 Kripke (1982: 24 -  37).
364 By ‘meaning fact’ I mean the facts tliat determine which objects satisfy a predicate, as meant by a speaker at a time. 
Furthermore, the satisfaction conditions of a predicate are detennined by a propert}^ to which the predicates bear a certain 
relation. Whether an object satisfies a predicate is determined by whether the object exemplifies the property to which the 
predicate bears this relation. Zalabardo (1997; 468).
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(4) It is not the case that Andy’s meaning addition (or some other function) by 
is constituted by his ideal dispositions with the sign. [From (1), (2) & (3)] 366
This argument is valid; however, does this mean that sophisticated dispositionalism ought to be 
rejected? That depends on whether the argument is sound.
For the sake of argument I assume that (1) is true. (2) claims that dispositions are descriptive 
facts, this also seems correct. After all, we have already granted that dispositions are natural 
facts.^^  ^ However, (2) also claims that meaning facts are normative facts, or meaning facts 
determine what answer should be given. This too seems correct; after grasping the meaning of a 
term we think that this somehow ‘tells’ us how we ought to apply the term in the future. What 
does the ‘ought’ mean in this instance? It seems to be, at least, something like this; if you want 
to apply the term correctly, then use it in this way. The meaning of a predicate ‘contains’ the 
conditions of correct use. As Boghossian puts it:
Suppose the expression “green” means green. It follows immediately that the expression 
“green” applies correctly to these things (the green ones) and not to those (the non­
greens). The fact that the expression means something implies, that is, a whole set of 
normative truths about my behaviour with that expression: namely, that my use of it is 
correct in application to certain objects and not in application to others... The normativity
365 One cannot justify inferring evaluative conclusions from descriptive premises.
366 Note; I will use ‘ideal disposition’ as shorthand for ‘disposition under ideal conditions'.
367 The categorical bases which when appropriate conditions obtain manifest behaviour.
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of meaning turns out to be, in other words, simply a new name for the familiar fact that 
... meaningflil expressions possess conditions of correct nse^^^
At this stage I do not want to engage in the discussion concerning whether this is the most useful 
way of understanding normativity, but merely assume that (1) and (2) are true. The soundness of 
the normativity argument then depends on (3). Why might one think that one cannot justify 
drawing evaluative conclusions from descriptive premises?^^^
One answer may lie in the fact that dispositions are finite, whereas the question of how 
we would use an expression, in principle, should receive an answer in infinitely many cases: 
conditions of correct use cover a potentially infinite number of cases.H ow ever, it is not clear 
why this fact would justify premise (3). This is demonstrated by making explicit the implicit 
premises in this way of proceeding:
... that the finiteness of dispositions follows from the descriptive character of 
dispositional facts, and... that it is in virtue of its normative character that the question of 
how I should apply a predicate has to receive an answer in infinitely many cases.^^^
It is unclear whether either of these claims is true.^^  ^Hence, I assume that the finiteness 
of dispositions cannot justify (3).^ ^^  Jerify Fodor suggests that the most likely account of why (3)
358 Boghossian (1989: 129).
369 In terms of dispositionalism, why tliink tliat ‘the descriptive character of claims about speaker’s dispositions and tire 
normative character of claims about how they should use linguistic expressions invalidates inferences from tire former to tire 
latter’? Zalabardo (1997: 471).
370 The ideas concerning finiteness are taken from Zalabardo (1997).
371 Zalabardo (1997:472).
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is thought to be ti'ue is the He argues that a form of an ‘open question’ argument
supports the reasoning behind such claims, and it is precisely for this reason that the normativity 
argument fails to challenge his version of semantic naturalism.^^^ He writes:
In short. I’m not clear how -  or whether -  "open question” arguments can get a grip in 
the present case. I am darkly suspicious that the Kripkensteinian woriy about the 
normative force of meaning is either a non-issue or just the reduction issue over again; 
anyhow, that it’s not a new issue.^^^
If Fodor is correct, then what supports the claim that we cannot draw evaluative conclusions 
from descriptive premises is the OQA. How a speaker would apply a predicate under ideal 
conditions cannot be the fact that constitutes how he should apply it, because we can 
meaningfully ask whether the applications that he would endorse under ideal conditions are the 
ones that he should endorse. However, Fodor suggests that if this is what supports the 
normativity argument then it fails, because:
The problem is that proponents of naturalistic reductions of semantic notions see their 
task as on a par with other theoretic reductions, such as the identification of water with
372 As Zalabardo cites, Fodor (1990: 94 -  95), argues tlial dispositions need not be thought of as finite.
373 Equally, the fact tliat sophisticated dispositionalism has problems specifying ideal conditions non-circiüarly will not 
show why we ought to accept (3). The standard noimatmty argument is meant to challenge sophisticated dispositionalism 
even if a specification of ideal conditions were available.
374 Fodor (1990). Zalabardo (1997) argues that, in tire end, (3) is notlring more than Flume’s claim tliat one cannot derive 
and ‘ ought’ from an ‘is’. Hume (1978: 469). Flo wever, as noted in chapter (II) this understanding of Hie OQA would not be in 
line witli Moore’s OQA.
375 Fodor (1990: 135).
376 Fodor (1990: 136)
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H2O or heat with kinetic energy... No doubt we can meaningfully ask whether water is 
H2O, but the meaningfulness of this question doesn’t undermine the identification of 
water with H2O -  the claim that whether something is water is determined by whether it 
has that molecular structure. Similarly, semantic naturalists would concede that we can 
meaningfully ask whether a speaker should ascribe a predicate to the objects to which he 
would ascribe it under certain conditions. But the meaningfulness of this question, they 
would contend, doesn’t undermine the claim that how the speaker should apply the 
predicate is determined by how he would apply it under those conditions.
The sophisticated dispositionalist sees his account ‘on a par with theoretical reductions’: Andy 
means addition by ‘+’ is the fact that when asked to compute ‘x+y’, Andy is disposed, under 
ideal conditions, to produce the sum of the two numbers. But that ‘Andy means addition by 
does not mean, ‘when asked to compute “x+y”, Andy is disposed, under ideal conditions, to 
produce the sum of the two numbers’. The OQA fails to support the essential premise in the 
normativity argument as it assumes that property identity requires synonymy. It therefore fails to 
challenge sophisticated dispositionalism.
In the next section I argue that there are two versions of the OQA which can be applied to 
non-analytic naturalism, and hence that they support the premise in the normativity argument. I 
claim that as such we ought to accept the conclusion that it is not the case that Andy’s meaning 
addition (or some other function) by ‘+’ is constituted by his ideal dispositions with the ‘+’ sign.
377 Zalabardo (1997 ; 476 -  7). I argue against this way of understanding the task of explaining predicate reference in the 
next chapter.
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§2 Can the OQA Support The Normativity Argument?
I argue that there is justification for (3) via the OQA, and hence the normativity argument is 
both sound and valid. To understand this we need to be aware that what the OQA shows is that 
dispositional facts cannot jiistify responses; it is the connection between normativity and 
justification that renders the OQA a genuine challenge to sophisticated dispositionalism.
For the sake of argument, assume that for a meaning fact to justify my response to a 
addition sum, it must tell me how to respond. The argument I present is that the OQA suggests
(3) is true because our dispositions cannot tell us what applications to endorse. To see why this 
is the case consider another question: ‘why would typing ‘2+2’ in a calculator be a justified 
procedure for answering the sum, whereas rolling a die would not be?’ Whether a given 
procedure for answering additions questions is justified can be expected to depend on which 
facts determine how addition questions should be answered, and on how the procedure is related 
to these facts. There are two ways of understanding this relation.
First, if we start from an account concerning which facts determine how we should 
answer ‘2+2’, then from this we can generate a criterion of adequacy for the procedures that we 
may want to use for answering ‘what is 2+2?’ one that, for instance, would rule out die rolling 
and ‘rule in’ calculator use.
Second, if we start from a hypothesis concerning which procedures are justified, then this 
will generate a criterion of adequacy for accounts of which facts determine how ‘2+2’ should be 
answered.
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... the facts that play this role will have to be related to those procedures in such a way as 
to render them justified.^^^
Therefore, on this second way of proceeding, how the facts that determine how to answer ‘2+2’ 
are related to using a calculator, for instance, will help us answer why this procedure is justified, 
whereas die rolling is not.
For the sake of argument I assume that the correct approach in discussing justification in 
relation to sophisticated dispositionalism is the latter kind of criterion. In order to assess 
sophisticated dispositionalism we need to start from a hypothesis concerning which procedures 
are justified, and this will generate a criterion of adequacy for accounts of which facts determine 
how ‘2+2’ should be answered. That is, the fact that determines how Andy should answer ‘2+2’ 
has to be related to the procedures that Andy actually employs for answering these questions in 
such a way as to render the procedure justified.
One plausible account argues that a procedure for answering ‘2+2’ is only justified if it 
involved conscious engagement with the fact that determines how addition questions should be 
answered. The thought behind this is an internalist account of epistemic justification, a view 
summed up by John Greco;
... the conditions for justification must be appropriately internal to the knower's 
perspective. Roughly, something is internal to S's perspective so long as S is aware of it 
or could be aware of it merely by reflecting.^^^
378 Zalabardo (1997:479).
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Accepting internalism, we can set up an OQA that challenges sophisticated 
dispositionalism. The sophisticated dispositionalist claims that the fact that determines how 
questions such as ‘2+2’ should be answered by Andy is the disposition he would have under 
ideal conditions. Hence, Andy’s response to ‘2+2’ is justified if it involved conscious 
engagement with ideal dispositions. However, it is an open question whether the way that Andy 
responds to addition sums is the way he would under ideal conditions. Hence, the 
dispositionalist is forced to conclude that facts about ideal dispositions cannot determine how 
Andy should respond to ‘2+2’. This version of the OQA is as follows:
(1 *) The procedures that Andy uses for deciding how to respond to ‘2+2’ must be 
justified.
(2*) The procedures that Andy uses for deciding how to respond to ‘2+2’ would only be 
justified if they involved conscious engagement with the facts that determine which 
response Andy should give.
Andy decided how to respond to ‘2+2’ by considering what Andy would do under 
ideal conditions, then it would be a closed question for Andy whether under ideal 
conditions he would in fact respond in the way he did.
379 Greco (2000:181).
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(4*) It is an open question whether under ideal conditions Andy would in fact respond in 
the way he did.
(5*) Andy decides how to respond to ‘2+2’ without considering whether he would do so 
under ideal conditions (from (3) and (4))
((54)if facts about how Andy would respond under ideal conditions determine which 
response he should give, the procedures that Andy use for deciding how to respond 
would not be justified (from (5) and (2))
(7*) Facts about how Andy would respond to ‘2+2’ under ideal conditions do not 
determine how 1 ought to respond.
Thus, it seems that Fodor was wrong to dismiss the OQA so quickly. Even given that the 
sophisticated dispositionist bases his account on identities such as ‘H2O is water’, there is a 
challenge. Hence, using the OQA, we can assert that the following argument is sound and valid:
(1) The best the dispositionalist can say is this: under ideal conditions Andy would 
respond with such and such a number to each addition sum.
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(2) However, Andy’s meaning addition by ‘+’ determines what answer he should give, 
not what answer he would give. Meaning facts are normative facts, while dispositional 
facts are descriptive facts.
(3) Descriptive facts cannot license evaluative claims.
(4) It is not the case that Andy’s meaning addition (or some other function) by ‘+’ is 
constituted by his ideal dispositions with the ‘+’ sign. [From (1), (2) & (3)]
There are two main ways that the sophisticated-dispositionalist could respond to this. First, he 
could reject (1*) and claim that the procedure that Andy uses to decide how to answer ‘2+2’ 
need not be justified. This however seems very radical; it holds that all responses are ‘stabs in 
the dark’, and that we might as well pick a number from a hat as type the sum in the calculator. 
If the dispositionalist is forced to accept this then, I suggest, this is a good reason to reject his 
account.
More promising would be for the dispositionalist to claim that Andy does not require 
conscious engagement with the facts that determine what answer he should give for his response 
to be justified. Given this, it is -  the argument would continue -  no surprise that it is an open 
question to Andy whether the way that he responded was the way he would have done if he were 
under ideal conditions. After all, it is not transparent to him that his procedures track the 
disposition. To adequately assess if we can reject internalism requires an in depth discussion of
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epistemic extemalism and related issues -  something I do not enter into. However, I think there 
are reasons -  highlighted by the OQA - why it is problematic to reject (2*) and to claim that 
Andy’s responses are justified because his procedures for responding to addition sums reliably 
track the facts that determine how the questions ought to be answered.
The version of the OQA which will support this claim challenges the assumption that the 
dispositionalist can, without complication, argue his position is ‘on a par with theoretical 
identities.’ This version relies on my discussion of Horgan & Timmons in chapter (VII). Recall 
that they argued that we could generate an open/closed distinction when considering theoretical 
identities. Horgan and Timmons suggest that linguistically competent agents who reflect on 
‘Twin Earth’ thought experiments would claim that these questions are ‘closed’:
(5) Given that the use of ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind H2O, 
is liquid L, which is H2O, water?
(6) Given that the use of ‘water’ by humans is causally regulated by the natural kind H2O, 
is liquid L, which is water, H20?^ ^^
If the analogy between sophisticated dispositionalism and theoretical identities holds, then 
we should be able to write suitably altered question that are also closed. Here is my attempt at 
this.
3 80 This is as opposed to the questions (i) Liquid L is H 20, but is it water? And (ii) Liquid L is water, but is it H20?, which 
are 'open’.
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(7) Given that the use of “Andy means addition by ‘+’” by humans is causally 
regulated by Andy being disposed to produce, when asked to compute ‘x+y’,
the sum of the two numbers under ideal conditions. Is Andy’s disposition identical 
with Andy’s meaning addition by ‘+’?
(8) Given that the use of "Andy means addition by ‘+’” by humans is causally regulated 
by Andy being disposed, when asked to compute ‘x+y’, to give the sum of the two 
numbers; is Andy’s meaning addition by ‘+’ identical with Andy’s disposition?
If sophisticated dispositionalism is correct then a competent speaker who reflects on (7) & (8), 
and who taps into his own linguistic competence ought to judge that the answer to these 
question is obviously ‘yes’. I suggest, however, that they would not, and that a suitably altered 
version of the Twin Earth demonstrates that our semantic intuitions do not ‘close’ (7) & (18). 
This shows that the dispositionalist cannot, without qualification, claim his position is ‘on a par 
with theoretical identities’. Consider a ‘Semantic Twin Earth’ thought experiment.
On Earth Andy exhibits behaviour that common sense takes to maxiifest meaning addition 
by "+ ", and on Twin Earth Twin-Andy exhibits exactly the same behaviour. However, they 
differ in their disposition; that is, in the ‘categorical base’ underlying their identical behaviour. 
Call the base on Earth E, and on Twin Earth TE. Now, assume that an Earthian visits Twin Earth 
and on observing Andy’s behaviour say ‘Andy means addition by ‘+” . There are two possible 
ways of describing this situation.
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If sophisticated dispositionalists are correct we would expect our intuitions to be as 
follows. When the Earthian makes his pronouncement on what Andy means, he makes a 
mistake, for he refers to the categorical base E and not TE. Moreover, if the Earthian talks with 
the Twin Earthian about whether Andy means addition by ‘+’, they are talking at ‘cross- 
puiposes’. They mean different things by their claim that ‘Andy means addition by ‘+” .
The second way of describing things is that given the behaviour of Andy and Twin Andy 
is the same, they both exhibit behaviour that common sense takes to manifest meaning addition 
by “+ Then the Earthian and Twin Earthian mean the same by ‘Andy means addition by 
and there can be genuine disagreement between Earthians and Twin Earthians.
I judge that the second way is the most natural way of describing the thought experiment, 
as ‘Andy means addition by plus’ is warranted so long as the behaviour is fbund.^^  ^Hence what 
this suggests is that we are not predicating any particular categorical property in predicating it; 
that is, even given that our ‘+’ talk is causally regulated by some underlying physical property E, 
it is still and open question whether the property E -  the property of meaning addition by ‘+’. If 
this is the ca:se then it ‘gets things wrong’ for the semantic naturalist who sees his task on a par 
with other theoretical reductions. If they are ‘on a par’ then reflection on this thought experiment 
ought to generate intuitions analogous to those generated in Putnam’s thought experiment. That 
is, that Semantic Twin Earthians and the Earthians mean something different.^^^ It seems then
381 Even so, the meaning of ‘Andy means addition by ‘ +”  cannot be reduced to Andy’s behaviom-. See tire next chapter for a 
rejection of sticli a reductionist strategy.
3 82 There is anotlier puzzling side to this, one tliat I do not discuss. If ‘Andy means addition by can be analysed in terms 
of Andy’s possessing some intentions and beliefs about tlie usage o f ‘+’, tlien we have an identity between meaning tliat and 
having tliese intentions/behefs. Yet, I doubt tliat tlie OQA challenges üiis identity: that is, between meaning sonietliing and 
having such-and-such beliefs and intentions. Meaning something is indeed having certain beliefs and intentions. So does tlie 
proposition tliat X has tliese intentions and beliefs entail some normative proposition? That is, i f ‘meaning is normative’ tlien
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that the meaning of ‘Andy means addition by ‘+” depends on the similarities in the behaviour 
across worlds, rather than identity in the categorical bases which are manifest in such 
behaviour/^^
Thus, one can state a revised OQA that challenges the sophisticated dispositional 
account;
ROQA: Revised Open Question. Argument: Questions of the form (9) and (10) are open 
questions.
That is, closing the epistemic possibility does not ‘close’ (9) and (10), they remain ‘semantically 
open’. If this is correct, and the sophisticated dispositionalist cannot respond to it, then they have 
to accept the truth of (3). Furthermore, given that the other premises are true, and the argument 
is valid, they would have to accept the conclusion of the normativity argument.
(1*) The best the dispositionalist can say is this; Under ideal conditions I 
would respond with such and such a number to each addition sum.
(2*) However, my meaning addition by ‘+’ determines what answer I should
are certain beliefs and intentions normative? It seems plausible to answer ‘yes’. In which case the OQA, if sound, would 
challenge Hie identity between having tliose beliefs and intention and being in some physically characterised state.
383 But this does not mean that one can reduce ‘meaning’ to such similarities.
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give (i.e. the answer in accord with the function I mean), not what answer I would 
give. In other words, meaning facts are nomiative facts, while dispositional facts 
are descriptive facts.
(3 *) From the revised OQA, a set of descriptive facts cannot entail that 
another set of facts (here, my uses of the sign) are correct or 
incoiTcct. In other words, descriptive facts cannot licence normative 
facts.
Therefore,
(4"^ ) It is not the case that my meaning addition (or some other function) by
‘+’ is constituted by my (ideal) dispositions with the ‘+’ sign. [From (1*), (2*) 
& (3*)].
Notice also that Horgan & Timmons’ adapted argument does not just hold for 
dispositional accounts. Specifically, OQA would challenge any semantic naturalist position 
according to which semantic terms bear some relation R to certain natural properties, and 
semantic terms refer to the natural properties to which they bear this relation R. In such cases, 
one could reconstruct a similar ‘Semantic Twin Earth’ thought experiment by rewriting the 
causal role in terms of the relation R. For example, Jerry Fodor’s asymmetric dependency
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account of meaning would stand challenged by this approach.^ '^  ^As with the discussion in the 
moral case there are three possible responses that the semantic naturalist could make to this 
version of Horgan & Timmons’s OQA.
First, they could deny that Horgan & Timmons’s account describes a genuine possibility, 
and so hold that our intuitions have no evidential weight. This response fails, as it is too strong. 
It would require defending the conceptual impossibility of such thought experiments. Given the 
‘Semantic Twin Earth’ scenario is intelligible, this would incur an overwhelming burden of 
proof.
Second, they can argue that altliough (9) & (10) are ‘open’, there is no guarantee that they 
will stay this way; a categorical base may end up ‘closing’ them. Apart from an unrealistic 
optimism, this response fails because it disregards the fact that Horgan & Timmons’s OQA is a 
general argumentative sltxtlegy. The naturalist cannot argue against them by simply asserting -  
without further argument -  that eventually their position will be vindicated.
Third, they can argue that people’s intuitions about ‘Semantic Twin Earth’ are simply 
mistaken, and hence do not undermine causal semantic naturalism. After all, brute intuitions do 
not settle the matter by themselves. However, responding like this would again place a great 
burden of proof on the semantic naturalist. He would have to demonstrate why the intuitions 
concerning ‘Semantic Twin Earth’ could be categorised differently from those concerning 
‘Twin Earth’. He would have to account for why people’s meaning-intuitions about meaning are 
so strong and widespread, even though they are allegedly mistaken. I suggest none of these three 




I argued that the most reasonable dispositionalist accounts is a sophisticated one, as this avoids 
problems to do with competence and performance. However, this position is threatened by the 
normativity argument, though in its original form, this seems unable to challenge dispositionalist 
accounts that see their identities ‘on a par with theoretical identities’. However, even granting 
this, two forms of the OQA do present a challenge. This in turn means that the sophisticated 
semantic dispositionalist cannot dismiss the normativity argument but is challenged to accept its 
conclusion: it is not the case that my meaning addition (or some other function) by ‘+’ is 
constituted by my (ideal) dispositions with the ‘+’ sign. I conclude that when applied to 
dispositional accounts of meaning, the OQA is a genuine argumentative device.
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
In § lof this chapter I draw the main conclusions of the previous eight chapters. In §2 and 
§3 I briefly give an account of the moral theory I think we should adopt in light of these. In §4 I 
draw some conclusions.
§1. Conclusion.
I started the thesis with a discussion of G. E. Moore’s OQA.^^  ^It quickly became apparent that 
Moore’s presentation of his ideas are confused. His open question argument relies on his 
conception of analysis, phenomenology, metaphysics and epistemology. All of which were 
problematic. I then used three modern interpretations of the OQA to show that although Moore’s 
OQA should be abandoned, there is something of value in his argument; in the words of 
Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, I argued that Moore was ‘on to something’. T h e  main 
outcomes of these three accounts are first that the ‘open question’ argument is, at best, a 
challenge and not a ‘knock-down’ argument. We should note that people we judge to be normal, 
do, in fact, find the argument compelling. Second, that the OQA only challenges those accounts 
which hold that property identity requires synonymy. Out of the three accounts discussed, I 
developed Darwall, Gibbard and Railton’s (DGR).^^  ^ Their proposal relied on there being a 
conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation, and a conceptual connection
385 Moore (1993).
3 86 Daiwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992). 
3 87 Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992).
187
between something being right and practical reason. I argued that their former argument fails, as 
there is no such conceptual connection between judgement and motivation. However, 
considering the link between them did pose a challenge to the analytic naturalist. That is, for the 
analytic naturalist to secure the truth of his reduction he would have to demonstrate that 
naturalistic judgements have the capacity to motivate in and of themselves. I suggested that it is 
hard for the naturalist to do this, and that this is the first account of why the OQA is a genuine 
argumentative device. I then moved to discuss DGR’s second claim. I found this argument more 
convincing than the last, because there is a conceptual link between something being right and 
there being reason to do it. This conceptual connection thus has to be respected by the analytic 
naturalist. However, our intuitions suggest that there is no conceptual connection between 
judging that (|)-ing would produce N  and the judgement that one has any practical reason to (j). 
Thus, the second challenge fi’om the OQA is this. Either the analytic naturalist has to 
demonstrate why there is no conceptual link between something being right and practical reason, 
or he has to account for why people have the convictions they do.
I then turned my attention to non-analytic naturalism, which is thought to be immune to 
open question arguments. Non-analytic naturalists argue that the open question argument relies 
on the premise that property identity requires synonymy, but that their account shows this to be 
false. I considered two recent non-analytic positions, Peter Railton’s and Richard Boyd’s.^ ^^  I 
argued that there is a version of the OQA which challenges both these accounts. The OQA that 
challenges Railton’s account turns on the fact that his naturalisation of normativity is 
incomplete. Questions concerning Railton’s account are ‘open’ because his account fails to
388 Railton (1986a), (1986b) and (1989), and Boyd (1988).
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recognise the role of ideals for people. Possible selves inform our decisions, and the notion of 
possible selves requires the ability to change personality. This is something that Railton’s 
account rejects.
I rejected Boyd’s account because once we close epistemic possibility, the semantic 
intuitions which are meant to support Boyd’s account fail to do so.^ ^^  Furthermore, if we 
consider our referential intuitions with moral terms this demonstrates that identities between 
moral properties and natural properties are not like theoretical identities. The third and fourth 
conclusions were then that the OQA challenges methodological, substantive naturalism, and it 
challenges those naturalistic accounts which draw an analogy with theoretical identities.
I then considered supernaturalism. The thought was that perhaps such an account could 
avoid these conclusions. Any position which claims that moral properties are beyond our 
knowledge will leave questions concerning the account open. However, by closing epistemic 
possibility and considering referential intentions I demonstrated that this position is also 
challenged by the OQA. This led me to the fifth conclusion; the OQA is not to do with 
epistemological possibility, but to do with our semantic practice.
Then I discussed another naturalist account, but this time in terms of semantics. I was 
interested in whether the normativity of meaning meant that the OQA challenges sophisticated 
dispositionalist accounts of meaning. I concluded that it does. The main reason is that there is no 
way of justifying the sophisticated dispositionalist claim that their identities between semantic 
facts and dispositional facts are on a par with theoretical identities. This, then, was my sixth 
conclusion.
The same argument also applies to Railton’s account.
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In light of these six conclusions, arrived at via a discussion of the OQA, there are two 
options. Perhaps we ought to develop a more sophisticated naturalist account, or perhaps we 
should adopt a non-reductive moral realism, or a non-cognitive account. Maybe we will be able 
to revise and develop such positions so as to respect all that has been said thus far. I do not 
discuss this possibility here. The other way of proceeding is to tiy to give an account that avoids 
reductionism and realism, but respects the six conclusions noted. I consider this option and 
suggest that the lesson of the OQA is that we ought to adopt moral nominalism, or so I shall 
argue.
§2. Nominalism
This section is a tentative suggestion as to how we might develop a position in response to the 
conclusions drawn thus far. I call such a position ethical nominalism. First, I discuss an account 
of predicate applicability that supports ethical nominalism and second, I argue that such a 
position should explain our application of moral predicates in terms of those spontaneous 
inclinations to apply them that arise from our conscience.
There is a version of ethical nominalism which is clearly false. It holds that moral 
predicates are applicable to states of affairs just in case speakers feel inclined to apply them. Its 
implausibility lies in the fact that such a view fails to take into account two fundamental aspects 
of our moral practice - features that the OQA makes perspicuous. Specifically, a predicate as 
meant by a spealcer can be applicable to something even though the speaker is not inclined to 
apply that predicate to that thing; and a predicate may not be applicable to something even 
though a speaker may feel inclined to apply it to that thing. Henceforth, I eschew this version of
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‘nominalism’ and attempt to develop another. The view I discuss can be summed up as follows: 
the applicability of moral predicates can be explained solely in terms of speakers’ feeling 
inclined to apply predicates to some situations and not to others, but we cannot define moral 
predicates in terms of these inclinations. I argue that such a position can demonstrate why moral 
predicates seem beyond definition - as highlighted by the OQA - and that because such an 
account does not rely on moral properties it avoids epistemological and metaphysical worries 
associated with moral realism. First, though I develop an account of predicates applicability 
which supports ethical nominalism.
G. E. Moore was right, but for the wrong reasons, when he wrote that ‘good’ is 
indefinable.^^^ Discussion concerning why ‘good’ cannot be defined has been guided by an 
assumption: to resist moral realism one has to show that moral predicates can be defined in 
terms of speaker’s inclinations to apply them: for example, in terms of their inclinations to apply 
‘good’ to that which we desire to desire. However, I have argued that a proper understanding of 
the OQA undermines the idea that moral predicates can be reduced in such a way. It is no 
surprise, then, that moral realist positions have emerged, and that, for instance, such positions 
compare moral terms with natural kind teiTus. After all, philosophers such as Saul Kripke and 
Hilary Putnam have provided good reason to conclude that we cannot define natural kind 
predicates, and this is supposedly, what we are looking for in our moral predicates.W hether 
‘water’ is applicable to an object is not determined by what verdict on the matter our ‘water’ 
applying procedures support. Its applicability is not dependent on whether ‘liquid’, ‘clear’.
390 Moore (1903).
391 Kripke (1980) & Putnam (1975).
191
‘tasteless’, etc. are applicable to it. We cannot give a priori necessary and sufficient conditions 
for natural kind predicates. Hence, given the assumption - accept either reductionism or realism 
- philosophers give a realist account of the applicability of natural kind predicates. Whether 
‘water’, ‘salt’, etc are applicable depends on the presence of certain properties, H2O, NaCl etc. 
Hence, given that; (i) the OQA shows that ‘good’ is not definable; (ii) our practice with moral 
predicates is similar to our practice with natural kind predicates; (iii) we hold the assumption 
that we accept either reductionism or realism, then we should adopt a form of moral realism. 
The OQA forces us to account for the applicability of ‘good’ by postulating a property whose 
presence in, or absence from, states of affairs determines its applicability.
What this clarifies is that we can resist realism whilst respecting the OQA by rejecting 
the assumption that we must accept either reductionism or realism so construed. Arguably, we 
could accept the claim that ‘good’ is indefinable whilst avoiding the metaphysical and 
epistemological worries surrounding moral realism.
Consider one attempt to define ‘good’.^ ^^  One way to ascertain whether something is 
good is to ask whether it would give us pleasure. It is clear that not everything that gives us 
pleasure is good; hence, one would introduce other factors to make the definition more 
plausible. In that way, we may aivive at the view that the ‘good’ is whatever gives us pleasure 
when we are under certain conditions. However, I argued above that this commits us to an 
unacceptably strong conclusion. It is surely not a contradiction to apply ‘good’ to situations 
where these conditions do not apply. For instance, say we define ‘good’ as ‘that which gives 
pleasure to those who are statistically psychologically normal’. Do we really want to conclude
392 The position in the example is naïve, but tlie point holds.
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that there is only one answer to the question ‘does the fact that the majority of people gain 
pleasure from something make that thing good?’ that avoids contmdictionl Surely, we do not. 
Perhaps, then, we would attempt to introduce some other conditions into the definition; for 
example, idealised epistem ologydefining ‘good’ as ‘that which gives epistemologically ideal 
agents pleasure’. This seems more plausible than the last account but, ultimately, it is not 
satisfactory as it is still an open question whether something which gives some 
epistemologically ideal person pleasure is in fact good, or so I have argued.^ "^^
Of course, there are other ways the reductionist can, and does, respond to this type of 
worry. However, the repeated application of the OQA to more complex definitions highlights a 
problem for reductionism. The reductionist attempts to define ‘good’ as meant by an agent, in 
terms of other predicates of his which are connected to ‘good’ by further beliefs of his. 
However, what the OQA demonstrates is that a definition is only successfril when a belief 
connecting ‘good’ with that definition has the feature that it cannot be given up without thereby 
changing the applicability conditions o f ‘good’; call such foundational. For example, we
cannot give up the belief connecting ‘good’ with ‘what an epistemologically ideal agent would 
gain pleasure from’, without thereby changing what counts as the applicability conditions for 
‘good’. My suggestion is that what the OQA highlights is that there can be no foundational 
beliefs connected with ‘good’. There are no beliefs that connect ‘good’ with a definition, which 
when given up would change the application conditions o f ‘good’.
3 93 This is the way tliat Railton proceeds. See chapter V.
394 See specifically chapter VII. Here I argue tliat the open question challenge does not rely on our epistemic status.
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Notice also that the problem is not that a particular agent has none of these foundational 
beliefs in relation to ‘good’. Any beliefs are going to be equally révisable. Furthermore, notice 
that even if we are positive we have such foundational beliefs this is not enough .D efin ing  
‘good’ in terms of the predicates to which it is linked by these beliefs may not result in a 
satisfactoiy account of the applicability of the predicate because our beliefs about which beliefs 
count as foundational are themselves not foundational. Assume that we arrive at a number of 
beliefs we thought to be foundational beliefs involving good; it is always possible that we will 
decide that they are in fact not foundational, and that we should give them up.
Assume, then, that the OQA demonstrates that there are no foundational beliefs 
connected with ‘good’. As such, the realist may conclude that his position is vindicated. A 
property that determines the applicability condition of ‘good’ need not coincide with any of the 
properties that determine the applicability condition of other predicates in any proposed 
definition. ‘Good’ might, for instance, be a rigid designator referring to such a property 
irrespective of which beliefs we hold. This, though, does not avoid the challenge of the OQA. 
Specifically, it fails to take in to account the difference in referential intentions between moral 
predicates and natural kind t e r m s . I n  light of these points, I discuss whether another account 
could capture the fact that ‘good’ cannot be defined.
The OQA shows that our practice with ‘good’ is dynamic. At any one point in time, we 
will have a criterion for answering the question ‘is this good?’ Moreover, we do not arrive at
395 For instance, Jackson is positive tliat he has such beliefs. See my discussion of Jackson in chapter IV.
396 See specifically chapter VI and my discussion of Richard Boyd’s Moral Realism.
397 It is unclear to me whether we should characterise this position irrealist or not. The issues sunounding the 
characterisation of realism are highly complex spasming a vast amount of hterature. Simply put, tliough, a moral ‘irrealist’ 
rejects a metaphysically robust account of moral properties. The paradigm example of tlie type of metaphysical outlook Üie 
moral irrealist rejects is Robert Adams’ account discussed in chapter VII. Perhaps a usefiil way of putting my position tlien is 
not irrealist, but anti-Platonist.
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such a criterion for no reason; we aie informed by other beliefs about what counts as a reliable 
indicator of something being good. In light of these beliefs, we may change our criterion and 
thus how we attempt to answer the question ‘is this good?’ Yet, we do not think our new 
criterion changes the meaning of the question; we believe the new answers to the questions we 
arrived at with our new procedure are better verdicts on the same subject matter. Say, for 
example, that the criterion we used for answering the question ‘is this good’ was to ask our self 
‘Would Jesus do this?’ We have adopted this criterion because we think it is a good indicator 
allowing us, we believe, to dwell on God’s will. However, say that we loose our faith and come 
to believe that the best criterion to decide on what counts as good is whatever gives us most 
pleasure. Hence, we decide that the best criterion is not asking ‘what would Jesus do’, but 
asking ‘what would give us most pleasure?’ As such, we have adopted a new criterion for 
deciding what is good, based on our new belief about what counts as a good criterion. Moreover, 
we do not think that, in light of our hedonistic criterion, we are now answering a different 
question; we think that the meaning of the question ‘is this good?’ remains the same. The point 
is that any belief concerning which criterion is most appropriate is révisable.
However, we do at least think our verdicts on ‘is this good?’ can improve. From our 
standpoint, within our practice with ‘good’, we think that we can improve at detecting what is 
good. However, just because we have made revisions it does not mean they are revision in the 
‘right directi o n A f t e r  all, later we may conclude that we are actually worse now at detecting 
good than we were at some time in the past. In fact, this outcome is as possible as our 
concluding that a new way of deciding whether something is good is an improvement. What is
398 See Quine (1951).
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more, the same goes for our belief that a change in our ‘good’ involving beliefs leaves the 
applicability conditions o f ‘good’ unchanged.
What this shows, and what the OQA makes clear, is that our practice with ‘good’ is 
variable. This is why we cannot define ‘good’, for to do so successfully would require a ‘cross 
section’ of such a dynamic practice. This failure does not mean that realism is the only option. 
My suggestion is that all we can say concerning the meaning of the question ‘is this good?’ is 
that it is a question we attempt to answer by means of révisable procedures; I discuss this in 
more detail below. In addition, all there is to be said about those things to which ‘good’ is 
applicable is just that ‘good’ is applicable to those things which the questions that we attempt to 
answer by means of these procedures should receive a positive answer. However, as I have 
suggested, for this approach to be as plausible as moral realism, I have to show how it can 
capture those features of our practice with the predicate ‘good’ for which only realists thought 
only they could account.
One thing that the OQA has shown is that the conclusion that any application of ‘good’ is 
correct by definition is counter-intuitive. This is something that the reductionist fails to capture. 
For instance, if we define ‘good’ as ‘that which gives pleasure to x’, then if x feels pleasure then 
the application of ‘good’ cannot fail to be correct. The realist has the ability to resist this counter 
intuitive conclusion, as what counts as a correct application of ‘good’ depends on the 
instantiation of a property which we may fail to track accurately. The account under 
consideration can also give the result that the application o f ‘good’ is not correct by definition, 
as it carries no commitment to the idea that ‘good’ is definable. However, where it differs from 
realism is that the inability to define ‘good’ is not accounted for in terms of a property that we
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fail to track. It is simply our practice with ‘good’ to always leave open the possibility of revision 
in the procedures that we associate with ‘good’ which would leave its applicability conditions 
unchanged, but would force us to change our verdicts on the matter.^^  ^Given this, we can say 
that the ‘fact’ we are trying to track with the question ‘is this good’ will always remain one step 
ahead of our trying to answer the question, for the possibility will always remain open that we 
will revise these procedures without changing the meaning of the question. Nevertheless, ‘fact’ 
here is not a commitment to the moral facts that the moral realist invokes to account for such a 
practice with ‘good’; it is used in a trivial and non-metaphysical sense.
Another feature of our practice with ‘good’ is that we think that some revisions of our 
procedures for applying ‘good’ would change the conditions under which we can apply it, while 
others would not. Again, the view I am considering can make room for this. Speakers associate 
with ‘good’ certain ways of ascertaining which changes in procedures leave their applicability 
conditions unchanged. However, these ‘ways of ascertaining’ are also révisable. On this view, 
the meaning of questions concerning whether the application condition o f ‘good’ are the same is 
explained along the same lines as the meaning of questions concerning whether something is 
good. They are the questions that we attempt to answer by means of our révisable interpretive 
procedures. As in the case of the question ‘is this good?’ this account does not entail that the 
verdicts on sameness of applicability conditions supported by our interpretive procedures are 
correct by definition. For the possibility always remain open to revise our interpretative
399 Notice tJiis expresses tire same idea as conclusion five in § 1.
400 Obviously, I will have to show that this is not a mere verbal manoeuvre; I do not discuss this here. For a convincing 
starting place for such an account, see Skorupski (1999).
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procedure which in turn would force us to modify earlier verdicts while leaving the meaning of 
the question ‘does this have the same application conditions?’ unchanged.
As it turns out then this view can capture certain features of realism which are 
highlighted by the OQA, without us having to countenance good as a robust metaphysical 
property. Of course, on this account we could rephrase the question concerning whether ‘is this 
good?’ is meaningful as a question concerning whether there is a property whose instantiation 
conditions determine the applicability of ‘good’. Similarly, we could rephrase the question 
whether ‘good’ is applicable to a state of affairs as the question whether the property, if any, that 
determines the applicability condition of ‘good’ is instantiated by the state of affairs. However, 
this would be a sense of propeiiy that does not commit us to a certain metaphysical outlook and 
hence such a move would not desei*ve to be called realist on my discussion."^^  ^ Although this 
raises a number of highly important questions concerning how best to characterize realism, anti- 
realism, and irrealism, I do not discuss these here. The important claim is that there is a way of 
accounting for the applicability of the predicate ‘good’ which does not subscribe to an account 
of moral realism as characterized in chapters V, VI and VII.
There is a final woriy concerning the account under consideration which arises from 
one view concerning the goal of a theoiy of reference. Assume that ‘good’ imposes a condition 
on states of affairs because it represents the world as being thus and so. What this means, on one
401 Discussing a similar position, Zalabardo writes tliat our practice witli predicates; ‘ is not characterised by a puritanical 
rejection of lire metaphysical ideology tliat attends semantic notions on the realist picture. What sets it apart from tlie realist 
approach is the order in which semantic and metaphysical notions are construed. The realist starts from a notion of property 
and its instantiation conditions, and goes on to explain the notion of predicate applicability in terms of a link between 
predicates and tliese antecedently available entities... [Whereas the view under consideration] starts by construing tire rrotion 
of predicates applicability in terms of tire procedures tlrat we errrploy for answerirrg applicability questiorrs. Oirce tire notion 
of predicate applicability has been construed hr tlris way, he goes orr to construe tire notion of tire property (if any) whose 
hrstantiation corrditions we are trying to track with our applications of a predicate as a by-product of the semantic notion.’ 
Zalabardo (1996: 149)
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theoiy, is that whether ‘good’ is applicable depends on whether the state of affairs satisfies this 
condition. There have to be facts concerning what has to be the case with respect to a state of 
affairs in order for ‘good’ to be applicable to it. However, what this view actually commits us to, 
is two notions of fact. One refers to the facts we assert with our application of ‘good’, the other 
refers to facts concerning the applicability conditions of ‘good’ that make it possible to assert 
facts with our application of them. The theoiy of predicate applicability that I reject is one that 
claims we must specify for ‘good’ what has to be the case with respect to a state of affairs in 
order for ‘good’ to be applicable to it. This position does not have to specify for every moral 
predicate what has to be the case with respect to a state of affairs for a moral predicate to be 
applicable to that state of affairs. I argue that, in fact, all we need to provide is an account of 
how conscience inclining us to apply ‘good’ can give rise to the notion of correct and incorrect 
applications of ‘good’. I suggest that this is all there is to be said about the notion of truth and a 
forteriori about the notion of predicate applicability and the propeiiy that determines the 
applicability conditions for ‘good’.*^^^
§3.Conscience and Nominalism: My proposal is that we take this account of predicate 
application as con ect, and explain the meaning of the question ‘is this good?’ by reference to 
speaker’s conscience.
The nature of conscience is complex and my account of it is highly tentative. Roughly, 
we can understand it in terms of those impressions of what is right or wrong, good or bad which
402 For an interesting discussion concerning how such an account of trutla may be developed see for example, Skorupski 
forthcoming, and Horgan & Tiimnons (2000a).
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give rise to inclinations to apply moral predicates. It is what it is like for us when we feel 
inclined to apply ‘wrong’ to pictures of children being blown to pieces in American air raids; it 
is M>hat it is like for us when we feel inclined to apply ‘wrong’ when we hear the local BNP 
party canvassing.
Although I do not discuss the notion of conscience in detail, it is essential that we clarify 
what it if for something to be an impression of what is right or wrong, good or bad. What 
impressions of what is right or wrong, good or bad are not are some inner mental objects - if we 
fail to grasp this then the position under consideration fails to be distinct from realism."*^  ^To 
think the contraiy is to make something that is essentially subjective, objective. If we think like 
this then it will be mysterious how we could be infallible as to whether we really do have the 
impressions that characterise conscience. The point is, we should think of the impressions not as 
things in the sense of mind-independent objects. Such impressions are not like a table, for 
example, which has its own intrinsic inherent properties independent of what we think. 
However, it would also be wrong to think that the impressions have no reality -  they are not 
nothing.
The important point for the nominalist proposal under consideration is that we are 
infallible in our apprehension of such impressions that make up our conscience. It is never an 
open question whether we are really having the impression that something is right or wrong, 
good or bad. How, then, could our impressions of what is right or wrong, good or bad which 
characterise our conscience -  i.e. those impressions of what is right or wrong, good or bad
403 In tliat it introduces a universal, albeit a mental one, which is the reterent of the general term ‘good’. This conception of 
qualia is also discussed by Zalabardo (2001).
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which incline us to apply moral predicates - be infallible? The answer lies in how we just 
characterised such impressions. We should not think of the apprehension of the impressions as a 
cognitive enterprise. Our verdicts on their presence are not infallible because we are somehow 
too close to them for mistakes to arise, or just Jo brilliant at arriving at our verdicts on their 
presence. The reason is that facts about impressions of what is right or wrong, good or bad are 
constituted by the verdicts that we feel inclined to emit.
Notice that this does not make our inclinations arising from our conscience arbitraiy. I 
am not free to choose which impressions I feel inclined to emit. For instance, I am not equally 
inclined to apply ‘good’ to child sacrifice as I am to keeping promises, just as I am not inclined 
to change my judgement that Hitler is ‘evil’ after a hearty lunch.
Furthermore, notice that this does not render our verdicts on the presence of impressions 
of what is right or wrong, good or bad immune to revision. I might, for instance, discount my 
inclinations before lunch because I recognise that I was delirious with hunger. Alternatively, I 
might recognise that my inclinations to apply ‘good’ to Enoch Powell, but not Hitler are 
inconsistent, and hence form a new inclination. The important point is that the revisability of my 
inclinations to apply ‘good’ arise because one inclination is cancelled due to my forming 
another.
Consider how these points about conscience might relate to predicate application. 
Suppose that when I was young my parents tried to teach me how to apply the predicate ‘good’. 
To do so they show me a picture of a man helping an old lady across the road and said ‘good’, 
and they point out that sharing food with my brother is ‘good’, etc. Suppose that, after a year 
and thousands of examples, I feel I can recognise the impression of what is good in my
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conscience that inclines me to apply ‘good’. I think I can recognise in my experience what 
counts as the application conditions for ‘good’.'*^'*
Given that I want to claim that we can explain the applicability of ‘good’ purely in terms 
of conscience, there are two different ways of proceeding. The first way would involve defining 
‘good’ in terms of my impression of what is good; hence, whether ‘good’ is applicable to a 
situation is determined by my conscience when I consider that situation. Assume that on the 30^ 
of May my conscience inclines me to apply ‘good’ when I consider giving money to charity, 
keeping promises and not killing. I wake the next day to find that that my conscience inclines 
me to apply ‘good’ to stealing, setting fire to cats and public torture. Now, given that we are 
infallible in our apprehension of the impression of good, then if 1 think that I am experiencing 
the same impressions on the of June and the 30^ of May then I am. Moreover, we are forced 
to accept the counter-intuitive conclusion that my new verdicts concerning stealing etc. are 
correct.
There then arises a problem for this reductionist proposal, for this is not how we think of 
our practice with the predicate ‘good’. When we say that something is ‘good’, we want to allow 
for the possibility that we are mistaken, and that the things in May were good whereas the things 
in June were not. We want to be able to say this even if everyone's conscience inclines them to 
apply ‘good’ to the states of affairs that ours does in both May and June. The practice of 
applying ‘good’ must respect the fact that it is an open question whether ‘good’ is applicable to 
a state of affairs. However, on this first view this is not possible, as whatever I am inclined to
404 Notice again that if qualia cannot be thought of a distinct objective things; for then gi asping the application conditions 
would amount to apprehending a universal -  we would be realists.
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say, goes. Hence, it seems, via the OQA, that the attempt to define ‘good’ in terms of our 
conscience is implausible.
However, if we jettison the claim that holds that to explain the application of ‘good’ in 
terms of the impression of what is good requires us to define ‘good’ in terms of that impression, 
then ethical nominalism looks more plausible. I have shown in the last section an account of the 
applicability of ‘good’ that shows that such an account is possible. I argue that we can explain 
the applicability of ‘good’ in terms of conscience without introducing a reduction of ‘good’ to 
the impression of what is good.
Importantly, such a position would not entail that our application of ‘good’ must be 
correct. How would such a position work? Well, we can specify the relationship between moral 
predicates and impressions of what is right or wrong, good or bad in a similar way to how we 
characterised the relationship between ‘good’ and the predicates that describe speakers’ ‘good’- 
applying procedures. True, I am infallible about the impressions of good that I now associate 
with ‘good’, but the association itself is révisable. I may for instance, conclude that the 
impression of what is good in my conscience should no longer be, or in fact never should never 
have been taken as a reliable indicator of the applicability o f ‘good’.
On such a position then even though my verdicts on the presence of the impression of 
what is good is right by definition, it is always a significant and meaningful question whether 
my verdicts on the applicability of ‘good’ are correct. The presence of the impression in my 
conscience associated with a state of affairs leaves open the question of the applicability of
‘good’.
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What this provides then is a rough description of how an ethical nominalist could account 
for moral predicate applicability without facing the difficulties that invalidated the other 
accounts. We can explain the application of ‘good’ purely in terms of the agent’s conscience. 
But his verdicts on the applicability o f ‘good’ would not be treated as correct by definition since 
the pairings of impressions of what is good with ‘good’ are always open to revisions that leave 
the applicability conditions o f ‘good’ unchanged.
This means that we have an account that respects the OQA and as such avoids the 
problems I discussed concerning reductive accounts. In addition, it does not introduce the 
problems associated with moral realism: the metaphysical, epistemological and semantic worries 
which I have discussed above. For instance, such an account would not need to draw any 
comparison between moral terms and natural kind terms as Richard Boyd does, nor would it 
have to invoke a Platonic account of good as Robert Adams does."*^  ^ We avoid the pitfalls of 
realism and reductionism whilst respecting the lessons learnt from the OQA.
§4. Conclusion.
In this chapter, 1 attempted to develop an account that I felt was most plausible in light of the 
OQA. I developed an account of predicates applicability tliat fitted between reductionism - 
which construes the notion in terms of speakers’ inclinations - and realism, which construes the 
notion in terms of properties. I attempted to develop a position of predicate applicability that 
explains the notion in terms of inclinations, while rejecting the idea that this explanation should 
take the form of a reduction. I presented this suggestion as a vindication of ethical nominalism.
405 Boyd (1988) discussed in Chapter VI, and Adams (1999) discussed in Chapter VII.
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as it explains predicate reference solely in term of the notion of conscience; by which I mean 
those impressions of what is right or wrong, good or bad that incline us to apply moral 
predicates. I suggested we ought to define such impressions in terms of speakers’ inclinations to 
classify things as good, right wrong etc. I concluded that this account is the one we ought to 
adopt in light of the proceeding chapters.
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